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Abstract 
Critical Theories of Antisemitism 
Distinguishing between different ways of thinking about antisemitism, this study 
concentrates on those theories that understand antisernitism as a uniquely modern 
phenomenon. Covering the period from the mid-19th century to the present day, it 
first examines the work of Marx and Nietzsche and then moves on to those theorists 
who wrote in the immediate aftermath of the holocaust and concludes with the 
postmodern writings of Bauman and Lyotard. It argues that these critical theories of 
antisemitism all relate the emergence of antisemitism to modern forms of political 
emancipation and questions the impact of the holocaust upon this body of thought. 
The study argues that the fluidity and open-endedness by which the early writers 
characterise modernity - most notably the ambivalence within modernity itself 
between the possibility of full emancipation and barbarity - comes to be replaced by 
an increasing pessimism that sees antisernitism as modernity's only possible outcome. 
It argues that this change is accompanied first by increasing the centrality of 
antisemitism to modernity, and also by defining more rigidly the concepts by which 
antisemitism is explained, most noticeably, the concept of "the Jews". This study 
argues that as a result of these interrelated developments, critical theories replicate 
many of the assumptions of the antisemitic worldview identified in the early works. 
By calling for a cautious and critical return to these earlier ways of explaining 
antisemitism, the study concludes by pointing to an approach that remains within the 
tradition of critical theory, but which re-establishes the critical distance between ways 
of accounting for antisemitism and the phenomenon itself - one in which the "Jewish 
question" is de-centred, the explanatory concepts reopened to question and the 
promise of emancipation reinvigorated. 
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Preface: Letter From Shylock' 
Venice, 1597 
My dear friend, 
The little news that reaches me here is resplendent with tales of love. Love, how that 
little word sticks in my throat! I am told that at Belmont, the palace of that fair and 
gentle Portia, love reigns supreme; such perfect and ideal love. The love of husband and 
wife, Portia and Bassanio, Lorenzo, and, oh, how that pains me, my daughter Jessica, 
and the love of friends, Antonio and Bassanio. How they must spend their days in idyllic 
bliss, without a care in the world. And yet, my dear friend, only I know what all these 
lovers and friends know themselves but do not dare acknowledge - that love has a price, 
that love has a cost. And who has paid for their love? Me, Shylock, the one who was 
once known as Shylock the Jew. And how have I paid? With my money, my religion, 
and my future. Without exaggeration, I could even say that I have paid for their love, 
their happiness, with my own life. 
And how did this bitter-sweet tale come to pass? This I shall tell you, and in so telling 
leave out nothing - nothing - including the part I myself played in my own downfall and 
in their victory. 
A few months ago, the noble Bassanio came to visit me. He requested three thousand 
ducets. Why he wanted them at the time I did not know. It later came to my knowledge 
that he needed them so as to have the means to court the woman of his heart, Portia. He 
needed my money for his love! for his happiness! Yet, do you hear a word about this 
part of the story, about how I furnished him with the money so that he was free to love? 
About how Jewish money paved the way for that most perfect of loves? Oh, how much 
more I shall tell you of this association of Jewish money and Christian love. 
1 This preface has been published in [ 1997] 2 Law and Critique 215-222 
Needless to say Bassanio, who knows how to spend money, but not how to produce it, 
was not in a position to make any kind of deal with me. I have since heard it told that, 
Antonio the merchant, of whom I shall tell you a great deal more, had already given him 
- given, do you note, not lent, but given, and given out of friendship, out of love! - had 
given Bassanio a great deal of money so that he could invest in ventures. Apparently, he 
had asked Antonio to give him more, but Antonio was unable to. 
But, and here lies the first of many infamies, do you know what justification Bassanio, 
this paragon of virtue, gave to Antonio in requesting yet more of his friend's money? I 
shall tell you. He pleaded his request by arguing that since Portia had been bequeathed a 
great fortune, and since whoever won her would gain control of that wealth, both the 
later gift and the earlier one would be repaid a hundred fold. So much for the purity of 
love. These Christians, these merchants, they treat the affairs of the heart as if it were a 
business deal. Yet, it is the Jew that bears the weight of that assumption! 
Be that as it may, Antonio was not in a position to give his friend the funds he needed so 
as to satisfy his heart's desire. His money was idle, tied up in goods sitting on ships in 
the middle of the ocean. The two were left, despite themselves, to come to me. To ask 
me for the money, to ask me to furnish the cost of Bassanio's love. 
When they came to see me, Bassanio did not mention even a word in my presence about 
his love, nor about the potential return that such love was to furnish. I suppose that they 
thought that love was an alien notion to me. What little they know! I know only too well 
about love, but I keep it in its place. Unlike those noble compatriots, Bassanio and 
Antonio, who speak of love in the same breath as profit, I keep the two firmly separated. 
Love is for the heart, money for the pocket. 
Bassanio, perhaps because of the intensity of his feelings, his need to stand a chance to 
win his hearts's prize, was pleasant enough toward me in asking me to lend him the sum. 
True, I heard in his voice his hatred with which he treats a Jew, but, what's the news in 
that! As I have said, I do not lend out of love, but out of calculation. But my calculating 
mind knew that his coffers were empty. On his own, I would have refused him without a 
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second thought. But, and such a small word for such a great consequence, he then 
assured me that Antonio would stand surety. 
F 
Antonio, Antonio. Oh, how long I had waited to catch him on the hip. He was not like 
the other Christians that I have dealt with, either as friend or client. He hated me, but he 
hated me in a novel and original way. He is unlike those Christians who hated me for 
their usual reasons, killing their Lord, and for refusing the truth of the "one true 
religion", etc., etc.. That is their only reason for despising me, even while they knew that 
I was necessary for them. 
I was necessary to give them money to live, since in the way they lived, they could 
make none of their own; they used money to consume - no more, no less. Apparently, it 
goes against their Church for them to make money make money. Even in their hatred of 
me and my people, we remained a part of their lives and their world. But, not so to 
Antonio and his new breed of merchants. 
Antonio and his kind believe that they have found a way around their Church's 
prohibitions. Instead of money making money through interest, money makes money for 
them through profit. A fine distinction! Tell inc my dear friend, what is the difference 
between buying cheap and selling dear and charging interest on money lent? Is it not 
true that in both ways the recipient gives back more to the provider than the provider has 
laid out? Ah, you might say, but the man who provides the goods still needs us Jews to 
give those that buy the money to purchase what is supplied them in this way. That is not 
the case. And why is that not the case? I shall tell you. 
The merchant faces those that come into contact with him in two ways - as a buyer and 
as a seller. First, he buys what they have made with his own money; then he takes those 
goods and exchanges them with others that a another merchant has acquired in the same 
way, and - this part is so clever that I do not know why a Jew did not think of it - he sells 
those goods back to the same people who made them originally, but this time for a far 
greater price. In this way, money constantly reproduces itself through the work of people 
who make things themselves, but who then buy those things back as if they did not 
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make them or had ever seen them before. The trick of the merchant is to keep the people 
blind in this way, so that they can take the difference between the price at which they 
buy and that for which they sell. 
You can see, my dear friend, why, for them, there is no place for the Jew. Our money, 
even when lent out for interest, merely remains as money and comes back to us as 
money. Unlike these Christian merchants, money does not suddenly turn into something 
else that pretends it is not money. Antonio calls our money, our Jewish money, "barren". 
How can it be barren if it breeds in the way of more money? 
For all his talk of refusing to be "neither a lender or borrower", he came to me for a loan. 
A loan, not for business you understand, but for love! How fragile is his new practice! 
He talks of money "breeding", but how successful is the intercourse when his money, or 
as he calls it, "his goods" sit nowhere other than in the bright blue sea, at the mercy of 
the heavens and of the pirates? No, he still needs us Jews and our money. Or so I 
thought.... 
Yes, he needs our money, but all of it.... and now. His new way of making wealth 
depends on all the people buying and selling. Because all people do not do this, he is 
limited. He also runs the risk that all his money could disappear in one rough night on 
one rough ocean. If only I would have understood his merchant's situation. I would have 
acted so differently. 
In the end Antonio robbed me. He and his like robbed me of all my money. If they had 
cone like thieves in the night and taken it, at least that would have been open and, dare I 
say, honest. But such an action they would see as unchristian. Instead, the stole it with 
deceit; they stole it in the name of love - they stole it in the name of their Lord; and I 
was a party to it. 
When I saw Antonio come into my house ready to make an agreement, my heart leapt. 
"Now I have him", I thought, and I did. But, oh, how I missed my chance; how stupid I 
was. If only I had acted as a Jew! Instead I acted as a Christian; can I now complain that 
I was judged like a Christian? 
As you know, I lend money free of favour. What do I care about the person who stands 
in front of me; what do I care if he is Jew, Christian or Moor, whether he be left-handed 
or right-handed. All I care is that the person is good; and by "good", all I mean is that he 
is good for the debt. I sit as with an equal and discuss the agreement, and sign, seal and 
deliver it within the bond. If the debt cannot or will not be met when it is due, then I go 
to court, appeal to the law and expect, nay, demand, that the law treat me as I have 
treated it, with respect and with justice. That, as you more than other know, my dear 
friend, is the Jew's greatest and most magnificent achievement - the creation of the law, 
and the subservience of all in the face of it. Where, I ask you, would the world be, 
without this greatest of miracles? 
If I had acted under the law in my dealings with Antonio, what a different story could 
now be told. Knowing that his ventures were at the mercy of the gravest of risks, and 
knowing the desperation of his love for Bassanio, I could have charged whatever interest 
I wanted with such a forfeit that, had his ships been a day late, he would have been 
ruined, and it would have been my satisfaction to see that day. 
But, oh, what a fool I was. In front of me I saw, not a man like all others, not a man of 
more or of less means, but Antonio -a Christian and a merchant who had made enemies 
of me and my and my people. My passion obstructed my vision and my thought. 
I could not see that in baiting him, it was he who set the trap and that I walked into it as I 
said, blindly but with my eyes wide open. These Christians, what do they know of 
setting prices and charging interest justly, according to the law, free of personal 
involvement. No, they sneer at interest (as if it were different from profit! ) and, so he 
tells me, they give money in the spirit of friendship and love. Indeed, in their new 
merchant's corporations they set their prices in agreement one with the other and 
measure it not by justice in the face of the law, but by love in the face of their Lord. Oh, 
how this elite and the rabble act in the same way. 
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That was the next step in my own undoing. I, Shylock the Jew, blasphemed against our 
own law, and acted as a Christian. In place of the justice inherent in our law, I was 
willing to use the cover of the law to wreak vengeance, but under the thin veneer of 
kindness, friendship and love. It was only later that I realised just how strong was the 
relation of Christian love to Christian vengeance. 
I told Antonio that I would deal in kindness with him, contrary to my legal and just 
habits. And, in this so unjewish way of dealing, I thought I would be better at being a 
Christian than Antonio! What a mistake I made. 
I told him that in the spirit of friendship I would forsake all interest and, should the debt 
not be met, merely ask for a pound of his flesh. Of course, I knew that this would mean 
his death; what I did not realise was that I 'was staking my life as well. 
The day of the forfeit finally arrived. In the meantime, my daughter Jessica eloped with 
a Christian and took on his religion. This event compounded my desire for vengeance to 
that which I felt toward that Christian-merchant Antonio. 
I went into court that day with vengeance in my heart, but, of course, to me and to the 
court I pleaded that vengeance in the name of justice. After all, I argued, the date for 
repayment had arrived, the money could not be returned to me, so, as the law demands, I 
must be allowed to take my pound of flesh from him as was written in the bond to which 
Antonio agreed and signed as a freeman. 
The judges, those trained in the law, and only the law, despite some whining for 
clemency, had no alternative but to agree that I was in the right. All victory was to be 
mine. It is then that Portia arrived on the scene; asked by the court to arbitrate. Why 
could not they themselves decide? Surely, the law is the law? 
Oh, how Christian love appears! Did she come into court dressed as that which she was 
- love and virtue? No, she came in (as did I) as a charade; she came disguised as a 
lawyer. What chance did law and justice, those noblest of Jewish values, stand in the 
face of her Christian values of love and revenge? 
Oh, what pretence of justice she made! I should have seen what was about to be visited 
on me. In the guise of Justice she asked, not Justice's question, who was defendant and 
who was plaintiff? Instead, she asked who was merchant and who was Jew? As if she 
did not know the answer! She continued her masquerade as the blindness of law when 
she pretended not to see the difference between me in my gabardine and the merchant in 
his finery. 
Still masked, in this court of law, she then, with eloquent words, pleaded with me in the 
name of mercy and charity. Oh, those vile Christian virtues through which their love of 
man is met. What have I, a man of the law, to do with love or mercy? What does a Jew 
know of love. I do not love my fellow man, I have too much respect for humanity to 
love a man. I treat a man with respect, as my equal, no matter who he is. Because of my 
lack of love, a lack I am proud of, can I, a Jew, show mercy? Nay, to show that noble, 
Christian virtue, you need to be above another, to patronise him with your pity. If I am 
above a Christian, it is in the name of justice. I demand justice, I expect to be judged 
according to it, not according to love. 
But, if the truth be known, what justice could I demand? Had I not given up my right to 
justice when I bargained with Antonio in the name of friendship, but with a heart of 
vengeance? Had I not made a mockery of law when I attempted to force into it what 
does not belong there? Can I complain that I was treated in the same way? 
How quickly, Christian mercy turns to vengeance, yet all in the name of love! At my 
refusal to show "love for my fellow man", how speedily, love turned to hate. How fast I 
was to suffer the violence of love spurned. 
Using legal arguments full of spite and malice, Portia, that gentle lady, spat out her 
decision. I may take my flesh, but not a drop of his blood must be spilled. The flesh was 
mine, the blood was his - as if the two could be separated. One of us had to yield, and, in 
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the face of this court of love and vengeance, it was to be me. And so the precedent was 
set. 
Not content with permitting her to make judgement, they then left it to Portia to speak of 
punishment. And what punishment. Not the punishment of law and of justice, such 
notions had flown out of the room, chased by the spirit of love! It was the punishment of. 
love: all I had was to be its own. One half was to the state, to Venice, the other half to 
Antonio. I had been robbed in Portia's court of all I possessed. 
Once dispossessed in this manner, what use did they have for a Jew? To show the 
measure of my new worth, they told me who I really was and who they really were. I 
was told that I was an alien who had threatened the life of a citizen, and must pay 
accordingly. An alien! All my life I had lived in Venice, entering into contacts, paying 
taxes, yet, I was called an alien. But was I an alien of the state, or was I an alien of a 
community of love? Or had one become the other? Love and vengeance had overcome 
law and justice, and, dressed in its mantle, continued to act. but with such a different 
heart. 
In this name of love, so unlike that of justice which stands between the wrongdoer and 
the wronged to temper the feelings of vengeance, in love's own name, the one wronged, 
Antonio, was to extend further humiliation. In his blend of Christian love and merchant 
avarice he made me the trustee of my own money. For whom was I to hold this money 
so it earnt all the more, but without its true owner becoming visible? I was to hold it for 
my Christian daughter and her Christian husband until my death. If for no other reason, 
how I desire to live forever! 
Finally, Antonio confronted me as the victor faces the vanquished. I lay before him and 
waited. He could take my life if he so desired. After all, what is a Jew to him after his 
money and his law has been stolen. And took my life lie did; but in a oh, so gentle, 
Christian way! Speaking out of mercy he killed nie by bading me become Christian. By 
this simple act of death and resurrection, was I no longer to be a Jewish alien in a 
Christian world? 
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I could stand no more and left that room of deceit, trickery and hypocrisy. 
How, I wonder, my dear friend will this tale be told to those not present? 
Will Portia and Bassanio lying in their bed of sublime love, readily admit the tricks they 
played? Will they acknowledge the role of the Jew of whom they so kindly disposed, in 
allowing them their peace and happiness? And will Bassanio ever tell the fair Portia that 
he sought to woo her, not only for her love, but so as to use her wealth to repay Antonio 
for his first "gift"? 
When Antonio is thanked by Lorenzo and Jessica for the money he has procured for 
them, will he tell them, will he tell himself, of the cost to himself that lay behind that gift 
of love? Or will he see the Jew in himself even as he congratulates himself for killing 
Shylock, the old Jew? 
And will all of the nations of Christianity ever realise that for them to live in ideal love 
and communion among themselves, as one perfect community, so as to create their 
Christian heaven on earth and call it the "world of justice"; that for such a prize 
somebody else will need to be seen to pay for their earthly sins, including, of course, the 
sins of human necessity? And pay we do! Will it now always be us, my dear friend, will 
it from this day, be the Jews, who pay this cost of Christian love, and who will be the 
water in which they cleanse their vengeance when they find, time and time again, that 
they themselves must wash their dirty Jewish hands so as to keep their Christian hearts 
clean. 
As for me, I left the court and found that I had done as they willed. I had already become 
a Christian. But tell me, am 1, now with a simple act of baptism, with the rule of a 
Christian court, more of a Christian or less of a Jew than I was before. As I walk with a 
cross around my neck, speaking to my noble fellow Christians in words of love and 
mercy, I shall never forget what else has been taught me - that vengeance is love by 
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another name. Yes, my friend, I was killed as a Jew, but no more than Antonio a 
Christian. Who now can separate the flesh from the blood? 
Introduction: Critical Theories of Antisemitism 
Ever since the term "antisemitism" first appeared in print in Germany in 1860,2 there 
have been questions as to how its emergence should be explained. For some thinkers, 
it was explained as "old wine in new bottles". From this perspective, antisemitism 
represented a new form of the old, even ancient, phenomenon of Jew-hatred. For 
others, its emergence in Germany meant that antisemitism was a specific and uniquely 
"German problem". Both of these perspectives are not only current today, but also 
appear to be gaining increasingly wide popular support. 3 Norman Cohn4 for example, 
relies upon religious animosity and anti-Judaism to explain antisemitism, and Daniel 
Goldhagen's recent work', Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
holocaust explicitly indicts Germany in the birth of modern antisemitism. 
I believe that part of the reason for the currency of these theories is the lack of 
challenge with which they present their audience. In the former case, once 
antisemtism is seen as "eternal" it takes on the aura of a "law of nature" and, as such, 
any praxis to counter and, finally, to eradicate it is seen as futile. From the perspective 
'- "The term was first used in 1860 by a Jewish writer, M. Steinschneider in a polemic against Ernest 
Renan. It next appeared in 1879 with Wilhelm Marr's "Anti-Semites' League". The abstract term "anti- 
semitism came into use soon after". Paul Lawrence Rose, [1990; 288] 
These perspectives are discussed in Chpater I below. 
Cohn, N. (1967) Warrant for Genocide London: Eyre and Spottiswoode 
Goldhagen, D. (1996) Hitlers 1 filling Grecutioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust London: 
Little, Brown and Co. 
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of the antisemite, it leads to the conclusion that "the Jews" can never truly be part of 
wider society as long as they remain Jews. Even if they were to renounce their 
Judaism, their "true nature" would always make a mockery of such membership. 
From the perspective of some Jewish groups, it gives legitimacy to their perception of 
the "outside" world as hostile and to the belief that the only safe place for a Jew is 
Israel or within one of the various "self-defence groups". For the religious Jewish. 
right, the only refuge that can be provided is a return to an orthodoxy that treats any 
form of social progress as suspect. 
Paradoxically, this theory reproduces the worldview of antisemitism itself. First, it 
replicates the antisemitic idea that the categories of antisemitism, of an alleged 
impenetrable barrier between Jews and non-Jews, reflect an empirical reality. 
Secondly, it leads to a discussion of the false and pernicious question of "Who is a 
Jew"; a question that has only ever been the concern of antisemites and the Jewish 
religious right. Finally, this view culminates in the "essentialising" or "racializing" of 
both Jews and non-Jews, a practice that can result in the most terrifying consequences, 
such as apartheid, "ethnic cleansing" and the murder of millions of individuals alleged 
to be of the now despised "race". 
Whereas the "eternal antisemtism" theory leads to the idea of a hostile world, the idea 
that antisemitism is a specifically "German" problem leads to the opposite conclusion. 
Hermetically sealing antisemitism within the "tradition" of one specific nation-state, 
all those outside it can feel safe and secure with their own "national traditions", free 
from any responsibility. This (false) security is the basis for insisting that Germany be 
asked to carry forever the "guilt" of their past and be treated as a criminal eternally on 
probation. The consequences of such a general abdication of responsibility can never 
be guaranteed before hand. 
There is also another body of theory to explain the emergence of "modern" 
antisemitism. These theorists avoid explaining antisemitism's origins as either 
German or religious. To those writers whose work forms the main body of this 
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study, antisemitism represents the appearance of an entirely novel and. modern 
phenomenon that departs substantially from previous types of hostility aimed at Jews. 
Interestingly, their work, although different in so many respects, converges in the 
recognition that the concept of "antisemitism" appeared at the same moment that Jews 
were finally granted full and unqualified emancipation within the newly constituted 
nation-states of Western Europe. 
7 They then seek to understand the apparent. 
relationship between antisemitism and the praxis of modern emancipation in general 
and its medium of legal rights in particular. They end up approaching the question of 
antisernitism through a critique of "modernity" itself. 
I characterise this work as "critical theories of antisemitism". They are critical 
because unlike Jacob Katz and Paul Lawrence Rose who combine eternal 
antisemitism and the German problem, they approach the issue of antisemitism from a 
perspective which implicates political and social conditions, individual relations and 
human agency. Further, because of their refusal to see antisernitism as isolated from 
more general conditions in the modern era, these writers spent only a part of their 
working lives specifically addressing the question of antisemitism. In many cases, 
once they reached conclusions that dealt specifically with the question of 
antisemitism, they returned to those more general issues, which remain the subject of 
ongoing and thorough critical attention, whilst their reflections on the question of 
antisemitism are marginalised or avoided. Alternatively, the works were viewed on an 
individual basis as isolated examples of a particular thinker's observations and were 
not read as part of a body of work collectively shedding light upon questions of 
modernity and antisemitism. 
Part of the reason for the marginalisation of the critical theories of antisemitism may 
have been that antisemitism became removed from mainstream social theoretical 
pursuits as a result of the "eternal antisemitism" and "German problem" theories. It 
became the speciality of Jewish Studies or holocaust Studies [Bauman; 1989]. As a 
6! exclude here the works of Jacob Katz and Paul Lawrence Rose, for reasons that will be discussed 
below. 
Even though Germany was sometimes referred to a "Central European" it appears to inc that it was 
precisely their commitment to liberalism that (re)defined all and any nation-states as "Western" 
14 
consequence, the work of critical social theorists that did address antisemitism was 
buried. Alternatively, if the work did appear in these specialised fields of study, 
discussion about it focused less upon what the particular thinker had to say about 
antisemitism than on the question of whether they themselves were or were not 
antisemitic. This has been the case especially regarding the thinking of Marx, 
Nietzsche and Arendt. This study brings to light these "hidden" works not only by 
bridging the gap between the "centre" and the "margin", but, more ambitiously 
perhaps, by overcoming the dichotomy in the first place, despite, or, rather, because of 
the political, as well as the academic stakes involved. 
Yet, this study is not simply, or rather, not only, a systematic account of the various 
theories of antisemitism. It is also a critical evaluation of those theories, both as 
individual pieces and as a body of work. The perspective that I have adopted is in 
many ways in keeping with the tradition of thought that I am discussing. Thus, in 
critically evaluating the accounts of antisemitism each theorist offers, I seek to 
determine the way in which they account for the tension that I believe is inherent in 
modern society between meaningful equality and substantive inequality, of which 
antisemitism is but one manifestation. 
Secondly, and following from this point, I pay equal attention to where each thinker 
locates the causes of antisemitism and its connection with modern emancipation. If 
equality and inequality (i. e. antisemitism) are equally parts of the social world, I 
question those theories that argue that antisemitism, although in some manner related 
to modern society and modern social relations, exists in a sphere "outside" or 
"beyond" it in the realm, for example, of the imagination or the unconscious. 
Thirdly, I believe that an integral element of the praxis of antisemitism is to isolate 
one specific facet of an individual's multifarious social existence and claim it to be 
their determining or essential quality; and, in the light of this "discovery" claim that 
equality for "the Jews" is impossible. It is through this abstraction that a person, or 
group of otherwise diverse people, come to be recognised as "the Jews". As a 
consequence, I pay particular attention to the manner and the extent to which critical 
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theories of antisemitism challenge this conceptualisation of "the Jews". However, as 
will become apparent, it is on this point that the present limitations of critical theory 
are most far-reaching. On the one hand, there are those who treat "the Jews" simply as 
the product of the antisemitic worldview. On the other hand, there are those thinkers 
who believe that the Jews represent "something" that leads to the failure of modern 
emancipation. It seems to me that the result of either view is a replication (even if for. 
entirely different purposes) of the antisemitic idea that the Jews really do contain 
"something" that makes them distinct and incapable of emancipation. I consider the 
extent to which these aspects of critical theories of antisemitism dilute their authority. 
One last point must be made about the very approach that the critical theorists adopt. 
As was noted above, their work on antisemitism forms a part of their wider critique of 
modernity. Not surprisingly, they bring to their discussions of antisemitism the 
insights and conclusions of their wider work and antisemitism is often understood as 
representing a specific phenomenon within these wider aspects. Of itself, this fact is 
neither unwarranted nor unwelcome, and is, in fact what characterises them as critical 
theorists. However, what does present a problem is that in some theories, 8 
antisemitism and the Jews come to embody not just one, but the site of these wider 
(and more fundamental) limitations of modernity. As such, antisemitism comes to be 
explained in terms that place it as the problem of modernity. It is as if antisemitism 
carries with it the weight of all the ambivalence of modernity. The consequence is that 
these critical accounts of antisemitism reproduce the antisemitic view that the 
question of "the Jews" really is the question of modernity; once the "Jewish question" 
has been resolved, humanity can move on to its full potential. 
This tendency has become more pronounced in some of those critical accounts that 
have appeared after the holocaust. In these later accounts the praxis of emancipation, 
antisemitism and the holocaust are read in such a way that any distinction between 
them is increasingly collapsed. Consequently, the understanding of antisemitism as 
8 See, for example, the works by Zygmunt Bauman and Jean-Francois Lyotard. I also argue, however, 
that this tendency is also implicit in the accounts of antisemitism offered by Theodre Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer and Hannah Arendt. 
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the focal point of the general ailments of modernity is reinforced by the idea that the 
holocaust, its terror and horror is the mark and index of modernity itself. Thus, in 
these accounts, the holocaust (and antisemitism) come to take on almost 
eschatological proportions. The effect of the holocaust on social theories of 
antisemitism has in this way, been both profound and unfortunate. It is as if the 
phenomena of antisemitism, the Jews and the holocaust have been collapsed into one 
concept that has become the defining aspect of modernity and critical theory has 
internalised the trauma and traumatising consequences of the catastrophe. 
This study is an attempt to re-evaluate this thinking and to bring together the work of 
the critical theorists in order to examine their individual ideas as well as the body of 
work as a whole. It aims to be critical, but also to discover insights; insights that, I 
argue, overcome the loss of critical distance between theory and the object of its 
study. I point to the manner in which critical theory can overcome its own trauma and, 
in so doing, account for antisemitism in a manner that re-establishes its own 
commitment to a praxis of emancipation, freedom and equality. 
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Chapter 1 
"Eternal Anti-Seniitisni" 
F 
Paul Rose9 and Jacob Katz10 are examples of writers who subscribe to the idea that the 
holocaust was the product of an "eternal antisemitism" that reaches back to the earliest 
periods of history. In their accounts, the relationship of antisemitism to the 
Enlightenment is one of form and not content. For them, modernity "merely" involved a 
change in the manner in which a pre-existing antisemitism (sic) changed into one that 
made genocide thinkable. They are not the only writers who fail to examine 
antisemitism's relationship to modernity' 1, but are examples of a theoretical trend which 
presumes a constant and eternal hostility between "Jews" and "others". 
I include Katz and Rose at this stage of my project because I wish to contrast their 
method, approach and assumptions to those thinkers who attempt to ground their 
analysis of antisemitism within the framework of social theory, to link antisemitism 
specifically to the modern age, and to adopt less reductive explanations for antisemitism. 
In contrast to the philosophical and social depth offered by the balance of the texts in 
this study, Paul Rose utilises the explanatory tools of myth, national character/race and 
revolution to sustain his argument that modern German antisemitism emerged out of a 
general European Christian antisemitic context, and Katz relies upon a European anti- 
Jewishness that has always been "in the air". 
Let me begin with Rose's position that German antisemitism crystallised in the period 
1780-1850, but began much earlier. His work presents a virtual "Whiggish" view of 
history. Whilst in the title the holocaust is not referred to specifically, it silently informs 
9 Rose, P. L. (1990) German Question/Jewish Question: Revolutionary Anti-Semitism firom Kant to 
Il'agner, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
10 Katz J. (1980) From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semilism 1700-1933 Cambridge: Harvard 
11 See, for example, Cohn, N. (1967) 11 arrnnt for Genocide London: Eyre and Spottiswoode; Dimont, 
M. 1. (1971) The Indestructible Jens Toronto: Signet 
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the whole book. Unlike, for example, Hannah Arendt's account of the development of 
antisemitism'Z, where the course of history gradually and contingently unfolds to lead to 
the holocaust, here it is the holocaust that is constantly present in the "history" of 
antisemitism. The history of antisemitism is read backwards as if the holocaust were 
inevitable from the onset of anti-Jewish thought itself. In this way Rose offers another 
rendition of the "Luther to Hitler" school of thought. 
Rose says that following the crucifixion of Christ, Christian feelings of guilt were 
transferred onto the Jews and were mediated through the creation of myths which 
constructed the Jews as containing an evil national character, one antithetical to 
Christianity and by which the Jews became perceived as the obstacle to Christian 
redemption [1990; 3-23]. In the mid-16th century, this religiously-mediated mythology 
was adapted into a German context through Germany's search for a specifically German 
national identity. It was Martin Luther who first made the transference from the Jews as 
the obstacle to Christian redemption to the Jews as the obstacle to Germany's 
redemption [1990; 61-70]. Luther's concept of the "jewification" of Germany meant 
that the definition of "German" became anti-Jewish. 
Rose's history moves too smoothly from this period to the new era in which he says that 
the theological and religious mythology of the pre-modern period was secularised by 
Enlightenment thought. Whereas in the Christian era, the Jews were seen as the obstacle 
to the redemption of Christians, and Germans, in the modem German view, Jewish 
national character was seen as being the obstacle to the redemption of man through 
reason into humanity. 
A specifically German antisemitic mythology now became grounded in German society. 
For Rose, it is this process which led to the centrality of the Jewish Question as the 
concern of German thought and politics in the modem era. In this way, not only did the 
Jewish Question become dialectically related to the German Question (the search for an 
authentic non-Jewish, German national identity) but it also became negatively related to 
12 Arendt. H. (1979) Origins of Totalitarianism London: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 
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a specifically German and so antisernitic definition of "humanity". From 1780 to the 
1830s, the Question was whether the Jews could be reformed morally so that they could 
enter the new moral humanity, while from the 1830's onward it became a political 
question in which the Jews were seen as the usurious dominators of the human spirit of 
mankind and the German political project of revolution became to redeem the world 
from them. 
Of itself, such an approach is not automatically invalid. The holocaust did emerge from 
Germany, and so it is legitimate to enquire whether there was "something about" 
Germany which brought about this catastrophe for Europe and the Jews within Europe. 
However, the legitimacy of the enquiry ought to centre around an examination of 
concrete material conditions and actually existing social relations between Jews and 
other Germans. 
Katz attempts to take seriously historical developments which brought about the change 
from the pre-modem to the modem era in Europe. However, he then says that modem 
antisemitism cannot, in its originality, be attributed to anything in that period. For 
example, the rise of capitalism with its change in political and social relations, the 
change in property relations, the rise of individualism, the dispersion of power brought 
about by these changes, the rise of the nation-state, rationality, imperialism and 
immigration, are deemed by Katz's view as irrelevant. 
Instead he seeks the cause of anti-Semitism outside of contemporary developments. He 
argues that despite the demise of institutional and doctrinal Christianity, vestiges of it 
that contained negative images of the Jews remained so that a continuing, and general 
atmosphere of anti-Jewishness was always and already in the air. For Katz, 
Jewish/gentile relations are intelligible only in the light of an eternally, hermeneutically- 
sealed, dialectical relationship between two pre-formed groups mediated solely by 
hostility. According to both authors, then, all that remains is an idealistic reading of 
German history. 
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Apart from their dubious historigraphies, I have a number of questions regarding these 
authors' uncritical adoption of various analytical tools. The first is Rose's use of 'myth". 
Rose argues that relations between Jews and non-Jews have always been mediated by 
antisemitic myths. Although the historical context determines the particular form of 
those myths, their content - the construction of both Germany and the Jews having a 
antithetical "national characters" - remains constant. However, on closer examination, 
this mythical antithesis focuses not on a relationship between Jews and Germans as 
much as it does on "Germanness" exclusively. Rose first places the Jews in the role of 
the "sacred executioner". He then presumes the emergence of a specific German 
psychology which, because it was premised upon Christian guilt revolving around 
Christ's execution, was inherently antisemitic. This antisemitic psychology remained 
constant throughout the vagaries of European history, and changed only its form from 
the theological to the national and to the rational. 
Katz commits a similar error. In his assumption that anti-Jewishness was always "in the 
air" in Europe, Europeans in general, and Germans in particular, from Kant, to Hegel, to 
Bauer, to Marx, to Wagner and to Hitler, are all susceptible to anti-Jewish influences. 
Instead of characterising this construction as myth, however, Katz brands all modem 
philosophy and other discourses as "ideological justifications" for social reality in 
general, and for the situation of the Jews in particular. In this way, all the critical and 
progressive power of modem European thought is reduced to its alleged antisemitic 
content, which is then used to justify Jewish social separation. European thought is left 
bereft of further meaning. 
The most obvious problem with this argument is that because these myths or ideological 
justifications contain a false view of the Jewish "national character", Christian 
Europeans' appearance of relations with Jews is really an internal and self-contained 
relationship between their own guilt and that guilt in a mythical but reified, form. Katz 
and Rose offer explanations of antisernitism that are hermeneutically sealed within 
Christian Europe regardless of Jewish actions. Indeed, real Jews are entirely invisible, 
and actually existing concrete social relations between Jews and non-Jews are entirely 
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absent. For Rose, the question of materialism does not arise in the history of 
s 
antisemitism as myth. 
For Katz, the question of human agency is also ignored. In Katz's account, for example, 
non-Jewish authors are, by definition of being born into Europe, anti-Jewish. It would 
appear that, for him, even assuming that Europe was inherently antisemitic, a person's 
attitude is completely determined by his or her environment, so that all "Gentile" 
thinkers amongst all "Gentiles", are anti-Jewish. It is difficult to sustain this view if 
historical human agency is examined. How, for example, would Katz account for the 
continued pressing forward of emancipation in 19th century western Europe? Moreover, 
this position cannot explain the development of either "philo-semitic" trends or 
developments leading to a neutral, let alone, positive attitude to Jews in Europe, nor can 
he explain those who aided Jews during the nazi period or at other times in German 
history. 
Further difficulties centre around Rose's unquestioned use of the concept of "national 
character". In his reification of the mythology of national character, Rose echoes the 
work of Sartre (1946) although he reaches opposite conclusions. For Sartre, the 
antisemite who seeks solace in the mythical notion of a "pure" France is considered to 
be the epitome of the "inauthentic" man, whereas for Rose, the antisemite becomes the 
truly "authentic" German. Indeed, Richard Wagner is considered to be the pinnacle of 
German "authenticity" because of his embodiment of the myth of the inherently 
antisemitic German national character [1990; 11-15]. 
Moreover, in the use of the term "national character", that which needs to be analysed 
and explained becomes the unquestioned key to Rose's thesis. At times, he speaks of 
German antisemitism as arising out of the German's own mythologizing of a Jewish 
"national character" and refers to German "national character" as if it were real. At other 
times, he presents both as real: 
But to deny that the phenomenon of German national character is a real 
category of explanation, to deny the specificity of the various national 
political and cultural traditions of the European peoples, is to react in a 
spirit of liberal prejudice which, while it may be morally inspired, is 
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scarcely objective or respectful of historical reality. There is clearly such 
a thing as German national character, just as there is Jewish national 
character. These historical concepts begin to be morally dangerous only 
when they are inadequately analysed and presented, when, for instance, 
only the unfavourable aspects of national character are insisted upon in a 
spirit of bad faith and intellectual dishonesty [1990; 67-68]. 
Having argued that "Germanness" is only meaningful in terms of its anti-Jewishness and 
that a successfully negotiated German "national identity" means the "destruction of 
Judaism", Rose maintains that any German thinker views the "Jewish Question" (in 
either its religious or secular terms 13) as the central question of German thought, 
including German philosophy. 
In this way, he sees the moral "project" associated with Kant as antisemitic and the 
political emancipation with Marx turned into the antisemitic political "project" of 
Wagner and Hitler. Whilst these original revolutionaries were not "racist" in the exact 
meaning of the term, Rose argues that their conception of a separate, isolated and 
antithetical Jewish national character served the same purpose as "race" and indeed 
paved its way for its adaptation onto the Jewish Question. Indeed, he argues that, when 
"racial" thought developed, it was only natural that German thinkers should utilise it 
when discussing the Jews. This process, it is claimed, is clearly evidenced by the 
biographies of Bauer and Marr, who moved from socialism to racism. Again, he shares 
this view with Katz, whose "tainting" of all German thinkers was discussed above. 
Finally, "national character" implies one homogenous group, first in relation to the 
"Germans" who are unified by myths concerning the Jews. 
Rose argues that in the period 1780-1850 an antisemitic German interpretation of the 
Enlightenment invaded its universality because this was the age in which German 
philosophy and thought influenced all later Western thought. The invaded discourses 
constructed a web of antisemitism throughout Europe that eventually enmeshed the 
Jews. The central meaning of the "Jewish Question" in his Germany between 1780- 
1850, then, is not whether Jews should or should not be granted civil emancipation, but 
13 For a discussion of the similar meaning Rose bestows on these terms, see below. 
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whether their "national character" allows them to enter German society (characterised by 
its "Jew-hatred" and not by its social, political or economic divisions) in particular and 
"humanity" in general. Rose claims in this way to have solved the paradox that he 
assumes existed at this time in Germany - support for Jewish civil rights existing 
simultaneously to hostility to Judaism. 
Likewise, by ascribing to the Jews a "national character", Rose is unable to distinguish 
differences amongst Jews. Indeed, those Jews in Germany who accepted the idea of 
"abandoning" their "Jewislmess" in order to assimilate may be accused by Rose of 
having betrayed their "national character". This view is supported by Rose's treatment of 
"race" and "race-states". 
Whereas other authors have linked modem antisemitism to "race"14, Rose maintains that 
"race" is to be seen only as a modem, insubstantial gloss, on "national character", and 
that of themselves, 
notions of race and national character did not necessarily have to be anti- 
Jewish (and that) racist theory itself.... was not the crucial factor in the 
development of German antisemitism but merely represented a particular 
ideology of Jew-hatred that lent antisemitism a pseudoscientific basis. 
Biological theories of race and genetics were welcomed by antisemites 
because they conferred a systematic "modem" logic on an original 
intuition that Jewish national character could not be changed. By the 
time of Kant and Fichte, the concept of Jewish national character had 
sufficed to demonstrate that for all practical purposes the "Jewish 
Nation" was the Jewish biological race [1990; 13-14]. 
For Rose, first, modem conceptions of "race" and the idea that Jews were a distinct 
racial group, had no impact on the genesis of modem antisemitism. Instead, it operated 
as a justification of a pre-formed alleged German anti-Jewishness. Secondly, Rose is 
arguing that "national character" of itself need not be anti-Jewish, but developed only in 
that way in the case of Germany. This position has implications for the issue of the Jews' 
place in Europe and the possibility of their existence within it. 
14 See, for example, (1991) Zygmunt Bauman Modernity and the Holocaust Oxford: Polity Press. 
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For the Germans, "race stood for "racial domination"; for the Jews, "racial harmony" 
[1990; 306]. In his support for this "Jewish" viewpoint and "race's" conflation with 
"national character" along with the nostalgic call for "autonomous social space", Rose 
implies that each "race" needs its own autonomous state so as to live in "harmony" with 
other "race-states". 
Finally, for Rose, the road to antisemitism and genocide began with the work of German 
revolutionaries and now amounts to the same thing: revolutionary antisemitism. By 
maintaining that national character has the same power as "race" and then arguing that 
national character underpins the basis of German revolutionism, he is able 
anachronistically to equate "revolution" and "race" so that German Revolutionism and 
revolutionary antisemitism are invested with the same modem meaning. For Rose, then, 
all German revolutionists, left or right, nationalist or international, are antisemitic. 
On the one hand, German nationalist thinking was imbued with 
revolutionary idealism. The quest of the nationalists for the elusive 
essence of national identity was an expression of their urge for 
redemption; through the nation redeemed would come the individual's 
redemption. On the other hand, German revolutionists of all stripes 
accepted the implicit racial prejudice that there " existed a virtually 
unchanging Jewish - as well as a German - national character. German 
revolutionism was therefore embedded in a pattern of thought that was 
essentially racial and potentially anti-Jewish [1990; 130]. 
Rose's essentialism and separation of German national character and Jewish national 
character again bear similarities to Katz's approach of assuming the existence of two 
distinct and separate groups - Jews and gentiles. Katz implies that the relations between 
these two groups are not only mediated solely by an anti-Jewishness and/or antisemitism 
that arises because of the powerless and inferior position of the Jewish minority within a 
Christian majority15, but that these relations exist outside of the context of all other 
forms of general social relations. For example, in discussing the Hep riots of 1819, Katz 
states that they cannot be understood as a manifestation of the general social crisis 
afflicting Germany at that time. 
15 Or, in earlier times, a pagan majority. Katz, J. [1980; 17] 
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The result is an ahistorical and unsociological analysis of modem antisemitism with the 
Jews cast in the familiar role of "scapegoat". Even though Katz argues that he has 
provided reasons for this eternal scapegoating of the Jews - Christian antisemitism - the 
result is a tautology; Jews are scapegoats because of Christian anti-Jewish images of 
Jewish separation because the Jews are separate and so cast in the role of scapegoats. In 
other words, Katz's analysis concentrates on the forms of modem antisemitism, without. 
analysing the possibility of changes in the content of antisemitism. For both Katz and 
Rose, Jews and gentiles and their relations are formed outside of the specificity of 
historical periods. Antisemitism is the continuation of Christianity by another name. 
Katz's belief in Jewish "separateness" giving rise to a negative image of the Jews in turn 
further increasing their separation, raises another problem. It means that it is the image 
of the Jew, created by non-Jews, which engaged the European mind. The relation of Jew 
and non-Jew exists solely in the sphere of non-Jewish discourse itself, and the Jews are 
absent from Katz's view of the development of antisemitism. Indeed, this problem is 
reinforced by the unacknowledged assumption that Jewish separateness implies a Jewish 
absence from developments in general European history. Katz's picture is of a Jewish 
community going about its life without either caring or worrying about European 
matters or participating in them as either cause or effect. In fact, the only effect that 
"non-Jewish Europe's" ideological view of the Jews has on the Jews themselves is to 
increase their pre-existing separateness. Thus, Jewish separation results in Jewish 
separation. 
The penultimate problem in Rose's and Katz's work is their reliance upon an always- 
existing antisemitism which even in the modern era is merely another form of pre- 
modern Christian anti-Jewishness. According to Katz, new forms of anti-Jewish images 
merely replicated the content of the Christian image of the Jew. Christianity saw the 
Jews as religiously inferior, as operating a double-morality between themselves and 
Gentiles, and as willing to exploit the Christian majority by any means at their disposal. 
In the modern period, these same accusations (and some others which emerged out of 
the original ones) were reproduced, but in secular terms. The religiously-inspired 
perception of Jewish inferiority was translated into and reproduced by a new ideological 
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perception of Jewish irrationality and Jewish immorality, and was compared - to 
Christian-inspired notions of rationality and morality. Therefore, although Christian 
institutions and doctrines ceased to be dominant, Katz claims that the early rational 
philosophers interpreted Christianity as a spiritual guide for their writings on morality 
and rationality. 
The result of this early development was the reproduction of pre-modern anti-Jewish 
animosity into the modem, secular world, and the background against which the Jewish 
Question of the modem era becomes intelligible. The Jewish Question became one of 
whether the Jews were fit for admission into full citizenship, "tainted" as they were with 
immorality and irrationality. 
Finally, for Katz, even the transmutation of Jewish separateness to nationality and then 
to race was linked with Christian-inspired anti-Jewish images. 
For Rose as well: 
In this new age the Jews were deemed to be holding hostage all rational and 
moral humanity, not just superstitious Christendom; they did so, not by refusing 
to disappear as a nation and religion through the gentle means of assimilation 
into European society and submission to reason.... There existed underneath 
these secular transformations deep continuities between the themes of the old 
Christian and the new secular Jew-hatreds [1990; 10]. 
Whilst I am not convinced of the modem demise of religion, to the degree of that 
espoused by Weber 16 or Bauman17, neither can I accept that the full meaning of religion 
has continued from the pre-modern era, albeit by another name. Both Christianity and 
Judaism still exist spiritually and institutionally, and in recent years, politically. I do not 
believe either that religion "ended" or, conversely, that it merely changed its form. In the 
light of contemporary events, neither extreme appears plausible. 
16 Weber, M. (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitaiism tr. Parsons, T., London: Ilarper 
Collins 
17 nPP-cit, 
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Moreover, although Rose's European Christian antisemitic myths became more 
specifically German-nationalistic, and Katz's more scientific and rational, they were still 
originally anchored within the "sphere" of religion and theology, and so remained other- 
worldly. This meant that, although life could be uncomfortable for Jews in the pre- 
modern period their actual lives were not threatened in the same way as in the "post-. 
religious" age.. For both, the real danger for the Jews came when this "gap" between the 
religious, mythological realm and the social world was closed by Enlightenment 
thought. For Rose, 
The real danger began when Christianity was superseded by a new secular 
mythology of reason and revolution that claimed dominion over the whole 
territory of society, a territory that had never been the primary concern of 
Christianity, no matter how successful it had been in acquiring temporal power... 
Secular revolutionary mythology not only negated Judaism on a mythological 
level as had Christianity, but also negated the future existence of Judaism on the 
social level that had always been theoretically independent of Christian religious 
mythology. The Jews must sooner or later disappear, either through assimilation 
or less pleasant means. This was the revolutionary demand, a demand that was at 
once mythological and social. Paradoxically, the rise of secularism in Germany 
meant that the Jews lost their secular space in which they so long found refuge 
[1990; 57]. 
For Katz, even in 1930's Germany the content of the image of the Jew was still the 
Christian-inspired view of the Jew as the universal "other", but it was combined with the 
modern racist view of the Jews as the irredeemable, hostile alien to Genpans/Aryans. 
The two versions became linked by a man who devised a "solution" to the "Jewish 
Problem" that until this time, had been lacking. However, this modern, radical, racist 
antisemitism had now become separated from its Christian context. The uncoupling 
meant not only that the move from segregation to isolation was complete, but any 
Christian justification for the Jews' separate existence ceased. Thus, from the seeds of 
the possibility of genocide in the 1870's arose its logical culmination, the actual murder 
of the Jews. Social reality and ideology came together at Auschwitz and the other killing 
centres of the holocaust. 
Both theorists argue that the religious content of antisemitism remained but in a secular 
. 
form. They have theologised the Enlightenment and the Revolutionary tradition by 
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emphasising the notion of redemption of non-Jews whether through conversion, 
assimilation or destruction of the Jews. 
My final critique of Rose's work, and to a lesser extent Katz's, is their view of the 
moment that the Jewish Question became transformed from a moral-philosophical 
question to a social one. Rose argues that this transformation may have ended German. 
antisemitic rhetoric. Yet, he claims that it was through the thought of the socialist Young 
Hegelians - such as Bauer, Marr, Hess and Marx - that modern German antisemitism 
was transformed from a philosophical to a social phenomenon. After that 
transformation, not only were the Jews seen symbolically as the antithesis of Germany 
and humanity, but they became perceived as the actual, material, carriers of that 
opposition. Moreover, such a transition was still connected with the "blood libel"; this 
time however, it was a metaphorical interpretation through the connection made 
between money and blood. 
For the authors of this period, both "left" and "right"Ig, the new capitalistic order was 
now associated not only with Judaism and a Jewish national character, but also with real 
Jews as its actual agents. Rose argues that to these thinkers capitalism appeared as yet a 
further example of the "jewification" of Germany's, in which the "authentic" German 
spirit was being crushed by the miseries of alleged Jewish-capitalist oppression. This 
allegation gained acceptance through the metaphor of the Jews drawing the life-blood 
from Germany (and humanity) in the form of money. 
For Rose, it was Marx who first conflated the symbolic Jew with the real Jew as the 
agent of capitalism. According to Rose, Marx's goal was not civil, but human 
emancipation. However, since Marx's understanding of emancipation meant the 
liberation of man from civil society, and since, to Rose, Marx equated capitalism with 
IS Although as we have seen, such terms are for Rose, meaningless, since all German authors were 
invested with a German national character. 
19 Rose considers Martin Luther to be "the moulder of so much of German culture" (1990.4) and through 
whom, "a hysterical and demonizing mentality entered the mainstream of German thought and discourse" 
so that "Luther in fact legitimated hysteria and paranoia in a major European culture" (1990; 8). 
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Jews, then Marx's concept of human emancipation must have meant emancipation from 
the Jews. Consequently, for Rose, it was Marx who made synonymous the oppositions 
German/Jew, exploited/exploiter, human/non-human. 
Rose claims that this discourse of economic antisernitism fuelled the political arguments 
of both "left and right"; the left (Marx) because political action meant the overthrow of 
Jewish capitalism so that man could become truly free; for the right (Wagner) "Jewish- 
capitalism" had to be overcome so as to free the "true" German spirit. 
Rose's tracing of the journey of antisemitism from the religious other-worldly 
antisemitism to the secular, this-worldly antisemitism and finally, to the heart of 
economic, social and political life of Germany appears to make social and material 
relations relevant to explanations for antisemitism. On closer examination, however, he 
relies upon an uninterrupted voyage through history of Jewish national character and 
German national character, and allows for no modification, disruption or challenge to 
those pre-existing constants. 
Katz also falls appears to locate antisemitism in social conditions and social relations, 
but he too assumes those social relations are mediated only between already pre- 
determined Jews and non-Jews. He argues, for example, that, because of Jewish 
insistence on separateness (which Katz regards as a, if not the, defining characteristic of 
the Jewish tradition) assimilation was doomed to failure. Yet, he says, it was at least 
partly the failure of assimilation that accounted for the failure of emancipation and aided 
the rise and cohesion of German society's antisemitism. For Katz, assimilation was 
always doomed to failure because of both Jewish and non-Jewish attitudes. 
He seems to argue further that if Jews did not exist in Europe, there would be no 
antisemitism: "I regard the very presence of the unique Jewish community 
among the other nations as the stimulus to the animosity directed against them" 
[1980; 322]. 
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Merely existing, in addition to failing to assimilate in a period when non-Jewish society 
was willing to grant them a place in Europe, is seen as leading to anti-Jewish animosity. 
Antisemitism is thus read as a backlash against Jewish obstinacy. 
Yet, Katz does not ask how, or into what the Jews were supposed to assimilate. It could 
be argued, for example, that the Jews did assimilate into the political structure of the. 
state. Jews voted, joined and were active in political parties. Jews did become full-blown 
citizens, equal before the law, with the same rights and responsibilities as all other 
citizens. It could also be argued that they assimilated into society. Jews did own 
property and lived within society, affected by capitalistic relations. However, by 
positing Jewish separateness, distinct from the rest of society, characterised simply as 
"Gentiles", Katz cannot delve deeper into Jews' membership in different classes or 
different occupations - they remain simply "the Jews". 
As Jews, even after social mobility was permitted, their very presence as a former pariah 
group entering into mainstream society resulted in antisemitic reactions. Thus, for Katz, 
assimilation was doomed to failure, not only by continued Jewish separation, but also 
because, no matter how far they moved into "non-Jewish" society, the Jews would 
always be considered a former pariah group overstepping their boundary. The Jews were 
in a "Catch-22" - become emancipated through assimilation and so be destroyed, or not 
assimilate and so be destroyed. Katz's underlying Zionist agenda now becomes 
transparent. 
In Katz's account, as in Rose's, Jews and non-Jews face each other as pre-formed 
groups; only the form of social relations in that confrontation alters. Changing social 
relations has no effect on Jews or the non-Jews. Katz and Rose thus exclude any 
possibility of discussing the meaning of Jews or "Jewishness" or of discussing and 
antisemitism as the product of changing social relations. They are not able to examine 
the changing meaning of "Jewish" in a fully-socialised context. Indeed, one cannot 
speak of a. group pre-existing outside of contemporary social relations. Social relations 
and the subjects/objects created by those relations are indivisible. Each implies and 
makes meaningful the other. 
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Further, Rose's and Katz' ahistorical explanations of pre-modern and modem European 
and German antisemitism evade the whole problem of responsibility. If antisemitism is 
the product of an European and specifically German "psyche", or separateness, and if 
that "psyche" determines all thoughts and actions, then no individual can be held 
responsible for antisemitism in general or the holocaust in particular. Rather, all German 
people are responsible because of their common social-psychological character. In fact, 
"responsibility" and "guilt" become meaningless terms in this communalist analysis. 
Either way, collective whitewash or collective guilt, Rose's and Katz's analyses lead to 
the same end - the mere fact of "Germanness" determines one's position to the Jews. 
Correspondingly, in Rose's account, the Jews themselves become completely passive 
and take no serious role in the advent and development of antisemitism. In Katz's 
account, the Jews' very "socially cohesive" existence comes uncomfortably close to 
being held responsible for antisemitism. 
In both accounts, antisernitism emerges within the sphere of the German people 
themselves. "Real" Jews and "real" Germans are completely absent and only imagined 
ones imbued with a mythically-inspired "national character" remain. Both Katz and 
Rose, therefore, have written a history and sociology of antisemitism without Jews. 
Their history is flawed because both attribute to antisemitism its own power of 
continuity and an ability to survive over time in multifarious forms, only changing in 
terms of increasing intensity. Thus, history acts as merely a form of repetition of the 
original process of Jewish separation. In this repetitive role, history and historical events 
are denied any creative role in the development of antisemitism. Moreover, because all 
relations between non-holocaust and putative Jews are deemed to have originated 
underneath or outside of society, actually-existing social relations are bypassed and a 
social theory of antisemitism is ruled out from the start. 
32 
Chapter 2 
Karl Marx: Dissolving the Jewish Question 
f 
In this chapter, I shall discuss Karl Marx's (1818 - 1883) contribution to a critical 
theory of antisemitism through an investigation of the two essays that together 
comprise his article On the Jewish Question. I will argue that in defending the cause 
of Jewish emancipation, Marx seeks to dissolve the Jewish question into one aspect of 
a critique of the nature of political emancipation in general. Marx criticises the leading 
Berlin left Hegelian, Bruno Bauer for seeking to exclude Jews from entry into the 
modern nation-state. He illustrates that the reasons Bauer relies upon to exclude the 
Jews are equally applicable to whom Bauer deems deserve entry. I also argue that 
despite his critique of political emancipation Marx does not abandon it. Finally, I will 
argue that the nature of Marx's defence of Jewish emancipation points to the 
potentiality for a modern and virulent form of anti-Jewish hostility - antisemitism. 
Even though Marx had intended to contribute to the debate on the Jewish question for 
at least a year prior to the publication of On the Jewish Question, his immediate 
motivation was provided by the publication of two anti-emancipationist and 
antisemitic tracts by Bruno Bauer. 20 Consequently, Marx's article can be read as an 
attack on Bauer's leftist antisemitism and Bauer's work provides the reason why 
Marx's On the Jewish Question presents itself as a critique of Hegelian idealism. 
In The Jewish Question, Bauer argued against the Jews being granted either political 
rights (the Rights of the Citizen) or civil rights (the Rights of Man) on three grounds. 
First, he said the granting of rights depends upon the Jews renouncing their religious 
beliefs and adopting atheism. Secondly, he said that were the Jews to be emancipated 
as Jews their "particularism" (their "restricted nature") would always dominate over 
the universalism that lie saw as the essence of political and civil rights. Thirdly, lie 
claimed that the Jews had remained outside the historical development that led from 
20 The Jewvish Oueslion; Brunswick (1843) and The Capacity of Present-day Jews and Christians to 
Become Free", Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schtiveix, pp. 56-71. 
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Christianity to "Christianity in dissolution" to human emancipation. In this way, 
Bauer produced a critique of the Jewish question that rests ultimately on a critical 
theology and the idealism that such a method implies. 
In criticising the first of Bauer's arguments, Marx challenges that which Bauer 
identifies as a specifically Jewish situation. Bauer wrote: 
[T]he Jew will recede behind the citizen and be a citizen, in spite of the fact 
that he is a Jew and is to remain as Jew; i. e. he is and remains a Jew in spite of 
the fact that he is a citizen and lives in universal human conditions, his Jewish 
and restricted nature always triumphs in the long run over his human and 
political obligations. The prejudice remains, even though it is overtaken by 
universal principles. But if it remains, it is more likely to overtake everything 
else .... The Jew could only remain a Jew 
in political life in a sophistical sense, 
in appearance; if he wanted to remain a Jew, the mere appearance would 
therefore be the essential and would triumph, i. e. his life in the state would be 
nothing more than an appearance, or a momentary exception to the essential 
nature of things and to the rule [Quoted in Marx, 1992; 214, emphasis in the 
original]. 
Marx agues that this is in fact a universal condition and arises, not for any theological 
reason, but is a consequence of the (secular) nature of political emancipation itself. 
Consequently, Bauer's anti-Jewish stance applies as much to those to whom he grants 
the right to have rights as it does to the Jews themselves. In this way Marx begins his 
task of dissolving the Jewish question by denying a specific "nature" of the Jews. 
We humanise the contradiction between the state and a particular religion, for 
example Judaism, by resolving it into the state and particular secular 
elements, and we humanise the contradiction between the state and religion in 
general by resolving it into the contradictions between the state and its own 
general presuppositions [1992; 218,219, emphasis in the original] 
In achieving the dissolution of the Jewish question, Marx re-formulates the question 
of the relationship of the Jews to political emancipation: 
Bauer asks the Jews: Do you from your standpoint have the right to demand 
political emancipation? We pose the question the other way round: Does the 
standpoint of political emancipation have the right to demand from the Jews 
the abolition of Judaism and fi"omn man the abolition of religion. [Marx; 1992; 
216, emphasis added] 
To his own question, Marx answers in the negative. 
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Drawing on the example of certain North American states, Marx illustrates 
f. 
that the 
political emancipation of religion does not entail the emancipation of ratan from 
religion, but rather the emancipation of the state from religion. This apparent 
contradiction, Marx explains, arises because political emancipation is not 
synonymous with human (i. e. social) emancipation (through which humanity would 
have thrown off the conditions that makes religion a possibility in the first place).. 
Thus, political emancipation represents an individual's freedom from religion only in 
an indirect, mediated and abstract manner: 
The attitude of the state, especially the free state to religion is still only the 
attitude to religion of the men who make up the state. It therefore follows that 
man liberates himself from a restriction through the medium of the state, in a 
political way, by transcending this restriction in an abstract and restricted 
manner, in a partial manner, in contradiction with himself [1992; 216]. 
Marx explains the nature of this contradiction with reference to the institution of 
private property. On the one had, private property is abolished politically when it 
ceases to be relevant as a qualification for the right to vote. However, this does not 
mean that private property itself is abolished; it continues to exist and exert its 
influence but remains in the realm of civil society where it is perceived as a private 
(i. e. apolitical) matter. Marx implies the same is the case for religious belief, be it 
Judaism or Christianity. 
In this way, the contradiction that Marx notes in Bauer's work, "the state can have 
emancipated itself from religion even if "the overwhelming majority is still religious" 
has been explained through a discussion of the secular nature of political 
emancipation.. Consequently, Marx has countered Bauer's antisemitic idea that the 
Jews cannot be emancipated as Jeivs and that they must first renounce their own 
religious affiliation. He illustrates, first, that one's religious belief in general is no bar 
to membership in the state, to a person's being granted the Rights of the Citizen: and, 
secondly, that of itself, religion does not represent a unique problem, but is expressive 
of a general contradiction between the state and civil society. 
Bauer's further claim, that the Jew's alleged "particularism" will always dominate 
over "his human [i. e. universal] and political obligations" so that his "life in the state 
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would be nothing more than an appearance, or a momentary exception to the essential 
nature of things and to the rule"[ Quoted in Marx; 1992; 214, emphasis in the original] 
is also dissolved by Marx through the discussion of a further general condition of 
political emancipation. Here, he points to the nature of the relationship between the 
realm of the state (the public realm) and the realm of civil society (the private realm). 
Marx observes that the state's characteristic as the realm of universality or human 
freedom (what Marx terms as "species-life") only arises through its opposition to the 
sphere of private and particular interests. Comparing this relationship as that between 
heaven and earth Marx alludes to the idea that from the perspective of civil society, in 
which the individual is burdened with a life of toil and struggle, their existence in the 
realm of the state appears as an ideal of freedom that is, as yet, unattainable. However, 
even though this state of freedom now appears in the secular world, 
[t]he relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the 
relationship of heaven is to earth. The state stands in the same opposition to 
civil society and overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the 
restrictions of the profane world, i. e. it has to acknowledge it again, reinstate it 
and allow itself to be dominated by it. [1992; 220] 
Thus, the member of civil society is also, at one and the same time, a member of the 
state. In this way, Marx argues, this divided individual, "leads a double life.... not only 
in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality" [1992; 220]. 
He lives in the political conunrnity, where he regards himself as a communal 
being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards 
other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of 
alien powers [1992; 220]. 
However, since political emancipation leaves civil society "uncriticised", the 
bourgeois21 perceive their material life (i. e. their life in civil society as a private 
individual) as their real and natural existence. In this way, their life in the state, their 
life as citizens will always appear to them as an ideal, as something that could only 
occur once they have left the conditions of their individuality behind. In other words, 
21 In this context Marx uses this term to mean the individual as a member of civil society. 
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the bourgeois see their own citizenship in ideal and abstract terms. Thus, on the one F 
hand, where the individual 
regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual he is an illusory 
phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a 
species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is 
divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality [1992, 
220]. 
Through this analysis of the relationship of the state to civil society, Marx has 
illustrated that the situation that Bauer attributes solely to the Jews as a consequence 
of their particularist "restricted nature" is, in fact, attributable to all members of civil 
society, as members of civil society. Furthermore, he has shown that this 
contradiction applies not only to religious beliefs, now made a "private affair", but to 
the plethora of other phenomena (such as private property) displaced by political 
emancipation into the realm of civil society. Thus, 
[t]he conflict in which the individual believer in a particular religion finds 
himself with his own citizenship and with other men as members of the 
community is reduced to the secular division between the political state and 
civil society. For man as bourgeois "life in the state is nothing more than an 
appearance or a momentary exception to the essential nature of things and to 
the rule". Of course the bourgeois, like the Jew, only takes part in the life of 
the state in a sophistical way, just as the citoyen only remains a Jew or a 
bourgeois in a sophistical way; but this sophistry is not personal. It is the 
sophistry of the political state itself. [1992; 220] 
Moreover, Marx has achieved his aim of dissolving the Jewish question into the 
"general question of the age" by adopting a secular methodology in which the nature 
of political emancipation itself is called into question, rather than adopting the 
theological and idealist methodology advance by Bauer. 
It is on the same basis that Marx challenges Bauer's argument against granting the 
Jews the "Rights of Man", i. e. civil rights. Bauer's reasons for maintaining the 
exclusion of Jews from membership within civil society is again grounded in the idea 
of an alleged Jewish nature. Here, he argues that the Jews' "true nature" will result in 
their separation from gentiles and so they would not be able to participate within the 
human community, 
The question is whether the Jew as such, i. e. the Jew who admits that he is 
compelled by his true nature to live in eternal separation from others, is 
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capable of acquiring and granting to others the universal rights of mean?... As 
long as he is a Jew the restricted nature that makes him a Jew will irfevitable 
gain ascendancy over the human nature which should join him as a man to 
other men; the effect will be to separate him from non-Jews. He declares 
through this separation that the particular nature which makes him a Jew is his 
true and highest nature in the face of which human nature is forced to yield 
[Quoted in Marx 1992; 227' emphasis in the original] 
Drawing on the French and American declarations of the Rights of Man, Marx 
observes that far from demanding that one's religion be renounced, the Rights of Man 
guarantees religious freedoms 
[t]he incompatibility with the rights of man is so alien to the concepts of the 
rights of man that the right to be religious - to be religious in whatever way 
one chooses and to practice one's chosen religion - is expressly enumerated 
among the rights of man. The privilege of faith is a universal right of man. 
[1992; 228] 
Having resolved the specific relationship of religious belief to the rights of man in 
favour of the Jews, Marx challenges Bauer's assumption that the Jews, and only the 
Jews, on account of the "restricted nature that makes [! ] him a Jew", will remain a 
distinct and separate group. Here, again, Marx's purpose is to illustrate that this 
allegedly unique situation is, in fact, a universal condition. 
To achieve this aim, Marx analyses the same declarations. He notes that the 
fundamental right which gives meaning to all others, including the rights of the 
citizen, is nothing other than the rights to the freedom of private property. Marx 
defines this right as, "the right to enjoy and dispose of one's resources as one wills, 
without regard for other men and independently of society: the right of self interest" 
[1992; 229]. 
Marx argues that this basic right reflects the condition of the individual as he is 
constituted within the realm of civil society. Recognised solely through his ownership 
of private property, each person is perceived as "an individual withdrawn into himself, 
his private interest and his private desires [which, as we have seen, now includes 
one's religious beliefs] and separated from the community" [1992; 230]. Indeed, any 
notion of a communal existence appears from this social perspective as an interference 
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or obstacle to the freedom of the individual in his pursuit of his own particularism. 
Thus, far from social relations expressing ties of "species-being", "[t]he only bond 
which holds [social persons] together is natural necessity, need and private interest, 
the conservation of their property and their egoistic persons" [1992; 230]. 
Through this critical examination of the meaning and substance of the rights of man. 
and the attributes of the individual who is their embodiment, Marx has shown that the 
alleged "nature" of the Jews, which Bauer saw as the reason for refusing Jews the 
rights of man, is in fact, a replication of the "nature" of rights-bearing individuals 
themselves. It is a "nature', moreover, that, far from being inherent in "man himself" 
is, in fact, socially and politically constituted. 
Finally, by tracing the secular and materialist bases of rights, Marx has also overcome 
the third element of Bauer's anti-emancipationist argument. Bauer had argued that the 
Jews should be excluded from the rights to have rights because they stood outside the 
history that "discovered" them. He states, 
[t]he idea of the rights of man was not discovered in the Christian world until 
the last century. It is not innate in man. On the contrary, it can only be won in 
a struggle against the historical traditions in which man has up to now been 
educated. Therefore, the rights of man are not a gift of nature or a legacy of 
previous history, but the prize of the struggle against the accident of birth and 
the privileges which history has handed down from generation to generation. 
They are the product of culture, and only he can possess them who has earned 
them and deserved them. [Quoted in Marx; 1992; 227, emphasis added] 
Here, Bauer implicitly refers to the teleological and idealist thinking of Feuerbach22 
through which the history of emancipation was read as a "progression" from Judaism 
to Christianity to what Bauer terms "Christianity in dissolution" 23to human freedom. 
In consequence of this anti-Jewish interpretation, the Jews were seen as an 
anachronism. Their "stubbornness" in clinging to an allegedly superseded religion was 
interpreted as their refusal to join in with the march of human progress. It is this sense 
that Bauer refers to the "discovery" of rights as a "product of culture" Consequently, 
22 Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity trans, George Eliot, 1957, New York and London; in Carlbach 
1978. 
23 Quoted in Marx; 1992,235 
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Bauer not only argues that Jews should not be granted rights as Jews since their 
alleged particularity and separateness arises, ultimately, from their "stubbornness", 
but also calls on them to renounce their religion. 
Marx's answer to the Jewish question is to emancipate the Jews, to grant them the 
rights of the citizen and the rights of man. With this approach he has shifted the focus. 
of attention away from any allegedly subjective attribute of the Jews onto a critique of 
political emancipation itself. He has illustrated that the nature of the rights in question 
and the basis upon which they rest transcend any alleged dichotomy between the 
Judaism and Christianity or between Judaism and a Christianity "in dissolution" 
which Bauer believed was the progenitor of rights themselves. Marx has also shown 
that the Jewish question, by its very nature, transcends any praxis premised upon 
theological or idealistic considerations, and, instead, rests upon an analysis that 
stresses the importance of making the idealist consequences of political emancipation 
a social reality. 
Having confronted Bauer's argument that the Jews cannot partake in the earthly 
appearance of freedom on earth, i. e. be granted political and civil rights, Marx 
challenges Bauers idea that the Jews are nonetheless responsible for subverting that 
freedom through their alleged social dominance which occurs through a connection 
with money and finance. Bauer states, for example, 
The Jew, who is merely tolerated in Vienna, for example, determines the fate 
of the whole empire through the financial power lie possess. The Jew, who can 
be without rights in the smallest of the German states, decides the fate of 
Europe. [Quoted in Marx, 1992; 237] 
And, in a similar vein: 
[It is] a dishonest state of affairs when in theory the Jew is deprived of political 
rights while in practice he possesses enormous power and exercises a political 
influence in the larger sphere that is denied him as an individual. [Quoted in 
Marx, 1992; 238] 
1-lere, again, Marx dissolves what others claim is an inherent attribute of the Jews into 
a general condition of civil society brought about in the wake of political 
emancipation. Marx's response to this line of argument is quite simple. As was 
40 
discussed above, Marx had argued that in the relationship between the state and civil 
society, the latter always dominates the former. Consequently, 
[t]he contradiction between the practical political power of the Jew and his 
political rights is the contradiction between politics and financial power in 
general. Ideally speaking the former is superior to the latter, but in actual fact 
it is in thrall to it [1992; 238] 
Marx argues that the social dominance of money is itself only possible within a social' 
context premised upon the dominance of private property. Here, Marx challenges the 
idea prevalent in Bauer's thought, and in other "leftist thought at the time24, that the 
Jews are responsible for the development of money, and , in consequence, for the 
alienation of humanity from nature. His argument on this point is that the social 
significance of money cannot be detached from the institution of private property; that 
is from the same institution from which political and civil rights arise. 
As we have seen, Marx argues that through the medium of civil rights individuals are 
abstracted from their concrete existence and are recognised solely as owners of private 
property. Similarly, money is the medium through which nature is abstracted into 
"exchange-value" and so becomes robbed of its specific qualities. Thus, just as rights 
recognise the individual as an abstract owner of private property and so detach this 
element from his specific qualities so that exchange between two "equals" can be 
facilitated, so does money as the medium of exchange abstract the specificity of nature 
permitting its exchange. This character of money is made possible through its function 
as a universalising medium of exchange. Marx states "[m]oney debases all the gods of 
mankind and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal and self-constituted 
value of all things" [1992; 239]. 
Moreover, money, as the medium of value through which the world is commodified and 
transmuted into private property, represents the manner in which man is alienated from 
nature. Marx says "money has therefore deprived the entire world - both the world f man 
and of nature - of its specific value" [1992; 239].. 
24 An example of this form of anti-capitalist antisemitism can be seen in the work of Proudhon (see, for 
example, Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy; 1978) 
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As a medium that exists between the natural world and the social world through making 
the latter amenable to ownership and exchange as private property, the value of nature is 
reduced to its value in terms of money. The consequence of this process is that 
[t]he view of nature which has grown up under the regime of private property 
and money is an actual contempt for and degradation of nature.... contempt for 
theory, for art, for history, for man as an end in himself - is the actual and 
conscious standpoint, the virtue, of the man of money. The species-relation. 
itself, the relation between an and woman, etc. becomes a commercial object! 
Woman is put on the market [1992; 239] 
In this account of the significance and meaning of money, Marx has illustrated how it 
is intimately related to private property and so to the significance and meaning of 
rights. He has countered Bauer's thesis that whilst rights represent the culmination of 
a journey which has bypassed and excluded the Jews, money is an allegedly Jewish 
attribute. He illustrates, in other words, the intimate connection between rights and 
private property. Thus, for Marx, it is the secular and material emergence of private 
property that gives rise to both rights and money, each of which in turn is a reflection 
of the conditions in modern civil society in which individuals are themselves treated 
in abstraction. In this way, again, Marx has removed from the analysis of money any 
connection with Jewish attributes, and, instead, focused upon the "objective" situation 
of the nature of political emancipation. 
As others have noted25, Marx frames his analysis of money in the guise of a critique 
of the "materialist" basis of Judaism. Whilst this study is concerned with the manner 
in which antisemitism has been theorised in its relationship to modernity, and not with 
whether particular thinkers were or were not antisemitic, a few comments on this part 
of Marx's presentation are apposite, 
It seems to me that Marx's (perhaps unfortunate) use of Judaism to illustrate his thesis 
rests upon his desire, not only to challenge Bauer's anti-emancipationist and 
antisemitic thought, bit also to ridicule his methodology. As we have seen, Marx takes 
issue with Bauer's idealistically-driven explanation of rights as the "product of 
25 See, for example Carlbach, J. (1978) Karl Marx and the Radical Critiyice of. hcdaicm London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
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(Christian) culture". He also challenges Bauer's view that since Judaism had been 
"superseded", the Jews as Jews should not and could not be granted political and civil 
rights. Overtly referring to an allegedly Judaic tradition of seeing nature as something 
external to human existence, as something that is of use, but not of value -a view 
prevalent in much German idealistic thought from Kant through to Feuerbach - and 
comparing it to bourgeois values, Marx has indicated that Judaism is, and has always. 
been part of history. Indeed, he argues that Judaism and Christianity have, in fact, 
always existed in relation one to the other. As such, even on Bauer's own terms, it was 
contradictory to claim the Christian "parentage" of rights, whilst denying 
Christianity's role in the development of money. 
The Christian was from the very beginning the theorising Jew. The Jew is 
therefore the practical Christian and the practical Christian has once again 
become a Jew.... Christianity overcame real Judaism only in appearance. It was 
too refined, too spiritual, to do away with the crudeness of practical need 
except by raising it into celestial space.... Christianity is the sublime thought of 
Judaism and Judaism the vulgar application of Christianity. But this 
application could not become universal until Christianity as perfected religion 
had theoretically completed the self-estrangement of man from himself and 
from nature... . Only then could Judaism attain universal 
domination and turn 
alienated man and alienated nature into alienable, saleable objects subject to 
the slavery of egoistic need and to the market [ 1992; 240,241 ]. 
Throughout, Marx highlights, first, the weakness of Bauer's critical and idealist 
philosophy, second, the fact that modern social phenomena have overcome or 
transcended any idealistic dichotomies between "Judaism" and "Christianity", and, 
third, and this point is crucial considering the critical comments directed at Marx, that 
which Nietzsche would later theorise as the concept of ressentiment at the very heart 
of Bauer's thought. 
It would, however, be a mistake to read Marx's critique of political emancipation and 
rights as completely negative. Although he argues that work still needs to be done in 
order to achieve full human emancipation, he appreciates the significance of first steps 
Ile states" 
Political emancipation is certainly a big step forward. It many not be the last 
form of general human emancipation, but it is the last form of human 
emancipation within the prevailing scheme of things. Needless to say, we are 
here speaking of real, practical emancipation [1992; 221]. 
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For Marx, the recognition of the individual as a rights-bearing person is a recognition 
of his equality and freedom that should be welcomed. Yet, because these rights are 
formal; rather than substantive they leave the space for the future development of 
antisemitism. In his account of political emancipation, Marx concludes that 
the perfection of the idealism of the state was at the same time the perfection 
of the materialism of civil society. The shaking-off of the political yoke was at 
the same time the shaking-off of the bonds which had held in check the 
egoistic spirit of civil society from politics. Political emancipation was at the 
same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even the 
appearance of a universal content. [1992; 233] 
He points to the fact that political emancipation has robbed civil society of any 
universal or communal aspect that, no matter how debased in feudal society, was 
nonetheless present there. As a consequence of political emancipation in which the 
individual sees their conditions in civil society as their real or true life, any 
ineaningfrl notion of community has disappeared Instead, socially located individuals 
are now perceived in their isolation as "self-sufficient monads" - autonomous and 
standing alone. 
This situation of autonomy is replicated in the nature of modern civil rights whereby 
the rights-bearing person is abstracted from the various concrete aspects of his life in a 
manner similar to his abstraction from the "materialism of civil society" into the 
"idealism of the state". Consequently, personal factors disappear "behind" the image 
of the individual as an owner of private property and the socially recognised person 
comes to be alienated or abstracted from his full and concrete attributes. 
The only means of social relationship available to this individual is that of opposition 
and struggle in which each person is involved in a war of each against all. Those 
social relations which take place through the medium of money serve to alienate 
humanity from the nature of which they are a part. The alienation of "man" from 
himself, from others and from nature, are all related "irrational" aspects of the rule of 
private property which has emerged as a "rational" outcome of civil society. 
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Finally, Marx notes that political emancipation brought with it the dissolution. of prior 
forms of social and political existence in which the individual experienced some form 
of community.. However, with the coming of political emancipation and the 
separations between state and civil society, universalism and particularism, the 
alienated individual was thrown into the uncertainties of an unreconstituted civil 
society. It is at this point that the potential for antisemitism is identified. 
Whilst Marx indicates the rational, that is emancipatory aspects of formal and 
individualist rights and their potential for freedom, he also indicates (nothing more) 
their irrational element suggesting the way in which they can simultaneously give rise 
to antisemitism. The theorising of this relationship informs Nietzsche's thinking and 
forms the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Nietzsche: The Moral Economy of Antisemitism 
F 
The characteristics of modern antisemitism are far more wide-ranging than the 
animosity towards Jews that Marx confronted when he wrote his pro-emancipationist 
polemic in the mid-1840's. At that time, as we have just discussed, anti-Jewish 
hostility centred on the exclusion of Jews from the modern nation-state. Inherent 
within the state and civil society, was the concept of equality. This concept was 
central to the state and civil society whether they are interpreted on their own terms, 
i. e. through a conception of rights and the rule of law, or as a consequence of a critical 
view through the category of political economy which implied the abstraction of the 
individual and his recognition as an "abstract owner of property". Thus, as Marx 
argued so persuasively, excluding a group or individuals on the basis of their religions 
status represented an illogical discrepancy. 26 
It is no coincidence that it was at virtually the same moment as the Jews were 
emancipated into the modern body politic that antisernitism appeared on the scene. 
The relationship between the two occurrences is, of course, far from coincidental. 
Antisemitism arose precisely to re-inscribe relations of inequality that antisemites 
believed had been glossed over or "masked" by the principle of political and social 
equality. Thus, from the start, antisemites - as an attempt to distinguish themselves 
from "the Jews" and to introduce relations of hierarchical inequality - had also to 
contest the equality which was inherent within the modern notion of "society" itself. It 
was for this reason, that, from the antisemitic point of view, the twin notions of "the 
Jews" and "society" were conflated. It in this way that antisernitism involved not only 
an attack on "the Jews", but an attack on the very concept and reality of "society" and 
its premise of equality. It is this that separates the pre-modern anti-Jewish hostility 
from antisemitism. 
26 K. Marx On the Jewish Question. See above: Chapter 1 for a discussion of that work 
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In his study, On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche offers an explanation of the 
manner in which antisemitism, as distinct from anti-Jewish feeling, arose. As will 
become apparent, Nietzsche was one of the first thinkers to offer a coherent critical 
theory of antisemitism. lie recognised the relationship antisemites saw between 
equality, society and "the Jews". Whilst Nietzsche himself sought ways to critique the 
contemporary nature of society, he was also cognisant of the negative and nihilistic. 
aspects of the modern phenomenon of antisemitism. Nietzsche recognised that the 
antisemites' assault on society would not only fail to bring about the freedom that he 
advocated, but would result in its complete antithesis. Moreover, he was particularly 
vexed at the fact that the nihilism of antisemitism appeared under the guise of 
"progress". It is this observation that explains his negative references to the "left" 
antisemitism of Eugen Duhring. 27 Indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the 
development of his concept of ressentiment as the cause for the moral optical illusion 
in which evil comes in the guise of "the good" arose out of this observation. 
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche was also cognisant of the fact that this new hostility to 
"the Jews" was not the product of an "eternal antisemitism" - an ahistorical and 
constant conflict between Jews and Christians. In recognising antisemitism in its 
uniqueness and novelty, he was drawn to the conclusion that there was something 
about society itself that gave rise to, or produced, it. The question that we will 
investigate here, therefore, is the nature of the relationship between modern society 
and antisemitism. In other words, how, and in what way, did society produce its own 
potential negation, one that centred on a new and virulent version of the "Jewish 
Question"? 
An important aspect of Nietzsche's analysis is the relationship between his 
investigation and the "text" of the Genealogy itself. At the time of its writing, 
antisemitism was just appearing as a praxis within the social realm. One can see this 
relationship as analogous to the place of antisemitism within Nietzsche's book itself. 
Nietzsche's comments on antisemitism in general and on Duhring in particular 
27 Enrst Duhring Kritische Geschichte der Nalionekonomie und des Sozialismus, Berlin, 1875, (in 
Julius Caribach, Radical Critique ofiudaism, 1978, RKP London 
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suddenly "burst through" the text at particular junctures. A good illustration of this 
point is Nietzsche's diatribe against Duhring and antisemites in III 1428 at the juncture 
between his discussion of the meanings of the Ascetic Ideal and the Ascetic Priest. 
By placing his comments here he can be seen as implying that antisemitism is the 
break down of the asceticism itself. It is as if antisemitism appears as the negation of 
the "repression" that Nietzsche identifies as a main characteristic of modern life. Thus,. 
in bringing to the surface Nietzsche's reflections on the question of antisemitism, it is 
important to understand what is latent in his overt discussion of modernity. 
The place of Nietzsche's work within the body of scholarship comprising critical 
theories of antisemitism is itself important. On the one hand, his work can be seen as a 
critical engagement with Marx's On the Jewish Question, whilst, on the other, many of 
his insights form a basis for later theorists. For example, it is through the work of 
Nietzsche that the modern phenomenon of antisemitism comes to be understood 
through a thoroughly modern dialectic of freedom and unfreedom with the notion of 
ressentinrent as the mediating term. It is also in the Genealogy that we find this 
division represented in terms of equality and inequality and the "ethicisation" of the 
latter that then attempts to turn on the former. This division in Nietzsche as well as in 
others is also represented in terms of the manner in which rationality similarly gives 
rise to irrationality. 29 However, it is equally the case, that unlike the work of many of 
the later theorists, there are still traces within Nietzsche's work of his belief pre- 
modern hostility towards the Jews as reflected or grounded in religious prejudices. 30 
On the Genealogy of Morals is such a fascinating study, at least in part because it was 
written at a time of transition in which Nietzsche drew upon both this "pre-modern" 
phenomenon, as well as the "modernity" of antisemitism as voiced by Durhing. 
2 In discussing specific passages of On The Genealogy of Morals, it is more appropriate to refer to 
section and subsection. 
''' See especially, for example, the discussions above on Marx and below in the work of Adorno and 
Horkhcimer and Bauman. 
See especially, for example, below the discussions of Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism, Bauman's 
Modernity and the Holocaust and Modernity and Ambivalence and Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic 
of Enlightenment. 
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Nietzsche engaged directly with Marx's On the Jewish Question, in particular with his 
discussion of religion. In the last chapter, we saw that Marx recognised that political 
emancipation did not bring about the abolition of religion. In arguing that it became 
an aspect of civil society, he implied that religion took on the form most appropriate 
to that sphere; a species of private property that reflected the individualistic interests 
of those social actors. As he states, 
[Religion] has become the spirit of civil society, the sphere of bellum omnium 
contra omnes. It is no longer the essence of community but the essence of 
difference. It has become the expression of the separation of man from his 
community, from himself and from other men, which is what it was originally. 
It is now only the confession of an individual oddity, of a private whim, a 
caprice. The continual splitting of religion in North America, for example, 
already gives it the external form of a purely individual affair. It has been 
relegated to the level of a private interest and exiled from the real 
community.... The splitting of man into his public and private self and the 
displacement of religion from the state to civil society is not one step in the 
process of political emancipation but its completion. Hence political 
emancipation neither abolishes nor tries to abolish man's real religiosity. 
[1992; 221] 
Marx goes further than this in discussing the social effect of religion. Indeed, in many 
instances, Marx implies that the rationality of political emancipation means that the 
social phenomenon of law and money represents the rational kernel of their 
appearance in the irrational shell of religion. Consequently, in his discussion of the 
"materialism of civil society", religion and religion ideals have little formal 
explanatory force. 
It is in this context that the Genealogy is to be read in this study. On the one hand, 
Nietzsche accepts Marx's description of civil society as the realm of legal exchange 
relations. However, rather than representing a decline in religious belief, he argues 
that that mode of social existence itself gives rise to new and powerful religious 
forms. Moreover, and this is a vital point to make, these new religious forms operate 
as a means of compensation for the individuality which Marx characterises as forming 
the basis of civil society. Thus, religion, in Nietzsche's view is re-vitalised by the 
existence of the "materialism of civil society" and, as such, offers the existence of 
"community" precisely in the location where Marx believes it is absent. These are 
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points to which I will return. However, it is important at this juncture to note that this 
co-existence of materialist individualism and religious (idealist) community is not for 
Nietzsche responsible in itself for antisemitism. Nietzsche infers that it is only when 
this uneasy balance breaks down that antisemitism emerges and that the relationship 
between individualism and community may have a causal relationship to 
antisemitism's existence originally. 
Nietzsche also differs from Marx in the perspective he adopts in opening up modern 
society to critical analysis. Marx, adopting the methodology of political economy, 
views its development in "objective" terms. He is concerned to examine how the 
individual is "reduced" to an element of exchange relations. Conversely, Nietzsche, 
and for now we may call his approach, "social psychological" (although it often 
appears to defies rigorous disciplinary division), investigates the "subjective" aspects 
of that social existence. Thus, Nietzsche's interest can be understood as a 
comprehension of the modern subjectivity that comes about through the person's 
existence within society itself., Perhaps, for present purposes, his most important 
finding is the existence of a split or divided subjectivity; one aspect pointing to the 
"rationality" of individualistic legal exchange relations, and the other the 
"irrationality" of communal relations. 
I suggest, therefore, that Nietzsche represents modern subjectivity as dirempted. It 
may be more accurate to state, however, that, for Nietzsche, the emergence of the 
modern (rational) subjectivity is only comprehensible in terms that take into account 
the co-existence of its own negation. Modern man, therefore, is perceived as 
simultaneously a being with subjectivity and one in whom it is lacking. It is within the 
nexus of this dualism that we can locate the causes of antisemitism as discussed by 
Nietzsche. 
It is within the second essay of the Genealogy, ""Guilt", "Bad Conscience" and the 
Like", that Nietzsche discusses the emergence and development of this dialectic of 
freedom and unfreedom through an examination of the causes for the apparent 
contradiction between the emergence of subjectivity and its absence. The essay 
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comprises twenty-five "sections". The early sections are concerned with the manner in 
which subjectivity comes into existence and the closing sections concern the 
emergence of its negation. It is in section 11, at the close of his analysis of modern 
subjectivity and its relationship to the administration of law, that Nietzsche presents a 
scathing attack on antisernites on the grounds of their ressentiment in which revenge 
appears behind the mask of "justice". 
The structure of the essay is as important to Nietzsche's argument as the content. 
First, he implies antisemitism is the complete antithesis of law and justice. Although, 
as we shall see, Nietzsche holds law and legal rights indirectly responsible for the 
nihilism of the absence of subjectivity, his formulation of the relationship is far more 
complex. Secondly, the location of his rhetoric against antisemitism is important. It 
falls between law and morality (forms of subjectivity and its absence, respectively), 
just as in essay three, where at the same point he introduced the notion of ressentiment 
as the mode of re-evaluating morality from the perspective of the slave (those without 
subjectivity). Nietzsche, therefore, makes links between law, morality and the 
mediation of ressentiment where the latter "turns upon" the former in a relationship of 
negation and denial and its adopting the hues of antisemitism. I will return to these 
points below. 
In the structure of the essay as a whole we can identify an underlying explanatory 
mode premised upon the notion of exchange. The heuristic use of exchange is present, 
first, in Nietzsche's discussion of the emergence and development of freedom, 
subjectivity and objectivity; and second in the emergence of their antithesis through a 
discussion of man's relationship to God. Thirdly, the concept of exchange is present in 
the relationship between the first two discussions. Thus, Nietzsche implies that the 
more man achieves "freedom" through gaining a subjectivity, the more he exchanges 
it for unfreedom and his feeling of "being nothing". We can conclude that Nietzsche 
intends his Genealogy to be a critique of modern social life and the manner in which 
the rational and the irrational come into existence, as well as the way that each and the 
relationship between them reflect the nature of modern society as the realm of 
exchange relations. More specifically, the relations of exchange are themselves 
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modelled on the legal notion of contract. Indeed, antisemitism itself is explained 
F 
through the concept of ressentinzent as an attempt by the antithesis of subjectivity to 
deny and annihilate its progenitor - as an attempt to exchange the "bad conscience" for 
the "good conscience". 
Nietzsche's view of exchange modelled upon contract is in keeping with the initial. 
premise of the Genealogy that the exchange nature of modern society brings contains 
both rational and irrational aspects. In many ways he identifies a relationship between 
these two apparent oppositions by indicating their imbrication. 
The "rational" side of exchange relations - that is, its legal manifestation - gives rise to 
man's subjectivity as his consciousness of himself as one "with the right to make 
promises" [II 1]. Inherent in this right to make and keep promises is the ability to feel 
obligated to honour these promises. The acceptance of obligation then reaches such a 
level that the responsibility eventually transmutes itself into the meaning of man's 
"conscience" itself. Because exchange by necessity involves more than one party, 
others to whom one gives one's word also have the same awareness of their 
responsibilities, and modern subjectivity thereby implies an equality between parties. 
Thus, the sphere of legal relations - that is, the sphere of society itself - is premised 
upon the recognition of its inhabitants in terms of their autonomy and equality. 
Indeed, for Nietzsche, such men are the very definition of the "emancipated 
individual". 
Nietzsche also makes the observation that legally-mediated exchange relations are 
coterminous with the notion of equivalencies; that like be exchanged for like. This 
notion of equivalencies, lie argues, forms the basis of the administration of law itself. 
Thus, in the case of one who has broken his promise, as in the case of a debtor who 
has not kept his word to the creditor, punishment is always mediated through this 
concept of equivalencies. Indeed, this idea, of which "an eye for an eye" is the obvious 
illustration, is for Nietzsche the very definition of "justice". As lie states, 
Throughout the greater part of human history punishment was not imposed 
because one held the wrongdoer responsible for his deed, thus not on the 
presupposition that only the guilty one should be punished: rather, as parents 
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still punish their children, from anger at some harm or injury, vented on the 
one who caused it - but this anger is held in check and modified by'the idea 
that every injury has it equivalent and can actually be paid back, even if only 
through the pain of the culprit. And whence did this primeval, deeply rooted, 
perhaps by now incredible draw its power - the idea of an equivalence between 
injury and pain? .... 
in the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor, 
which is as old as the idea of "legal subjects" and in turn points back to the 
fundamental forms of buying, selling, barter, trade and traffic [1141 
Moreover, it is in the nature of this "just" legal punishment that the individual who 
breaks his promise bears no resentment against those who punish him, nor at the fact 
of his being punished. Conscious of his responsibilities, he is also conscious of the 
consequences and takes them with a "good conscience". 
Such is Nietzsche's focus upon this contractual development from subjectivity to law 
to justice, that he extends it to describe within the community premised upon the idea 
of the "social contract". On this view the "creditor" is the state which exchanges with 
the "debtor" for protection and peace and social disturbance is to be understood in as a 
breach of contract. Upon such breach the law will exclude or "thrust out" the one who 
has broken his word to the collective community. Finally, law and legal relations and 
the subjectivity on which they rest feels so confident of its own power that, in 
Nietzsche's words, it "overcomes itself' through the granting of mercy. Law is now so 
secure that it can afford to forget the injuries made against it. 
In this way, Nietzsche has accounted for the nature of rational civil society by tracing 
its legal basis back to the rights-bearing subjectivity of the individual, through the 
notion of justice and finally through the contractual notion of citizenship. Yet, it is 
precisely this subjectification that gives rise to its antithesis: man defined through an 
absence of subjectivity. Here, Nietzsche indicates the irrational dimension to the 
emergence of such a rational mode of social organisation and social relations. 
At this point in his argument, Nietzsche relies upon his notion of the "will to power" 
which is defined in terms of a life lived by instinct. He argues that for man to accede 
to the demand of legal autonomy and the subjectivity of responsibility and autonomy, 
53 
he must first "master himself'. In other words, such "freedom" is only bought at a 
cost. The implication here is that man must overcome his own instincts, especially as 
they relate to living life in the present without the notion of temporality required by 
exchange relations. Furthermore, the notion of equality that contract relations implies 
is defined in terms of instrumental rationality. 
Man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even. 
in his own image of himself, if he is to be able to stand security for his own 
future, which is what one who promises does! (II 1) 
It is in these terms that Nietzsche begins his discussion of the rise of the "bad 
conscience" [II 16] Tied in with man's feelings of guilt, the bad conscience leads to 
the idea of unfreedom, to man as the eternal debtor. Whereas the legal relation results 
in man looking outward to others, the consequence of this process leads to his 
introversion, and finally results in the development of the "soul". 
This is due to the effort of constraint that is inherent within the mastery of oneself 
necessary for the development of the appropriate "subjectivity". Nietzsche's thesis is 
that the will to power, man's instinctual drive, can never be abrogated or ended. If it is 
blocked in one direction, then it will seek other outlets. In the present context that 
"other outlet" is man himself. Thus, the "natural" cruelty that Nietzsche argues is an 
inherent aspect of the will to power is turned back onto the individual incarcerated 
within society. 
It must be noted here that Nietzsche argues that this turning back of the will to power 
is not necessarily merely negative. His ambivalence is evidenced by the fact that in 
some instances the tension it creates within man leads to great creativity. He cites 
Goethe as an example [111 2]. It is in the case of "weaker" individuals that it results in 
the denial of themselves, as a negation of their own subjectivity. 
Nietzsche uses the findings of anthropology to trace the manner in which this "delight 
in self-torture" has hitherto developed. This process follows that of exchange or 
contractual relations, although with the opposite effects to those that have just been 
noted. In beginning to speak of the rise of the "bad conscience", Nietzsche states that 
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[t]he civil-law relationship between the debtor and his creditor, discussed 
above, has been interpreted in an, historically speaking, exceedingly 
remarkable and dubious manner into a relationship in which to us modern men 
it seems perhaps least to belong: namely into the relationship between the 
present generation and its ancestors [11 19]. 
He then likens this relationship of the present to the past to a recognition of a present 
"juridical duty towards earlier generations" [II 19]. It is worth quoting Nietzsche on 
this point. 
The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and 
accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists - and that one has to pay 
them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognises a debt 
that constantly grows greater, since the forebears never cease, in their 
continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and 
new strength.... What can they give them in return? Sacrifices.... above all, 
obedience - for all customs, as works of the ancestors, are also their statutes 
and commands: can one ever give them enough? The suspicion remains and 
increases; from time to time it leads to a wholesale sacrifice, something 
tremendous in the way of repayment to the "creditor" [II 19]. 
Nietzsche argues that this process culminates with the advent of the Christian God - 
the idea that the "creditor" has sacrificed himself for the "debtor". It is at this point 
that the "bad conscience" comes into existence. Its effects are the ultimate cruelty that 
man can inflict upon himself: the notion that he is in a position of irredeemable debt, 
of "eternal guilt", of a party to a contract that can never be honoured. 
In this psychical cruelty there resides a madness of the will which is absolutely 
unexampled: the will of man to find himself guilty and reprehensible to a 
degree that can never be atoned for; his will to think himself punished without 
any possibility of the punishment being equal to the guilt; his will to infect and 
poison the fundamental ground of things with the problem of punishment and 
guilt so as to cut off once and for all his own exit from the labyrinth of "fixed 
ideas"; his will to erect an ideal - that of the "holy God" - and in the face of it 
to feel the palpable certainty of his own absolute unworthiness. Oh this insane 
pathetic beast - man! What ideas he has, what unnaturalness, what paroxysms 
of nonsense, what bestiality of thought erupts as soon as hi in prevented just a 
little from being a beast in deed! [II 22]. 
The essay ends with Nietzsche declaring that such a condition of man is a sickness. 
The sickness is manifested through the idea that the man of "bad conscience" denies 
his own existence, his own self and his own subjectivity. He denies any part of him 
that indicates or "reminds" him of his own existence, his own autonomy. The manner 
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in which this denial manifests itself is by projecting onto "something" or "someone" 
else the very aspects of himself that stand for his autonomy, human will and 
subjectivity. As Nietzsche states, 
[h]e apprehends in "God" the ultimate antithesis of his own ineluctable animal 
instincts; he reinterprets these animal instincts as a form of guilt before God...; 
he stretches himself upon the contradiction "God" and "Devil"; he ejects from 
himself all his denial of himself, of his nature, naturalness, and. 
actuality.... Here is sickness beyond any doubt, the most terrible sickness that 
has ever raged in man.... [11 22]. 
In this way, the "sick" man confronts his subjectivity as something alien or external to 
him, as something that oppresses him. It is oppression because it reminds him of his 
own "worth", in contradistinction to the feeling of worthlessness the bad conscience 
has erected within him. It is as if his very self becomes the cause of his predicament. 
As we shall see, it is this conflict that, from the position of the "bad conscience", gives 
rise to ressentiment. 
Nietzsche has thus shown that with the incarceration of man within society, of the 
constraint necessary for legal exchange, i. e. social relations, man has simultaneously 
developed for himself a system of guilt in which any notion of "free will" which is a 
consequence of those relations is correspondingly denied. This, for Nietzsche, is the 
contradiction inherent within the modern individual - to be and to feel guilty for being 
at one and the same time. Before discussing the manner in which man lives in such a 
condition, it is worth noting again the role of exchange in Nietzsche's thesis. 
Thus far, I have shown how Nietzsche's concept of exchange and contract forms the 
basis of the legal relations of civil society, and how his approach differs from Marx's. 
Secondly, we saw how the "irrational" aspect of civil society that remained hidden in 
Marx's account was also premised on contract through the notion of repayment to the 
ancestors. Finally, the interrelations between rationality and irrationality appear when 
in exchange for present prosperity, man increases his duty to his gods. In this way, 
Nietzsche has attempted to illustrate, not only that the irrational arises in a relation to 
the rational, but also that they are both structured on the same notion of exchange and 
contract. It is this way that the dialectic of freedom and unfreedom both emerge and 
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confront each other. As we shall see, it is in the conflict between the two, in the 
attempt of unfreedom to deny and negate freedom, that antisemitism can be located. 
The point at this juncture is Nietzsche's insistence that this diremption resides in the 
modern individual himself. The diremption, or the confrontation between man's 
freedom and bondage, or between the "good conscience" of the legal subject and the. 
"bad conscience" of the "religious" (which Nietzsche defines as "the psychological- 
moral" domain) also creates the potential for antisemitism [II 11] and it is in this 
context that Nietzsche develops the substance of his concept of ressentiment. 
On the average, a small dose of aggression, malice, or insinuation certainly 
suffices to drive the blood into the eyes - and fairness out of the eyes - of even 
the most upright people.... For that reason the aggressive man, as the stronger, 
nobler, more courageous, has in fact had at all times a freer eye, a better 
conscience on his side: conversely, one can see who has the invention of the 
"bad conscience" on his conscience - the man of ressentiment.... [ressentiment} 
blooms best today among anarchists and antisemites [11111. 
It is interesting to note that in this essay, the concept of ressentiment, so significant for 
Nietzsche's thought, is virtually absent. It is only mentioned twice, and once only in 
passing. Where it is discussed in detail is in section 11. This placement is interesting 
in itself. The discussion comes immediately following the discussion of the climax of 
legal relations where law ends in mercy as a form of "forgetting" harms committed 
because it is so secure in its feeling of security. Moreover, in placing his criticism of 
Duhring here as well, Nietzsche offers a strong defence of law, before examining its 
negative effects through an account of the development of the "bad conscience". 
Although it is not directly argues, one can see in this essay the potential for 
antisemitism when the "bad conscience" confronts the good conscience or when the 
morality of ressentiment breaks free of its constraints and enters into conflict with that 
which it seeks to deny. The context of this discussion is the claim made by "anarchists 
and antisemites" that justice is synonymous with revenge, that law and revenge can be 
conflated. Not only, as we have noted, does Nietzsche connect justice to law (in the 
notion of equivalencies), but he also indicates how justice mediates and neutralises 
ressentiment when it appears as revenge, through what we can now see as the "rule of 
57 
law", in which the harm caused to one party is viewed as an act against the law itself. 
Unlike "subjective" revenge, law treats requital in a measured and "objective" manner. 
Moreover, where Duhring had argued that "justice" arises immediately following the 
harm, Nietzsche argues that it can only follow the introduction of the administration 
of law. And, it is in the context of this part of his argument, that Nietzsche indicates 
the manner in which law includes the notion of freedom, 
A legal order thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the 
struggle between power-complexes but as a means of preventing all struggle in 
general - perhaps after the communistic cliche of Duhring, that every will must 
consider every will must consider the other will its equal - would be a 
principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an 
attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to 
nothingness [II 11]. 
The point is that the ressentiment of the bad conscience turns upon the "nobility" of 
law so as to destroy the individualism and the measured nature of its "good 
conscience". Thus, we can begin to see the way in which antisemitism incorporates 
within it the notion of social and legal relations premised upon exchange which, to a 
certain extent, give rise to an individualism and a subjectivity that are part of 
Nietzsche's notion of freedom as action. However, why it should take the form of 
hostility to "the Jews" is, at this stage left undiscussed. For this equation to be made, 
two other aspects of Nietzsche's argument must be discussed. The first is the means 
that Nietzsche argues are adopted precisely so as to avoid the conflict between man as 
free and unfree. In the light of that discussion the second is the nature of the concept 
of ressentinient that will help determine why antisemitism can arise out of this 
potential conflict. 
Nietzsche argues that it is through the emergence of asceticism that this conflict 
between the two aspects of the diremptive individual Nietzsche's description of these 
"men of ressentimmw" captures its spirit. 
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, 
an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible for suffering 
- in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent 
his affects, actually or in effigy; for the venting of his affects represents the 
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greatest attempt on the part of the suffering to win relief, anaesthesia - the 
narcotic he cannot help desiring to deaden pain of any kind. [[111 15]. F 
As a praxis asceticism is not only about theory, i. e. moral evaluation, but also entails a 
practice that reinforces its message of denial in positive terms. The relevant aspects of 
this practice all aim to present the meaning of life as punishment and of denial of 
vitality. First, there is the idea of communal life over individual life, mediated through, 
the doctrine of "love thy neighbour". Through this "community of love" the notion of 
denial is affirmed through the idea that one must deny oneself in the name of the 
other, one must sacrifice oneself when called upon to help one's neighbour. This, of 
course, is the antithesis of the legal relations, where it is precisely one's autonomy that 
separates one from the other; Nietzsche's pathos of distance. Secondly, there is the 
idea of "mechanical activity", the idea of "mechanical activity" or "the blessing of 
work", 
The alleviation consists in this, that the interest of the sufferer is directly 
entirely away from his suffering - that activity, and nothing but activity, enters 
consciousness, and there is consequently little room left for suffering. [111 18] 
Finally, there is the idea that asceticism permits occasional "outlets" of "orgies of 
feeling" - of the will to power. However, these are re-interpreted as sin, so that every 
outburst leads to even greater feelings of guilt. 
Nietzsche describes this praxis of asceticism primarily in religious terms, with clear 
references to Calvinism and Lutheranism (German Protestantism). He is also critical 
of that which he terms modern science. He argues against the self-legitimisation of 
science as conquering the ascetic ideal. Science (and it appears that in many instances 
he is speaking of modern philosophy31) represents a continuation of the ascetic ideal 
in its reliance upon the timeless or ahistorical subject of reason; the transcendent 
subject that represents the "truth" of man. This scientific "will to truth" assumes, 
Nietzsche argues, that there is a reality about man that is hidden. The consequences of 
this scientific view, therefore, is that our own reality, our own present life is but a 
shadow of a deeper reality. Some writers interpret this view of science as the cause of 
31 See section 11123-25] 
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antisemitism. 32 For Nietzsche it is merely an "extension" or "secularisation" of 
asceticism which so as to block or obstruct the outburst of ressentiment that is in some 
way related to antisemitism. 
Asceticism neutralises this lashing out through re-directing the outburst against the 
individual himself. Asceticism plays on and exploits man's sense of guilt and, 
reinforces the idea that earthly existence is understandable in terms of punishment for 
that guilt. In this way, the denial of self that is inherent within the "bad conscience" is 
given meaning. It becomes perceived in "positive" terms; it comes to be the greatest 
moral good. Critically, however, this ascetic valuation does not "cure" the sufferer, 
but makes his condition worse.. In re-evaluating denial as "the Good", life itself - 
including, of course, his own subjectivity, becomes ever more threatening and ever 
more oppressive. Thus, one can argue that asceticism keeps a lid on the boiling pot 
whilst simultaneously turning up the heat. 
Again, it is interesting to note that mid way through the essay where this aspect is 
discussed - essay three - Nietzsche "interrupts" his analysis with an attack on Duhring 
and antisemitism. The relevance of the location, which comes between a discussion of 
the various forms and styles in which asceticism had occurred throughout history, and 
its specifically "modern", religious forms, should not be underestimated. This, I 
believe, is indicative again of the latency and potentiality of antisemitism as a 
consequence of the breakdown of the ascetic ideal. This interpretation is evidenced by 
the many times in the Genealogy that asceticism is given a highly ambivalent 
treatment. One can see the ambivalence clearly when Nietzsche argues that, negative 
though it may appear, asceticism at least keeps the will to power alive precisely at the 
moment that the "bad conscience" tells man he is worthless and life not worth living. 
Asceticism, in other words, brings meaning, just when man says, "I am sick of 
myself". [111 14]. 
Nietzsche's attack on Duhring and antisemites in general appears in this essay to turn 
upon the idea that these people do not even have the "strength" to live up to the 
32 See for example, Aloder"niiv and Holocaust Bauman, Z. 1991, Oxford: Polity Press. 
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constraining demands of a life of denial and discipline demanded by the ascetic ideal. 
As we have seen, the "bad conscience" is the idea of the worthlessness of man in 
contrast, and in relation to, the "good conscience" of the legal subject. Yet, it is also in 
relation to the "bad conscience" that the concept of ressentinient comes to be an 
influence. For present purposes, Nietzsche's idea of ressentinzent indicates the way in 
which those too weak to live according to the demands placed upon them by the legal. 
and social relations of exchange re-evaluate their moral condition. Through 
ressentinzent values are inverted, and bad becomes good and good, evil. Through such 
inversions, the herd perceives its own existence in positive terms. This, in turn, aids 
them in the ascetic life in that the more they suffer the more "good" they believe 
themselves to be. They can contrast their goodness against "those" (themselves) who 
live according to the harshness of exchange, or legal morality. 
Nietzsche states that it is the "ressenlment of natures that are denied the true reaction, 
that of deeds, and compensate with an imaginary revenge" [I; 10] As we have seen, 
the "bad conscience" arises precisely out of the inability to act, the inability to live 
according to the constraints of the will to power (as self-mastery) demanded by legal 
relations. Nietzsche infers that the "imaginary revenge" consists of a future revenge in 
a world to come - in the "kingdom of God". As such, the promise of future dominion, 
particularly domination over those not as "good" is deferred. Yet, ressentiment 
operates differently with antisemites. For them, this element of postponement 
evaporates and ressentiment seeks immediate gratification. Antisenntism, therefore 
occurs precisely when asceticism is negated or "overcome". This "overcoming" of 
asceticism occurs within the weakest elements of the herd, and, contrary to the claims 
of Duhring, does not arise from the legal conscience or from the dictates of justice. 
As I have emphasised above, the division or diremption of the two aspects of 
morality, the "legal" and the "ascetic" occurs in the same individual, and that the 
ascetic arises, precisely because of the constraints upon the instinctual will to power 
of the legal. In the first essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche suggests that the asceticism 
which he terms slave morality, is the only one present in the modern era. This reading 
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misses a subtle point, however. In section 16 of the first essay, Nietzsche "concludes" 
his discussion of dirempted morality in the following way: 
The two opposing values "good and bad, " "good and evil" have been engaged 
in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years; and though the latter value 
has certainly been on top for a long time, there are still places where the 
struggle is as yet undecided. One might even say that it has risen ever higher 
and thus become more and more profound and spiritual: so that today there is 
perhaps no more decisive mark of a "higher nature", a more spiritual nature, 
than that of being divided in this sense and a genuine battleground of these 
opposed values [116] 
In section 200 of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche states 
[t]he man of an era of dissolution which mixes the races together and who 
therefore contains within him the inheritance of a diversified descent, that is to 
say contrary and often not merely contrary drives and values which struggle 
with one another and rarely leave one another in peace - such a man of late 
cultures and broken lights will, on average, be a rather weak man: his 
fundamental desire is that the war which he is should come to an end [BGE; 
200]. 
He then continues by observing that the manner in which this "war" manifests itself 
leads either to the creativity of the artist, or to the passivity offered by the ascetic 
ideal. 
In section 260, Nietzsche argues that, 
There is maser morality and slave morality -I add at once that in all higher 
and mixed cultures attempts at mediation between the two are apparent and 
more frequently confusion and mutual misunderstanding between them, 
indeed sometimes their harsh juxtaposition - even within the same man, within 
one soul [BGE; 260, emphasis in the original] 
In the same section of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche offers a brief summary of 
noble morality, 
[t]he noble human being honours in himself the man of power, also the man 
who has power over himself, who understands how to speak and how to keep 
silent, who enjoys practising severity and harshness upon himself and feels 
reverence for all that is severe and harsh [BGE; 260]. 
We can compare this view of noble morality to his view of the legal conscience. 
This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this 
master of a free will this sovereign man.... of how this mastery over himself 
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also necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over 
all the more short-willed and unreliable creatures.... The "free" than, the 
possessor of a protracted and unbreakable will, also possess his measure of 
value: looking out upon others from himself, he honours or despises; and just 
as he is bound to honour his peers, the strong and reliable (thus with the right 
to make promises) - that is, all those who promise like sovereigns, reluctantly, 
rarely, slowly, who are charring of trusting, whose trust is a mark of 
distinction, who give their word as something that can be relied on because 
they know themselves strong enough to maintain it, even in the face of 
accidents, even "in the face of fate"..... [II; 2] 
It is also interesting to note Nietzsche's idea of the "measure of value". He argues that 
noble morality gives rise to the idea of evaluation in which one values (or, recognises) 
another according to one's view of oneself. In other words, one first sees oneself as 
autonomous and then measures others against this harsh standard. It is in this sense 
that Nietzsche understands the nature of legal equality. Slave morality, with its 
essential ingredient of ressentiment, is the direct opposite. 
While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, 
slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside, " what is "different, " 
what is "not itself'; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value 
-posting eye - this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself 
- is of the essence of ressentiment. In order to exist, slave morality always first 
needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external 
stimuli in order to act at all - its action is fundamentally reaction [I; 10] 
Slave morality first looks at "others" to define itself, and, through r"essentiment, is then 
evaluated in negative terms. 
That antisemitism is this ressentinient "freed" of asceticism can be inferred by 
Nietzsche's comments recorded above. 
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, 
an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible for suffering 
- in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent 
his affects, actually or in effigy; for the venting of his affects represents the 
greatest attempt on the part of the suffering to win relief, anaesthesia - the 
narcotic lie cannot help desiring to deaden pain of any kind [III 15]. 
Nietzsche continues toward the end of the same section. 
I suffer: someone must be to blame for it" - thus thinks every sickly sheep. 
But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: "Quite so, my sheep! someone 
must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you are alone to 
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blame for it - you alone are to blame for yourseffl "- This is brazen and false 
enough: but at least one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressesrriment is 
altered [111 15]. 
Nietzsche also explains what occurs without this change of direction. 
The suffering are one and all dreadfully eager and inventive in discovering 
occasions for painful affects; they enjoy being mistrustful and dwelling on 
nasty deeds and imaginary slights; they scour the entrails of their past and. 
present for obscure and questionable occurrences that offer them the 
opportunity to revel in tormenting suspicions and to intoxicate themselves 
with the poison of their own malice; they tear open their oldest wounds, they 
bleed from long-healed scars, they make evildoers out of their friends, wives, 
children, and whoever stands closest to them [III 15]. 33 
Nietzsche argues that it is precisely with the "weakest".... "those who are failures from 
the start", "the born failure" (and here Duhring is mention by name) that ressentiment 
becomes a nihilistic, destructive and antisemitic force. 
They are all men of ressentiment, physiologically unfortunate and worm-eaten, 
a whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge, inexhaustible and insatiable 
outbursts against the fortunate and happy and in masquerades of revenge and 
pretexts for revenge.... Here the worms of vengefulness and rancour swarm; 
here the air stinks of secrets and concealment; here the web of the most 
malicious of all conspiracies is being sown constantly - the conspiracy of the 
suffering against the well-constituted and victorious, here the aspect of the 
victorious is hated [III 14]. 
In the many accounts of antisemitism that I have read none captures as clearly as this 
its nature or attitude of mind. Not only is it a dark and dank world of lies and 
conspiracies, but ressentiment inverts this "evil" into the "good". It is also at this point 
that we can see the notion of mimesis at play, the idea that under the guise of 
ressentiment, the "unmediated slave" desires nothing other than to occupy the position 
of power that he ascribes to his enemy, 
And what mendaciousness is employed to disguise that this hatred is hatred! 
What a display of grand words and postures, what an art of "honest calumny! 
These failures: what noble eloquence flows from their lips. How much sugary, 
slimy, humble submissiveness swims in their eyes! What do they really want? 
At least to represent justice, love, wisdom, superiority - that is the ambition of 
the "lowest", the sick. Admire above all the forger's skill with which the stamp 
of virtue, even the ring, the golden-sounding ring, is here counterfeited. They 
monopolise virtue, these weak, hopelessly sick people, there is no doubt of it: 
33 This description, that harkens to the idea of non-forgetful Ines, is, of course, in strict opposition to the 
idea of law and its ability to "forget", or at least " to let things go, once punishment has taken place. 
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"tive alone are the good and just, " they say, "we alone are the homines bonae 
voluntai"is [men of good will] [III; 14] F 
Here, Nietzsche has indicated the power of r"essentiment. The language in which it 
manifests itself is the language of its "other", law and legal subjectivity, or "justice". 
But, as Nietzsche states, 
.... as for Duhring's specific proposition that the home of 
justice is to be sought. 
in the sphere of the reactive feelings, one is obliged for truth's sake to counter 
it with a blunt antithesis: the last sphere to be conquered by the spirit of justice 
is the sphere of the reactive feelings! [II; 11] 
Antisemitism can, therefore, be said to be the outcome of the attempt by the slave - 
too weak to live by any discipline - to confront the noble in a spirit of animosity and 
hostility, and to invert the valuation so that the "good", and the just, become the 
"evil". One could say that antisemitism represents the destruction of any patience or 
discipline - the exchange of the nothingness of the man of ressentiment for 
everything he can never possess. He tries to obtain what takes others - the others he 
despises (himself) - harsh and unremitting discipline or self-mastery. The language of 
exchange is not inappropriate. 
They walk among us as embodied reproaches, as warnings to us - as if health, 
well-constitudentness, strength, pride, and the sense of power were in 
themselves necessarily vicious things for which one must pay some day and 
pay bitterly: how ready they themselves are at bottom to make one pay; how 
they crave to be hangmen. There is an abundance of the vengeful disguised as 
judges, who constantly bear the word "justice" in their mouths like poisonous 
spittle, always with pursed lips, always ready to spit upon all who are not 
discontented but go their ways in good spirits [III; 14]. 
Nietzsche concludes with the following comment, 
The will of the weak to represent some form of superiority, their instinct for 
devious paths to tyranny over the healthy - where can it not be discovered, this 
will to power of the weakest [III; 14]. 
In this account of antisemitism and its causes, Nietzsche has indicated the way in 
which the "weak", those who can stand neither the harshness of the demands made 
upon modern man in the world of legal relations of exchange, nor the discipline of 
asceticism, seek to destroy first the former and then the latter in order to gain the 
immediate "Kingdom of God". He has also indicated the way that this attempt at 
exchange by the weak appears in the language of that which it seeks to destroy - 
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justice. Perhaps most important, however, is Nietzsche's recognition that it is law itself 
that brings into existence its opposition. Whilst in the normal course of affairs this 
opposition and its confrontation is deferred or mediated, antisemitism arises when its 
"defence mechanisms" no longer bind the weakest of the weak. 
Nietzsche thus offers an account of the modernity of antisemitism in terms of its. 
relationship to society as the realm of legally mediated exchange relations. One 
question remains unanswered though? Why should the self-hatred of the antisemites 
find its point of reference in the Jews.? 
The first point to note is that in his discussion of ressentiment, Max Scheler34 makes 
the point that one of the characteristics of ressentiment is its ability to grow stronger 
the more its basic ingredients, such as revenge or envy, lose their specific object. As 
we have seen, Nietzsche's "specific object" is the nature of society itself as it 
constrains the (instinctual) will to power. But this is a radical idea (in a way more 
critical than many Marxist ideologies), and one that modern nian, least of all the "bad 
conscience", cannot recognise. Whilst helpful, Scheler's observations avoids the 
question why should the ressentiment that arises with (and because of) modern 
society, find its outlet against the Jeus? 
Nietzsche does not directly provide an answer. One can, however, be inferred from his 
writings. Yet, as we shall see, even this implied answer leads to certain problems, 
many of which are repeated within the body of critical theories of antisemitism as a 
whole. 
The first essay of the Genealogy "Good and Bad", "Good and Evil", can be read as an 
analogy of the development first of Judaism and then of Christianity from their 
emergence from the Classical World of Greece and Rome. In this essay "Judaism" is 
the Priestly religion of ressentiment par excellence through which the classical world 
was lost, and Christianity develops out of Judaism, but strengthens and deepens the 
notion of ressentiment. 
34 Ressentiment; Max Scheler, 1961, Free Press, New York 
66 
It is also interesting to note that the morality that Nietzsche discusses in terms of legal 
subjectivity, especially the idea of "equivalencies" has many characteristics in 
common with Old testament rules. Think, for example of regarding an eye for an 
eye. 35 Similarly, the asceticism of the third essay bears a striking resemblance to the 
German Reformation movement. In both of these examples, Nietzsche implies that the. 
successor turns upon its progenitors. Indeed, in some comments, one can see the idea 
of a Pauline Christianity that acts to deny the law and the legal morality of the Old 
Testament. The secular version of this account is repeated in the second and third 
essay. 
The point to note is that despite Nietzsche's whole-hearted anti-antisemitism, it could 
be argued that, Nietzsche ultimately conflates "the Jews" of the first essay with the 
law of the second and third essays. Such a move is open to various interpretations. 
First, one could maintain that Nietzsche's linkage of "the Jews" and society is itself an 
inversion. It is not, however, the inversion of ressentiment, but rather is one that 
shows the law to be "noble" and not the "evil" of the "bad conscience" of 
ressentiment. Alternatively, one could argue that Nietzsche believed that it was "the 
Jews" who in fact, actually introduced exchange-relations into the static world of 
feudalism. If, as he argues, this coincides with notions of freedom and rights, this is to 
be taken as a "compliment" to Jews. 
Recently, there has been a debate about Nietzsche's "attitude" to "the Jews". 36 All that 
can be said in the present context is that there is little doubt that Nietzsche brings out 
(and probably adopts) an ambivalent attitude to modernity and to its notion of 
freedom. Thus, Nietzsche's ambivalence to the Jews mirrors precisely his ambivalence 
to modernity itself. The consequence of this view is that it is "the Jews" who become 
the embodiment of modernity. On one level, this is precisely the position adopted by 
antisemitism. Whilst, this of course, could be the very point Nietzsche is making, it 
A parody of Feuerbach, perhaps? See: Essence of Christianity, trans, George Eliot, 1957, New York 
and London; in Carlbach 1978. 
'G See, for example, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality; ed. Richard Schacht, 1994, University of 
California, London. and Judaism and Modernity; Gillian Rose, 1993, Blackwell, Oxford 
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appears, on a more generous interpretation, that the separation of his critique -of 
F 
antisemitism from the phenomenon itself, especially the position he himself is taking 
as to "the Jews" role in history, is rather problematic. The conflation of Jews, law and 
modernity can be evidence of this uncertainty, and is replicated in many of the 
accounts that follow. In other words, Nietzsche's ambivalence of modernity is 
synonymous with his ambivalence of "the Jews". 
Many of Nietzsche's themes are developed in later critical theories of antisemitism. 
Many, for example, have recourse to the idea that modernity represents to a certain 
degree, the repression of certain aspects of nature - that man's domination over nature 
results in the opposite relationship. This is a theme developed by Adorno and 
Horkheimer [1973]. There is also the idea in the Genealogy of the gradual distinction 
between individualism and community. Whilst in Nietzsche's thought, these two 
aspects remain closely knitted together, we can see in later writings the distinction its 
distance increasing, such as in Sartre [1995] 
In more general terms, Nietzsche as was Marx [1992] was concerned to understand 
the manner in which claims to universalism give rise simultaneously to its antithesis 
of particularism and the way that the universalism comes to be perceived as the 
characteristic of a particular group, in this case "the Jews". Moreover, as in Marx, and 
critical theory up to the intervention of post-modernity, this dichotomy between 
universalism and particularism, and its location around the "Jewish Question", appears 
through the description of society as the economic realm of exchange. In this way, 
Nietzsche work can be read as a supplement to Marx and the Marxist tradition, and 
not as its antithesis. 
One final point remains. Although it may be a truism, Nietzsche was a theorists very 
much of his time. Despite the fact that he recognised the phenomenon of antisemitism 
and attempted to comprehend it in the context of modernity, he still relied upon pre- 
modern ideas of both the Jews and antisemitism. Thus, despite the richness and 
originality of his account, he still perceived antisemitism to be related in some 
fundamental way to religious animosity; in this case to the harshness of Jewish 
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"legalistic morality". As will be discussed, he shares this idea with many other critical 
f 
theorists of antisemitism. 
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Chapter 4 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Antisemitism: Between Rights and Ressentiment 
F 
In this chapter, I shall examine Jean-Paul Sartre's (1905 - 1980) reflections on the 
causes of modern antisemitism. These reflections were set down in writing in the 
latter half of 1944 and published in France in 1946 under the title Reflexions site la 
Question Juive. In 1948 it appeared in English under the title Anti-Semite and Jeiv. 
Two observations as to these bibliographical details are especially relevant. First, is 
the fact that the work was written before the full extent of the mass murders 
committed by the Nazis became known to the majority of the population. This point is 
reflected in the fact that Sartre's account on the question of antisemitism is not read 
through the prism of the holocaust and, in some ways, therefore, belongs to the earlier 
tradition of critical thinking of antisemitism. This location of Sartre's thinking is also 
evident (and this is the second point) in the French title of the work (literally 
translated as Reflections on the Jelvish Question) which echoes a 19th century 
perspective of the issue. Indeed, in many respects, the "answer" Sartre provides to this 
"question" is equally reminiscent of earlier times: ultimately, assimilation into a 
society in which all differences and distinctions have been overcome in the name of 
universal humanity. 
The combination of the French and English titles of the work reflects the 
methodological approach with which Sartre addresses the subject of his enquiry. This 
method foreshadows the methodological concerns that he was to make explicit some 
37 sixteen years later in The Problem of Method. 
Following the publication of Being and Nothingness in 1943, Sartre's philosophy was 
criticised by many for concentrating too exclusively on subjective experience at the 
expense of objective conditions. As Hazel E. Barnes notes in her 1968 introduction to 
3' The Problem of Method (which appeared in the United States as Search for a Method) is the title of 
the first section of Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason. (1968) 
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Search for a Method, these critical comments highlighted the fact that "his philosophy 
allowed no room for any positive social theory. The individual consciousness was 
splendidly independent - and alone"[ 1968; vä]. 
38 Anti-Semite and Jetiv reflects Sartre's 
answer to these concerns. Here, Sartre avoids explaining antisemtism by relying upon 
either entirely subjective factors or impersonal "objective" factors. 
Anticipating many of the methodological concerns he expressed in Method, Sartre's 
thesis of antisemitism in Anti-Semite and Jew is premised upon the idea that the 
antisemite "chooses" himself from within his situation in modern society, and that that 
subjective choice then rebounds upon those objective conditions. Sartre implies that as 
a consequence the very categories in his account of antisemitism - anti-Semite and 
Jew - cannot be identified a priori. Rather, they must be discovered through analysis 
of their conditions of emergence - objective and subjective - and the dialectical 
relationship that exists between them. 
Sartre relies heavily on Marx's On the Jewish Question [1844] in his description of the 
objective nature of modern society and modern social relations. He depicts modern 
society as comprising formally equal and abstract legal subjects, each pursuing 
individual and particular interests in a competitive struggle of all against all, and whose 
relations are mediated through the abstract categories of universal law. One of the 
consequences of this situation is that any sense of collectively or union with others 
dissipates. Instead, Sartre argues that this social individual experiences a profound 
feeling of isolation that is almost unbearable. It appears to Sartre that modem social 
individuals are constantly weighed down by a sense of personal and unavoidable 
responsibility that arises from their existence in modern society; their actions, their 
successes and/or failures appear to themselves to be entirely their own responsibility. It 
is in this situation that they choose themselves as antisemites. Indeed, it is their 
opposition to the Jews that "fixes" them, or gives them a feeling of "stability". 
Sartre sees this choice as a strategy to cope with feelings of isolation, alienation and 
responsibility. He suggests it is a psychological response which gives rise to a "feeling" 
's I Iazel E. Barnes" Introduction- to Search for a Method (1968), Vantage Books, New York. 
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of community or group existence. It involves the rejection and devaluation of the 
principles on which that society is premised and their "projection" onto the Jews. In this 
way, therefore, the alienated individual creates for himself an alternative means of 
perceiving the world resplendent with its own set of principles and which give rise to an 
alternative way of being-in-the-world in which "community" is prioritised over 
individuality and is made cohesive by its antisemitic "confrontation" with the Jews. 
However, one's subjective choice is always mediated by one's individual situation in 
society. The choice to become an antisemite, therefore, is narrowed through one's class 
position. It is for this reason that Sartre believes that it is only open to the middle-class 
to make that choice. Sartre argues that because of their relation to the means of 
production, the working-class perceive the social world in terms of the historical 
confrontation between classes premised upon laws that reflect this class's objectification 
and that govern the "things" or commodities upon which they work. Conversely, the 
middle-class, whose economic function Sartre describes as "non-productive" and who, 
therefore, relate to the world through their objective economic condition and subjective 
experience, perceive social relations and social developments as the outcome of the 
confrontation between groups of humans and their alleged attributes. 
Because of their perspective that sees the world in terms of human synthesis, the world 
is for the middle-class divided into different categories of human groups, each with its 
own alleged particularistic "essence". Thus, for the antisemite, driven as he is by 
ressentiment and through which his own view of himself emerges as the personification 
of "good", the Jews become the essence of evil. As such, the Jews are "free" only to 
choose how to utilise that evil in their thought and actions. Through the prism of their 
perception, antisemite's of the middle-class have re-ordered the world in a Manichean 
struggle between good and evil with the community the embodiment of "good" and the 
Jew the embodiment of "evil". Sartre thus has defined for this class an alternative mode 
of "being together" which appears for them to have overcome the existential isolation 
and class insecurity produced by the objective conditions of bourgeois capitalist social 
relations. The central axis of this alternative community is its opposition to the Jews. 
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Sartre's explanation for why it was the Jews who were excluded from the community 
postulates a mythical relationship to the soil which neutralises bourgeois concepts of 
private property. As against abstract notions of property, the alienated and constantly 
economically threatened member of the middle-class imagines an alleged historical 
connection with that land that he believes constitutes what Sartre terms a "primitive" 
possession [1995; 23]. The value of such an imagining is that unlike bourgeois private. 
property which is, in theory accessible to all through personal effort, primitive 
ownership is limited only to those of the alleged "historical (i. e. national) 
community"[1995; 79ff]. This imagined "nation", with its inherently limited 
membership premised upon inherited and ascriptive "rights", is posed against the 
openness (and struggle) of the universality and equality of modern society and the state. 
Because this notion of possession resides on its purported connection with the past, it 
is by definition antisemitic since it points to a time before the Jews "entered history" 
Since the Jews were only granted admission to the modern body politic through their 
being granted the Rights of Citizen and Rights of Man in the late-18th and early 19th 
centuries, they are barred aforehand from this mythical connection between history 
and land. They therefore can never be a part of the alternative community, and 
become the scapegoat for the uncertainties of modern existence. 
Furthermore, all notions of possession imply that one can be dispossessed or robbed. 
In the eyes of the antisemitic community the thief can only be the one who has no 
claim to "legitimate" possession - the Jews. And, as noted above, since the antisemite 
sees the Jews as the embodiment of evil it is evident that the primitive community 
must be on constant guard. 
The perception of primitive ownership as an alternative to legal ownership is 
extended beyond the possession of land. Sartre argues that all objects come to be 
endowed with an alternative, intangible mythical value emanating from the alleged 
connection to the past that is deemed to capture its real significance beyond the 
spiritlessness of "objective" use and exchange value. Thus, the Jew can own objects 
legally and understand them rationally, but can never truly possess them or appreciate 
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them for what they "really" are. Indeed, Sartre argues that as soon as the Jew touches 
these things, the other, mystical value comes to the fore and automatically dispossesses 
the Jew. Thus, the potential (social) achievements and successes open to the Jew count 
for nothing in the face of the "true" possessors. Moreover, as noted above, this 
imaginative form of possession allows the "true countrymen" to possess and to 
participate in objects without responsibility and without the struggle necessary within. 
the objective conditions of modem society. In this way, the alienated members of the 
middle-class, in their own imagination, become members of a "ruling-class"; a fact that 
could never occur objectively. 
Not only modern forms of property ownership are discredited in this way. Other 
predicates of modernity such as reason, intelligence, labour and merit can be 
denigrated as "Jewish", not only because they are the other to "primitive" values and 
so represent the only way Jews can own "things", but also because they achieved their 
dominance in the social world at the same time (and were the means by which) Jews 
were emancipated. Consequently, from the perspective of the collectivity of 
antisemites, these "Jewish" values can never be accorded importance and the 
antisemites can turn their back on the dictates of modern society. The antisemite, now 
safely ensconced in a community and having successfully escaped the fact of 
responsibility, comes to associate modern society - its equality, its law, its rights, its 
property, its values and its difficulties - with the Jews. 
Sartre's account illustrates a theme common to many of the critical theoretical 
accounts of antisemitism: namely the way in which antisemitism replaces the alleged 
artificiality of the social world with naturalisation of the categories of antisemite and 
Jew. Thus, Sartre argues that 
[the Jew] can never have the security of the "Aryan", firmly established on his 
land and so certain of his property that he can even forget that he is a 
proprietor and see the bond that united him to his country as natural [1995; 
133, emphasis in the original]. 
Additionally, from the antisemite's perspective, whilst the Jew is the personification 
of the artifice of modernity, he is, simultaneously naturalised as the embodiment of an 
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evil that is beyond the control of subjective choice. The implication of this apparent 
contradiction is the antisemitic idea that "underneath" the modern social Jew there 
"lurks" the "true" (entirely "evil") "true" and "unchanging" Jew. 
At first sight, it is the democrat as representative of the universalism of the modern 
body politic, who should act as friend and defender of the Jews. However, not only do. 
the principles of universal legal rights afford the Jews little protection, they are 
actually inimical to their safety. Sartre explains this paradox with reference to the 
contradictions that surround the Jews' position in modern society. He notes that on the 
one hand, the Jew enters modern society as a "man" like all others; formally, he is 
treated as all others. On the other hand, the Jewish person is still perceived as a "Jew". 
For Sartre, the Jews' equivocal position arises because of the historical imagery that 
attaches to them as a group. 39 
Prior to their emancipation, the Jews were seen as the loathed killers of Christ and, 
because of the medieval Church's economic prohibitions, were identified with usury 
and money. Despite the rise of secularism and the end of such restrictions Sartre 
maintains that this anti-Jewish image remains. Thus, the Jews are over-determined in 
the modern social context, existing both as an abstract "man" and as a "Jew". 
The democrat will not take any action against the antisernite since antisemtism is 
perceived as an exercise of free speech and individual opinion and, as such, represents 
a fundamental "human" right (as evidenced in the various charters and declarations). 
Yet, Sartre illustrates that liberalism's failure is far more pernicious than such a 
position of "neutrality" implies, and, in fact, threatens the Jews' very existence. His 
argument rests on the ambivalent nature of the Jews' position within a legally-based 
society premised upon formal (abstract) equality. 
The threat is intensified in times of crisis which, Sartre argues, are concurrent with the 
predominance of antisemitism. At these periods, usually of social and political 
'`' It is to be noted that this idea of historical imagery is to be distinguished from the antisemite's 
imagined past. 
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disintegration, the rise of the nation is at its strongest. Fearful of its own demise, the 
state adopts an attitude of tolerance toward the antisemitic community in the name of 
"national unity". Consequently, at the very moment that the Jews seek and need 
protection they are denied it. Instead, the Jews become the sacrificial lamb on the alter 
of unity. In this way, the nation usurps the state, particularity negates universality. 
The democrat poses a threat to the Jews because that he can only recognise people 
through the concept of universal "man". Consequently, it is beyond the perception of 
this believer in universality to even recognise a "Jewish Question". Indeed, the notion 
of a collective (of the Jews) fills the democrat with fear lest it awake a particularist 
consciousness within the midst of a universalist society. Thus, liberalism attempts to 
separate the individual from his concrete relations of which religion and "ethnicity" 
are specific aspects "in order to plunge him into the democratic crucible whence he 
will emerge naked and alone, an individual and solitary particle like all other 
particles. " [1995; 57]. 
It is for this reason that, as the title of this chapter makes clear, the Jews of modernity 
are for Sartre, caught between rights and ressentiment, 
The anti-Semite reproaches the Jew with being Jewish; the democrat 
reproaches him wilfully with considering himself a Jew. Between his enemy 
and his defender, the Jew is in a difficult situation: apparently he can do no 
more than choose the sauce with which he will be devoured.... For a Jew, 
conscious and proud of being Jewish, asserting his claim to be a member of 
the Jewish community without ignoring on that account the bonds which unite 
him to the national community, there may not be so much difference between 
the anti-Semite and the democrat. The former wishes to destroy him as a man 
and leave nothing in him but the Jew, the pariah, the untouchable; the latter 
wishes to destroy him as a Jew and leave nothing in him but the man, the 
abstract and universal subject of the rights of man and the rights of citizen 
[1995; 58,57, emphasis in the original]. 
It is for these reasons that the Jews are caught between rights and ressentiment, state 
and nation. Thus, whilst Jews are theoretically free to attain all or any social and 
political position and honour as universal rights-bearing individuals, they nonetheless, 
at one and the same time, remain Jews. This gives rise to the contradiction of a Jewish 
businessman, a Jewish politician, etc.. Therefore, just at the moment of social or 
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political success, the nation, "amorphous, diffused, omnipresent - appears before him 
as if in brief flashes of lightning and refuses to take him in" [1995; 80]. The Jew, 
therefore, can never escape his situation of being a Jew. 
Sartre argues that this situation of being a Jew arises as a product of the antisemitic 
imagination. As a consequence, it appears to the antisemite and their national 
community as the embodiment of all those values of modern society that give rise to 
their avenues of flight. The creation of a distinct group of "the Jews ", placed in the 
position of the pariah or "other", for Sartre does not imply complete passivity. In 
keeping with his methodological premises, he argues that Jewish agency is limited to 
that of responding to their ("objectively" created40) situation of being cast as the Jews. 
As I shall explain, this response can take one of two forms, "inauthenticity" or 
"authenticity". 
Sartre's thesis begins from the assumption that there is nothing inherent in a Jew to 
make them a Jew. A Jew is not different from a non-Jew in any substantive way. 
Rather, the Jew arises through their being labelled as a Jew by others (the antisemites) 
and it is precisely this marking of the Jew as a Jew that places them in a situation of 
being a Jew. However, whereas the antisemite can choose from within their own 
situation to be an antisemite or not, the Jew has no such freedom. To be a Jew, in 
other words, is not within the realm of their choice. Rather, the only choice available 
to the Jew is, as noted above, how to respond? 
Sartre characterises one of the two possible responses as "authentic". Authenticity is 
defined as 
[h]aving a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, in assuming the 
responsibilities and risks that it involves, in accepting it in pride or 
humiliation, sometimes in horror and hate [1995; 901. 
Choosing "authenticity", therefore, means the Jew overtly accepting their 
situation of being a Jew and living in a manner that refuses to deny that fact. 1 
40 `objective" in the sense that it not of their choosing. 
41 It is to be noted, however, that Sartre does not fully develop what it means to live "authentically". 
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Conversely, acting "inauthentically" is an attempt to deny the condition of being "the 
Jew". The inauthentic Jew attempts to flee from his situation as Jew 'and the 
responsibility that flows from it. Sartre argues that the goal of this flight is to deny one's 
"situation of a Jew" [1995; 93]. The paradoxical result of this attempt at escape, 
however, is to affirm the situation of his "Jewishness". The inauthentic Jew internalises 
what is placed upon him externally - he looks in to himself to "identify" his Jewishness 
so as to deny it. Thus, the inauthentic Jew accepts as his starting point the antisemite's 
claim that there is something distinctive about him as a Jew, even though those 
distinctive Jewish traits are only imagined by the antisemites. The consequence of the 
attempt to deny these imaginary traits is to reproduce them by imagining that he sees 
them in himself and in all other Jews. 
Sartre notes that a further consequence of the inauthenticity of denial is for the Jew to 
adhere unremittingly to the idea of modem Enlightenment values and to deny the 
existence of any remnant of particularism or superstition. For example, the Jew will 
value wealth measured according to the universal value of money since 
[a]ppropriation by purchase does not depend on the race of the buyer; it does not 
vary with his idiosyncracies. The price of the object is set in reference to any 
buyer, who is set apart only by the fact that he has the amount written on the 
ticket. And when the sum is paid, the buyer is legally proprietor of the object. 
Thus property by purchase is an abstract and universal form of proprietorship, in 
contrast to the singular and irrational ownership by participation. [1995; 126- 
127, emphasis in the original]. 
However, the more the Jew values universality, the more the antisemite will affirm the 
mystical values he perceives as giving rise to "true", or historical possession. In this 
way, therefore, the clash of values between law and nation, rights and ressentinient, will 
not only remain, but will actually increase. Again, therefore, the Jews' denial of their 
being in the situation of the Jew feeds into and increases antiseinitism. 
Thus, for Sartre, the attempt at negation and denial is ultimately futile. Being in the 
situation of a Jew, like one's Jewishness itself, is not self-determined, but is determined 
by others, and these others will not allow the Jew to escape his situation. The outcome 
of this attempt, however, is that one creates a means of identifying oneself and others as 
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Jews, and so, unwittingly, re-affirms a Jewish collectivity of "Others", perpetuating the 
dialectic of Antisemite and Jew and therefore antisemitism. In internally misrecognizing 
oneself as "Jewish", one legitimises the external marking by the antisemite. 
In the concluding passages of Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre proposes a programme of 
action to combat antisemitism. Ultimately, his goal is one of assimilation: the 
membership in a nation premised upon an inclusive and "authentic" nationalism. Yet, 
achieving this aim is, he believes, only possible with a structural change in objective 
social and political conditions which result in ending the conditions of alienation in 
which the individual can choose to be an antisemite. Such a change would be brought 
about by working-class revolutionary praxis. Seeing this transformation as a 
possibility only for the future, Sartre advocates certain temporary measures that will 
not only hasten its arrival, but also would allow Jews to live authentically. 
What we propose here is a concrete liberalism. By that we mean that all 
persons who through their work collaborate toward the greatness of a 
country have the full rights of that country. What gives them this right is 
not the possession of a problematical and abstract "human nature", but 
their active participation in the life of the society. This means, then, that 
the Jews - and likewise the Arabs and the Negroes - from the moment 
that they are participants in the national enterprise, have a right in that 
enterprise; they are citizens. But they have these rights as Jews, Negroes, 
or Arabs - that is, as concrete persons [1995; 146]. 
Finally, Sartre identifies the central theme and objective of his thesis; the reversal of 
the "Jewish Question" into one of the antisemite: 
Richard Wright, the Negro writer said recently: There is no Negro problem in 
the United States, there is only a White problem:. In the same way, we must 
say that anti-Semitism is our problem. Since we are not guilty and run the risk 
of being its victims - yes, we too - we must be very blind indeed not to see that 
it our concern in the highest degree. It is not up to the Jews first of all to form 
a militant league against anti-Semitism; it is up to us [1995; 152]. 
Sartre insists throughout that the emergence of antisemitism must be understood 
through a critique of the nature of modernity itself. For Sartre, antisemitism enters the 
world through its negative relationship with the praxis of modern social and political 
relations. Sartre thus understand antisemitism as a product of ressentiment brought 
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about by the limits and deficiencies of the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and 
equality mediated through the legal notion of rights. 
This methodological approach that brings to light certain problems with his 
explanation of antisemitism. As I have discussed, Sartre understands antisemitism as 
arising through a subjective response to objective conditions. The implication of this 
thesis is that the objective conditions themselves, i. e. social and legal relations, do not 
of themselves contain any ambivalence between equality and inequality or the 
universality of emancipation and the particularity of antisemitism. Rights and 
f"essentiment in other words, are located in two related, but ultimately distinct spheres. 
This division is itself reflected in Sartre's idea that antisemitism arises from within the 
imagination of the antisemite. 
A question can also be raised as to whether Sartre has not over-compensated in Anti- 
Semite and Jew for the criticisms that were levelled against his thought as it appeared in 
Being and Nothingness. In Antl-Senzite and Jew, Sartre appears to comes close to 
arguing that it is one's class position that determines whether one can be an antisemite or 
not. As such, it appears that one's objective position within the relations of production is 
the determining factor in creating the antisemite and that one's subjective choice is 
correspondingly determined by the laws which govern that objective structure. Again, 
such a perspective is further evidenced by his rather bold statement that the working 
class cannot be antisernitic because of their relationship to the means of production and 
the laws that govern that productive system. In other words, Sartre never quite breaks 
free, despite his intentions, of a "base/superstructure" thesis of antisemitism, in which 
the economic base determines the superstructure. 
These comments relate to another potential weakness in Sartre's account. His 
explanation of the emergence of the antisemite and their retreat into a collective, 
contains an echo of Nietzsche's analysis of the emergence of ressenlinient in the face 
of the harshness of autonomy. Sartre states: 
Antisemitism, in short is fear of the human condition. The anti-Semite is a 
man who wishes to be a pitiless stone, a furious torrent, a devastating 
thunderbolt - anything except a man [ 1995; 54]. 
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The most distinct difference, however, between the two approaches is that Sartre fixes 
the categories that he argues have emerged. This difference is reflected in Sartre's idea 
that once the choice has been made, it becomes the very being of the individual, so 
that one's whole essence then is, in this case, antisemitic or Jewish or democratic. In 
Sartre's account, therefore, one is either or one is not an antisemite. Conversely , in 
Nietzsche, there is very much evident the idea that the dialectic between rights and 
ressentiment and its outburst as antisemitism is always in question. One never knows, 
or can know, beforehand who will or who will not turn antisemitic, who will or will 
not be cast in the roles of oppressor and oppressed. 42 (This is a point Sartre 
disqualifies with his avowal that the working-class could not become antisemites). 
Sartre's theoretical understanding appears to contradict many empirical accounts of 
those in Germany who could not believe that so many of their "friends" and 
acquaintances should suddenly walk passed them on the street. 43 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Sartre's explanation of antisemitism is his 
idea that the Jews only exist in modernity as "the Jews" through the imaginings of the 
antisemite. Hannah Arendt, for example, criticises Sartre for this view [Arendt, 1979; 
xv]. 
Richard Bernstein, however, argues that Sartre is merely referring to the way in which 
the antisemite creates the Jew as a pariah, as the Other of modernity. 44 [Bernstein, 
1996; 195-197]. Michael Waltzer's view on the controversy [Sartre, 1995; xixff] is 
that Sartre's political goal is the assimilation of all in the name of an "authentic" 
inclusive and humanist nation, in which the Jews will lose their particular 
characteristics and, the logic of this view supports Arendt's criticism. Consequently, 
the relationship between the concept of "the Jews" and flesh and blood Jews is absent 
from Sartre's thinking. 
42 For a discussion of Nietzsche account of the relationship of ressentiment and antisemitism, sec 
above: Chapter 2. 
'' This point is referred to in one of Adorno's reflections of his life in pre-war Germany. 
43 Bernstein also points to the similarity between Sartre's category of ""authentic" and "inauthentic" Jew 
and Arendt's "pariah" and "parvenu". Sec Bernstein; 1996; 195-196] 
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Despite this criticism, Sartre has refused to rely upon an ahistorical and asocial notion 
of either the Jew or the antisemite. As such, his understanding remains clearly in line 
with his method that insists that such concepts cannot be found before and outside the 
phenomenon under discussion and then "simply" applied. He is clear that they are part 
of the phenomenon. 
Finally, one can challenge Sartre's insistence that the answer to the problem of 
antisemitism is assimilation. It could be argued that, at least at this point in his writing, 
Sartre was "situated" within a specifically French tradition which emerged from the 
experience of the French Revolution. This revolutionary tradition includes the notion of 
an inclusive citizenship premised upon legal rights regardless of one's alleged 
"ethnicity". It is, perhaps, this fact that accounts for Sartre's call for all to be included in 
the French state provided that they work toward "the greatness of the country". 
Sartre does not accept this tradition uncritically, however, and highlights the 
contradictions that have emerged since the Revolution within and between the once all 
embracing concept of "nation-state". Sartre's enquiry is to a certain extent fuelled by this 
observation and he questions how this once unified concept came to separate and the 
separated elements come to confront each other in a spirit of animosity.. It is also within 
this confrontation, of course, that he addresses the question of antisemitism. 
As we shall see in the following chapter, Hannah Arendt's thesis on antisemitism 
takes Sartre to task, (both explicitly and implicitly) on the last two points - the idea 
that "the Jews" only continue to exist in modernity through the praxis of the 
antisemite; and, that antisemitism can be explained within the theoretical confines of 
the nation-state. 
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Chapter 5f 
Hannah Arendt: The Genealogy of Antisemitism 
It was in the immediate shadow of the holocaust that Hannah Arendt addressed the 
question of antisemitism and developed an understanding of it that stood apart from 
conventional liberal assumptions. 
First, she was critical of what she termed theories of "eternal antisemitism" which 
maintain that from time immemorial (or at least since the birth of Christianity) Jews 
have always been hated and persecuted by Gentiles and that there was accordingly 
nothing radically new about this latest outburst. This way of addressing the question, 
she argued, ignores the determinate character of modern, political antisemitism and its 
difference from all previous forms of antisemitism. 
Second, she was critical of `scapegoat' theories which ignore the question of "why the 
Jews? " in favour of a general theory of the need for or functions of scapegoating. This 
way of understanding antisemitism, she argued, was incapable of addressing the 
specificity of Jews as victims of extermination. She looked to an approach in which 
Jews cease to be the "innocent victim whom the world blames for all its sins" and 
become instead "one group of people among other groups, all of whom are involved 
in the business of this world" [1979; 6]. She emphasises human responsibility, 
including Jewish responsibility for antisemitism. Thus, the Jews do not cease to be co- 
responsible simply because they become victims of the world's injustice. 
Third, she was critical of `victimisation' theories which focus exclusively on the 
antisernite without taking into account the agency and actions of Jews themselves. 
These theories, she argued, can only treat Jews as objects of history, never as its 
purposeful and responsible subjects, and imply the `complete innocence' of the 
victims in a way that denies Jews their own role in human history. 
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Fourth, Arendt was critical of theories of antisemitism, sometimes put forward by 
antisernites themselves, which explain it as the product of the undue political 
influence or monetary wealth of Jews. Drawing on an observation made by de 
Tocqueville, Arendt argued that at no time is a group more vulnerable than when they 
suffer a "rapid loss of real power not accompanied by any considerable decline in their 
fortunes" [1979; 4]. It is at this point, when wealth is dissociated from power, de. 
Tocqueville argued in relation to the French aristocracy, that a previously tolerated 
group is viewed with particular resentment, 
neither oppression nor exploitation as such is ever the main cause for 
resentment; wealth without visible function is much more intolerable because 
nobody can understand why it should be tolerated [ 1979; 4] 
Arendt argued that antisemitism followed similar lines: the Jews were attacked most 
when they had lost their special political functions vis-ä-vis the old nation states. 
The remarkable similarity of arguments and images which time and again were 
spontaneously reproduced have an intimate relationship with the truth they 
distort. We find the Jews always represented as an international trade 
organisation, a world-wide family concern with identical interests everywhere, 
a secret force behind the throne that degrades all visible governments into 
mere facade, or into marionettes whose strings are manipulated from behind 
the scenes. Because of their close relationship to state sources of power, the 
Jews were invariably identified with power, and because of their aloofness 
from society and concentration upon the closed circle of the family, they were 
invariably suspected of working for the destruction of all social structures 
[1979; 28] 
The thesis that at one time some Jews exercised a useful function which offered them 
wealth and power, and that at some later point they lost power but retained their 
wealth, was clearly meant to apply unequally to Jews. The great Jewish financiers, for 
example, had been a tiny minority. 
This leads directly onto the sixth point: Arendt's criticism of theories of antisemitism 
which treat it as an extreme form of ethnic nationalism. She argued that the rise of 
modern, political antisemitism was in an inverse relationship to the decline of 
nationalism and the nation-state. "The fact is", she wrote, that "modern antisemitism 
grew in proportion as traditional nationalism declined and reached its climax at the 
exact moment when the European system of nation-states and its precarious balance 
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of power crashed" [1979; 3]. The Jews were resented as representatives of the nation- 
state by those who came to be excluded from it. 
Seventh, Arendt was critical of theories of antisemitism, like those to be found within 
a Marxist canon, whose focus on class relations and capitalist dynamics leaves no 
space for an understanding of the centrality of antisemitism in the development of. 
modern politics: 
Twentieth-century political developments have driven the Jewish people into 
the storm centre of events; the Jewish Question and antisemitism, relatively 
unimportant phenomena in terms of world politics, became the catalytic agent 
first for the rise of the Nazi movement and the establishment of the 
organisational structure of the Third Reich, in which every citizen had to prove 
that he was not a Jew, then for a world war of unparalleled ferocity, and finally 
the emergence of the unprecedented crime of genocide in the midst of 
Occidental civilisation [1979,3] 
However, and this is the eight point, Arendt was also critical of theories of 
antisemitism which divorce the phenomenon from `wider' issues of the development 
of imperialism and totalitarianism. In its modern political form, antisemitism becomes 
increasingly separated from any internal history of Jewish - Gentile relations and its 
ideological function increasingly loses contact with any reality: 
The emergence of the first antisemitic parties in the 1870's and 1880's marks 
the moment when the limited, factual basis of interest conflict and 
demonstrable experience was transcended, and that road opened which ended 
in the "final solution". From then on, in the era of imperialism, followed by the 
period of totalitarian movements and governments, it is no longer possible to 
isolate the Jewish question or the antisemitic ideology from issues that are 
actually almost completely unrelated to the realities of modern Jewish history. 
And this is not merely and not primarily because these matters played such a 
prominent role in world affairs, but because antisemitism was now being used 
for ulterior purposes that, though their implementation finally claimed Jews as 
their chief victims, left all particular issues of both Jewish and anti-Jewish 
interest far behind [1979; xvi] 
Ninth, Arendt was critical of theories which reify the idea of `the Jews' as if this 
corresponded unproblematically to an empirically verifiable and distinguishable group 
of people. Whether conceived religiously, culturally or ethnically, she argued that the 
same historical processes which gave birth to modern antisemitism also disaggregated 
the unity of Jews. The category of the Jews was certainly not simply the product of 
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modern antisemitism (as it sometimes seemed to be presented in the writing of Jean- 
Paul Sartre) but modern antisemitism reconstituted `the Jews' as a unitary category 
precisely at the point when the process of dissolution of Jews into citizens was 
gathering pace. If the concept of `the Jews' was not created by the antisemitic 
imagination, it was certainly fostered by it. 
Tenth, and lastly, Arendt argued that 
nearly all elements [of antisemitism] that later crystallised in the novel 
totalitarian phenomenon... had hardly been noticed by either learned or public 
opinion because they belonged to a subterranean stream of European history 
where, hidden from the light of the public and the attention of enlightened 
men, they had been able to gather an entirely unexpected virulence [1979; xv] 
In other words, it was because antisernitism was largely hidden from history, except 
for a few "non-Jewish crackpots and Jewish apologetics" [1979; xv], that its virulence 
was so unexpected. 
This reference to "a subterranean stream.... hidden from the light..... " indicates why the 
choice has been made to explicate Arendt's thinking on antisemitism as a genealogy. 
It is a genealogy, first, because it investigates one incident or event and identifies 
several distinct strands or elements of that incident that can be pulled apart. When 
combined they produce the outcome which is the subject of investigation. In the 
present case, that event is the "Dreyfus Affair" and the following eruption of 
antisemitism that occurred in France at the turn of the twentieth century. Arendt's 
approach can be described as a genealogy because it uncovers those distinct strands 
that were previously hidden from history. 
The elements that Arendt identifies in the Dreyfus Affair are in fact the political and 
social principles that were believed to bring into the world freedom and security. 
Consequently, concepts such as "emancipation", "equality" and "rights" are 
interrogated so as to bring to light their meaning within the modern phenomenon of 
antisemitism. Arendt understands antisemitism as arising from within the framework 
of modernity itself, as the consequence of the "normal functioning" of these 
Enlightenment ad liberal principles. However, unlike those before her, such as 
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Nietzsche, who offers a radical critique of morality, finally calling for its overcoming, 
Arendt adopts a far more measured and ambivalent stance to these principles. In this 
way, Arendt differs from many of those who came after her, such as Bauman who 
understands antisernitism as inherent in those principles. Rather, Arendt identifies 
tendencies in these principles whose negativity could only emerge when put into play 
through the praxis of historically located actors. The potentiality that is implicit within. 
Arendt's genealogical method is reflected in her insistence that the outcome as to 
whether freedom or barbarity would prevail could be stated a priori. 
The event that formed a centre-point for Arendt's investigation into antisemitism was 
the Dreyfus Affair that took place in France at the turn of the 19th century. She saw it 
as a "kind of dress rehearsal for the performance of our own time" [1979; 10] which 
demonstrated the `hidden potentialities of antisemitism as a major political weapon 
within the framework of nineteenth-century politics'[1979; 10]. It was around the 
common denominator of antisemitism, expressed in the street-cry of `Death to the 
Jews', that an otherwise disparate collection of groups - the Catholic clergy, the army, 
the aristocracy, the haute-bourgeoisie, the mob and the declasse - could cohere. The 
unholy alliance contained those ruined by financial scandals of the late 19th century: 
the declasse middle classes whose investments in government schemes had collapsed 
in a welter of incompetence, lies and bribery. The fact that Jews only played an 
insignificant role did not rob them of the illusion that they were to blame and that the 
Jews were the real power `behind the throne'. It also contained those who never 
accepted the legitimacy of the new nation-state and the principles of political equality 
on which it rested. Included under this category were the clergy, army officers and 
aristocracy whose animosity to Jews was fuelled not only by their gaining of political 
equality but also by their presence in the world of `society'. It was this aspect of `the 
Affair' that was expressed in the idea of `Jewishness' as a racial characteristic that 
could be overcome neither by political equality nor by social assimilation. Finally, 
there were the bourgeoisie themselves who, although not driven by any direct conflict 
with Jews, were happy to see the blame for financial scandals placed upon the Jews 
and unwilling to act in their defence. 
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Arendt therefore sees the Dreyfus Affair as representing a coming together of political 
and social factors. She sees the Jews' political emancipation as complicated. The Jews' 
developing relationship with the nation-state at the end of the 19th century appeared to 
be one marked by equality, but a combination of political factors ensured that that 
appearance was all it was. Additionally, although the political element determined the 
emergence of antisemitism, Arendt maintains that it is the social elements, and its. 
relationship to the political, that creates antisemitism's genocidal tendencies. 
Beneath the superficial appearance that Jews were now equal rights-bearing persons, 
Arendt argues that civil and political rights were granted to Jews only inasmuch as 
they were Jews and performed specific services - mainly in the form of providing 
much needed financial resources - to the states which granted them these rights. At 
one level this continued an old tradition in which every Royal House would have its 
own `Court Jew', but with the development of modern state machinery the size of 
financial support was vastly increased and the `state-Jews', as Arendt called them, 
could only find the quantities needed through organising the Jewish masses under 
their leadership. Consequently, both the states in question and their Jewish financiers 
were wary of complete Jewish emancipation for fear that as a body they would simply 
dissolve into the classes of civil society. The Jewish financiers demanded and the 
states offered equality as a reward for services rendered; on the other hand, both states 
and financiers sought to retain a distinct set of Jewish `privileges'. Arendt argued that 
it was from this early history of bourgeois society that antisemitic images of the Jews 
were drawn: the identification of Jews with the state, the Jews as the secret power 
behind the throne, the Jews as a unitary and self-regarding entity outside of the nation, 
the Jews as a group that was privileged over the rest of the population, and the state as 
acting on behalf of Jewish interests. Since the large Jewish financial houses, like the 
House of Rothschild, had offices in many different countries, it also gave rise to the 
idea that the Jews were an international force, manipulating nation-states to their own 
purposes. The notion of a `Jewish World Conspiracy', most famously expressed in the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, emerged out of the role of Jews serving as channels of 
communication and peace-brokers in times of international conflict. These images, 
which represented a negative and selective reading of the real history of the Jews in 
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early bourgeois society, took on a force of their own when toward the end of the 19th 
century the rise of imperialism made the function of Jews redundant and Jews became 
perceived as traitors and enemy agents. 
Thus with the defeat of Prussia by the French in 1807 and the ensuing period of 
reform, the Prussian aristocracy, resenting its loss of political power and prestige,. 
began to argue that the state was now in Jewish hands. When the period of reaction 
began after 1815, liberals and radicals often turned anti-Jewish, claiming that under 
the new regime privileges were being granted to the Jews. In the 1870s and 1880s, 
when many of the middle classes lost their savings in a series of financial scandals, 
they pointed to the culpability of Jews as international bankers and financiers without 
commitment to any nation other than their own. The irony of this last period was that, 
at a time when the Jews were losing their position as state-financiers and as 
international mediators, they were finally being granted full political rights. De 
Tocqueville's general rule, that a privileged man is best kicked when he is down, 
seemed to be validated. 
Arendt first introduced the relationship between political and social factors through 
the `garret' of Rahel Varnhagen at the turn of the 18th century. At a time when Jews 
suffered stringent legal and political disabilities, the world of `society' was described 
by Arendt in terms of "almost unbounded communication and intimacy" between 
individuals regardless of religion or rank [1979; 60]. However, when German Jews 
began (albeit unevenly) to be granted political emancipation under the post- 
Napoleonic reforming bureaucracy, `society' began to ditch its Jewish contacts and re- 
locate itself in the homes of the now disenfranchised aristocracy and higher echelons 
of the army. From this time on, Arendt argued, social relations between Jews and 
Gentiles never recovered their innocence. 
With the early idyll of a mixed society something disappeared which was never, in 
any country and at any other time, to return. Never again did any social group accept 
Jews with a free mind and heart. It would be friendly with Jews either because it was 
excited at its own daring and "wickedness" or as a protest against making pariahs of 
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fellow-citizens. But social pariahs the Jews did become wherever they had ceased to 
be political and civil outcasts. 
Arendt argued that the early idyll of a mixed society was from the start illusory and in 
fact premised upon the concept of the `exceptional Jews', especially those who had 
distinguished themselves from their co-religionists in the field of education, who were. 
Jewish but at the same time different from the others. The `exceptional Jew' expressed 
for Arendt an unhealthy mixture of attraction and repulsion that `society' felt toward 
Jews, as well as the cost to Jews themselves (like Rahel Varnhagen) who were 
allowed to play the role of the parvenu only at the expense of breaking with the people 
of their birth. Arendt's story of Rahel Varnhagen concerned the unhappiness of a 
parvenu life in which she was never allowed to forget her Jewish birth and was 
tortured by the memory of it. She lived in a kind of `no-man's land' where she was 
both separated from `her own people' and never secure within her adopted setting. 
It was only when Jews were granted political emancipation, Arendt argued, that all 
strata of society began no longer to see exceptional Jews but the Jews as a group of 
whom the state was ready to make an exception. It was still easy for educated Jews to 
be distinguished and to distinguish themselves from the Jewish masses, but it became 
more difficult once Jews who wished to be admitted into non-Jewish society, had to 
stand out against the phantom of "the Jew". 
No longer would it suffice to distinguish oneself from a more or less unknown 
mass of "backward brethren"; one had to stand out - as an individual who 
could be congratulated on being an exception - from "the Jew", and thus from 
the people as a whole [1979; 61] 
Arendt saw in this social process the beginnings of the `Jewish type' as an assemblage 
of "psychological traits" said to constitute `Jewishness': 
The behaviour patterns of assimilated Jews, determined by this continuous 
concentrated effort to distinguish themselves, created a Jewish type that is 
recognisable everywhere. Instead of being defined by nationality or religion, 
Jews were being transformed into a social group whose members shared 
certain psychological attributes and reactions, the sum total of which 
constituted `Jewishness'. In other words, Judaism became a psychological 
quality and the Jewish Question an involved personal problem for every 
individual Jew [1979; 66]. 
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The idea that `being Jewish' is an innate essence first came to light when the educated 
Jew was forced to live in the space `between pariah and parvenu' and cone to terns 
with his `homelessness' from both Gentile and Jewish society: 
The majority of assimilated Jews thus lived in twilight of favour and 
misfortune and knew with certainty only that both success and failure were 
inextricably linked with the fact that they were Jews [1979; 66]. 
It was a difficult balance and the Jew had to present himself both as Jew and non-Jew. 
It was a balance that was important to maintain, however, because "it was precisely 
this ambiguity of situation and character that made the relationship with the Jews 
attractive" [1979; 66]. The Jews themselves fostered the myth of being `strange and 
exciting', as if their Jewishness really did exist and was worthy of universal interest. 
The concept of "Jewishness" as a racial characteristic, however, only became an 
integral part of antisemitic ideology at a time when Jewish emancipation into a 
disintegrating political world was occurring. At this time, the dialectic of attraction 
and repulsion toward Jews continued, for the doors of society could not resist 
accepting Jews on the basis of their `secret vice', and the more Jews were threatened 
politically, the more society became interested in them. It seems that society's 
ambiguous attitude to the Jews could be satisfied only when they were held 
responsible for some large-scale crime, such as the alleged betrayal committed by 
Dreyfus, who appeared interesting until he was found not to be guilty. Then he could 
be quickly dropped. The section of gentile society that was most interested in these 
newcomers was the bourgeoisie, whose lack of concern with political issues and 
feelings of boredom and ennui could be remedied by the presence of Jews. 
When one Jew's guilt (as in the case of Dreyfus) could be attributed to all others, the 
concept of `Jewishness' had arrived. The idea of `guilt' was itself transformed into 
`vice' - that is, "from an act of will into an inherent, psychological quality which man 
cannot choose or reject but which is imposed upon him from without and which rules 
him as compulsively as the drug rules the addict" [1979; 68]. If in the past "Jews had 
been able to escape from Judaism into conversion, from Jewishness there was no 
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escape. A crime is met with punishment [but] a vice can only be exterminated [1979; 
81]. 
F 
Jews themselves played a part in this process: 
If it is true that "Jewishness" could not have been perverted into an interesting 
vice without a prejudice which considered it a crime, it is also true that such 
perversion was made possible by those Jews who considered it an innate virtue' 
[1979; 83] 
On the one hand, the parvenu plays up his "Jewishness" so as to gain social 
acceptance; on the other, beneath the apparent tolerance of Jews society did not lose 
its instinct for hierarchy. The more equality was realised as a principle of political life, 
the more secretly was society rendered hierarchical [1979; 86]. The more threatened 
the Jews were politically, the more ambiguous was the philosemitism which "ends 
always by adding to political antisemitism that mysterious fanaticism without which 
antisemitism could hardly have become the best slogan for organising the masses 
[1979; 86]. Moreover, a genocidal instinct born of social resentment is multiplied by 
what Arendt calls a "psychological truth in the scapegoat theory" [1979; 86]. If and 
when antisemitic episodes actually lead to antisemitic legislation (as in Germany), the 
society that had "accepted" Jews will seek to purge themselves "of a secret 
viciousness, to cleanse themselves of a stigma which they had mysteriously and 
wickedly loved" [1979; 86]. 
Arendt brought to the surface the origins of antisemitism in the political and social 
history of Jewish emancipation. Her genealogy of antisemitism (Seymour 1999) 
referred to that which was `unaccounted for in political history, hidden under the 
surface of events' [1979; xv]. A purely political history of the causes of antisemitism 
might have explained anti-Jewish legislation or even mass expulsion, but hardly 
wholesale extermination. Modern antisemitic ideology came to the fore when the 
nation-state, the bulwark of the old political order, was in the throes of disintegration 
and an ever-increasing number of people were excluded from the structures of the 
state and civil society. That these elements should crystallise around antisemitism was 
explained not only as the consequence of the fact that the Jews appeared to represent 
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that political body, but also by the fact that, when emancipation and assimilation were 
finally granted, they were based on entry into an increasingly antisemitic and hostile 
world. Stripped of any useful function as possessors of wealth without power, the 
Jews were more exposed to danger than before. It was at this moment that 
antisemitism lost almost any connection with the reality of the world. 
Devoid of any contact with the empirical world, antisemitism crystallised into an 
ideology and became one element amongst others in the new totalitarian world, of 
which the mass killings of the Third Reich was a part. Whilst this later development is 
beyond the scope of the current study, one aspect of the "final catastrophe" is of 
relevance in the present context. Why, Arendt asks, did the institution of rights fail to 
protect the Jews and others once antisemitism had become an "origin of 
totalitarianism"?; why, when those outcast from their body-politic had nothing else to 
rely upon, did they appear to crumble as so many pieces of paper? 
In the section of the Origins entitled "The Perplexities of the Rights of Man", Arendt 
discusses this problem in detail. Her thesis is that from their inception, human rights, 
as encapsulated within the "Rights of Man" had always been inescapably bound up 
with the "right of the people to sovereign self-government", 
man had hardly appeared as a completely emancipated isolated being who 
carried his dignity within himself without reference to some larger 
encompassing order, when he disappeared again into a member of a people. 
From the beginning the paradox involved in the declaration of inalienable 
human rights was that it was reckoned with an "abstract" human being who 
seemed to exist nowhere, for even savages lived in some kind of a social order 
[1979; 291]. 
However, this paradox only fully came to light at precisely the moment that people 
appeared in the world whose only claim to protection rested precisely on these 
"abstract" human rights. Thus, as Arendt observes, even before one could claim their 
human rights, one first needed to possess a "right to have rights" -a "right to belong to 
some kind of organised community" [1979; 296,297]. Yet, it was exactly this 
fundamental, prior and hitherto invisible "grundnorm" that those cast out from their 
place of residence were lacking. Without membership of a sovereign state, therefore, 
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human rights, hitherto believed to be "inalienable", were unenforceable and to all 
intents and purposes, meaningless. 
f 
Arendt argues that it was not so much the dispossessed's exclusion from one body 
politic that was to prove fatal to so many, but rather that no space remained in the 
world that was not incorporated within the system of nations, 
[n]obody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time considered under 
the image of a family of nations, had reached the stage where whoever was 
thrown of these tightly organised closed communities found himself thrown 
out of the family of nations altogether [1979; 294] 
That the loss of membership from one's own national community led to such complete 
exclusion arose also from the fact that within this tightly knit family, each body politic 
was connected with others through various international treaties, the consequence of 
which was that a person's legal status, provided by their initial citizenship, travelled 
with the person themselves. As such, "whoever is no longer caught [in the web spun 
by this organisation of nations] finds himself out of legality altogether" [1979; 294]. 
From that moment on, in a world where "the loss of polity itself expels [a person] 
from humanity" [1979; 297], one's continued existence, one's life, is no longer 
guaranteed, but depends either on the kindness and charity of others, or is ended by 
those who had ensured that the verdict of "superfluousness" they had passed on these 
people was shared with others. In this way, 
because the incredible plight of an ever-growing group of innocent people was 
like a practical demonstration of the totalitarian movements' cynical claims 
that no such thing as inalienable rights existed and that the affirmations of the 
democracies to the contrary were mere prejudice, hypocrisy, and cowardice in 
the face of the cruel majesty of a new world. The very phrase "human rights" 
became for all concerned - victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike - the 
evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy [1979; 
269] 
Despite her critique of the limitations of human rights, Arendt maintains that they are 
still of significance for the development of a civilised world. Following Aristotle, 
Arendt characterises a truly lunnian life as one spent within a political community, a 
sphere in which rights and equality are both desirable and necessary. Indeed, she notes 
that the first step the Nazis took on their way to extermination was to deprive Jews of 
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their political and civil rights. Thus, Arendt notes the correspondence between the 
F 
denial of rights and the loss of civilisation. 
Arendt's critique of rights must be read in the context of the development that arose as 
a consequence of imperialism whereby the nation subsumed the function of the state, 
and in which the universality of rights was replaced with the particularity of ethnicity. 
as the mark of membership. Correspondingly, Arendt makes a distinction between the 
realm of public life and the realm of private life. Whilst in public, i. e. political life, 
relations between citizens should be governed by the principles of equality, justice and 
rights, within the realm of private life, in which individuals' innate uniqueness cannot 
and should not be suppressed, these political principles are inapplicable. Instead, 
relations in private life, 
can adequately be dealt with only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship 
and sympathy, or by the great and incalculable grace of love, which says with 
Augustine, "Volo ut sis (I want you to be)", without being able to give any 
particular reason for such supreme and unsurpassable affirmation. [1979; 
30 1]4' 
Arendt argues, however, that the equality of the political realm, in contradistinction to 
the naturalness that should prevail in the private realm, is itself a product of the human 
artifice, of the act of human labour in and through the "build[ing] of a common world" 
[1979; 301] which can only be accomplished by those recognised as equals. 
However, such a construction of equality at the level of the private is not only 
misplaced but threatens to eradicate the natural uniqueness which inheres in each and 
every individual and which can only thrive outside such principles of equality and 
universal rights. Nonetheless, Arendt argues that it is precisely this naturalness that 
comes to represent the greatest fear to the hubris of a humanity who increasingly 
comes to believe that nothing is itself beyond their own powers, 
[t]he more highly developed a civilisation, the more accomplished the world it 
has produced, the more at home men feel within the human artifice - the more 
they will resent everything they have not produced, everything that is merely 
and mysteriously given them [1979; 300,301] 
di For an intricate ad interesting discussion of Arendt's relationship to the thought of Augustine, see: 
lore and Saint .1 ugustine Hannah Arendt, (1996) London: University of Chicago Press. 
95 
Thus, to reduce the fear that innate difference produces I the realm of the "human 
artifice", the modern body politic will insist on the "ethic homogeneity" 'of their 
population. Within this context, those who are, or, rather, are said to be different will 
come to represent the limits of human activity and act as a provocation to the alleged 
omnipotence of "civilised man", who will treat that incitement with a "distinct 
tendency to destroy"[1979; 301]. 46 
This fear and resentment of the "alien", of the different and the unique (i. e. natural) 
which, in an increasingly nationally (i. e. ethnically), divided world can only produce 
increasing violence is further fuelled by the appearance of large numbers of rightless 
individuals. Those deprived of the right to have rights, unable to claim any affiliation 
to a body politic, will be left with nothing other than their basic "humanness". In this 
situation, such an expression refers to nothing more than a claim to the "minimum fact 
of their human origin" and, as such, have only the "right of the naked savage" [1979; 
300]. 47 Deprived of a truly human (i. e. political) existence, these "savages" are thrown 
back into a "peculiar state of nature", where their only attributes are the unique and 
natural attributes granted them through the accident of their births. Thus, from the 
perspective of those in whose midst of those in whose midst they find themselves, 
they come to embody the difference of nature thought to have been finally defeated. 
As such, they will call down upon themselves the resentful violence of those 
threatened by such an appearance. 
And it is at this point that Arendt notes the emergence of a modern viscous circle. The 
more civilisation produces savages, the more it produces barbarians who, in turn, 
produce more savages and so on. As she states, 
[t]he danger is that a global, universally interrelated civilisation may produce 
barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions 
which, despite all appearance, are the conditions of savages [1979; 302] 
As a historical explanation, Arendt's was of course incomplete. Thus the Jews of 
whom Arendt wrote were confined to a small section of the Jewish `community' as a 
46 This theme of civilisation and naturalness is developed and radicalised in the thought of Adorno and 
Horkheimer and Zygmunt Bauman; see below: chapters 5 and 7 respectively 
47 Thomas Payne's introduction to Edward Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in Fiance (1790). 
Quoted in Arendt. 
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whole: its financial and intellectual elite. They were the ones living between "pariah 
and parvenu", the space which gave rise to a specific "Jewish type" that was to have 
such devastating consequences. The inference could be made that here this "type" was 
in fact a product of embryonic antisemitism. To a great degree this is correct. 
However, it is also the case that in keeping with her determination to allocate to Jews 
their role of responsibility in the events that drove them into the "storm centre of 
events", she stresses that at all times, a choice remained open as to whether to "play 
the role" or not. As she states, 
If it is true that "Jewishness" could not have been perverted into an interesting 
vice without a prejudice which considered it a crime, it is also true that such 
perversion was made possible by those Jews who considered it an innate 
virtue. [1979; 83] 
The vast majority of Jews, whom Arendt termed the `Jewish masses', were subsumed 
under the hegemony of their leaders. She recognised that the modern Jewish 
communities were as stratified as everyone else, but the actions and agency of the 
Jewish masses are given no independent role in the analysis. For an analysis of these 
class relations, we have to look elsewhere. 
As an understanding of the roots of antisemitism, the question Arendt addresses is 
how antisemitism, which was a relatively unimportant phenomenon in terms of world 
politics, came to play such a central role in the history of Europe. She distinguishes 
between pre-modern forms of anti-Jewish animosity and modern antisemitism without 
ignoring the modern uses of explanations of pre-modern prejudices against the Jews. 
The configuration of elements to create the Jews, antisemites and antisemitism are all 
explained through a focus that never reaches beyond modernity. Consequently, unlike, 
for example, Nietzsche, Sartre and Bauman, Arendt has no need to explain modern 
antisemitism through recourse to a pre-existing prejudice against the Jews. Rather, she 
highlights48 the distinction between pre-modern forms of anti-Jewish animosity and 
modern antisemitism and its conditions of existence. 
°S It is of course true that her starting point refers back to the pre-nation-state "Court Jews", but even 
here they are clearly distinguishable from the later "State Jews". 
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Arendt neither falls back into the idea that antisemitism represents a harking back. to 
the past or a reaction against modernity; nor conversely does she propose that 
antisemitism is the logical product of modernity itself. In her analysis, antisemitism 
does not represent the futility of political emancipation or the rights of man, still less 
their alleged collaboration with genocide. Her account of the inability of human rights 
to protect those sent to their slaughter serves not as a call for their negation, but as a. 
critical summons to strengthen them and their enforcement, along with a truly human, 
i. e. political, equality, in which one's uniqueness is also permitted its expression. 
98 
Chapter 6 
Adorno and Ilorkheimcr: Antisernitism and the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Adorno and Horkheimer first announced and outlined in 1941 their chapter on 
'Elements of antisemitism: limits of enlightenment'. It was written between 1941 and 
1945 and published in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments in 1947. 
Writing during and in the immediate aftermath of the holocaust, they addressed the 
complexity of the relationship of antisemitism to modernity in the shape of a new 
research outline for the social sciences. Within this work, the analysis of the elements 
of antisemitism was seen to require new social scientific tools, not least the bringing 
together of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud in order to construct an adequate theoretical 
frame, but the assumption was still present that the phenomenon of modern, political 
antisemitism was susceptible to explanation with the tools of a recognisable social 
science. We shall see that this assumption was to be questioned in later explorations 
into the holocaust and modern antisernitism - not least by Adorno himself in 
Negative Dialectics. 49 
In my discussions of critical theories of antisemitism, one of the themes that I have 
highlighted is that something more is at stake than "merely" antisemitism: that the 
modern animosity to Jews is in some way representative of other, deeper problems 
and frictions within modernity itself. This is certainly true of the account given by 
Adorno and Horkheimer. One of their crucial contributions to our understanding of 
this relationship between modernity and antisemitism is a more focused critique of the 
concept of "enlightenment" itself in which they call into question what has come to be 
termed the "Western tradition" in general and the praxis of emancipation in particular. 
The parallels with the thought of Hannah Arendt are illuminating. Like Arendt, 
Adorno and Horkheimer wrestle with the difficulty of avoiding a collapse into 
nihilism. Just as Arendt argues that the rise of antisemitism 'does not mean that what 
came crashing down in the crisis (perhaps the most profound crisis in Western history 
49 Sec below Chapter 8 
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since the downfall of the Roman Empire) was mere facade' [Arendt; 1979,9], so 
Adorno and Horkheimer also argued that "Enlightenment which is in possession of 
itself and coming to power can break the bounds of enlightenment" [1989; 208]. We 
shall see that in Negative Dialectic, written some twenty years later in 1966, this 
'melancholic' optimism was replaced by a more consistently pessimistic attitude to 
antisemitism which Adorno then signified under the name of "Auschwitz", and by a. 
loss of confidence that 'Auschwitz' could be explained within the terms even of a 
renewed social scientific form of knowledge and research. It will be argued, however, 
that the seeds of this turn to "nihilism" were already present within the account of 
antisemitism that he and Horkheimer presented in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Critical theories of antisemitism can be roughly divided between those schools that 
understand antisemitism as a reaction to modern social and political conditions50, and 
those that perceive it as a result or product of modern social and political conditions or 
as a potentiality inherent within them. 51 Within Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno 
and Horkheimer's thought on antisemitism falls into the latter camp: antisemitism is 
associated with the concept and practices of fascism which in turn is associated with a 
specific moment within capitalist development. Fascism is understood in this work as 
an emergent property of bourgeois society in its imperialist phase and of the social 
and political praxis which is generated within this phase. In this respect Adorno and 
Horkheimer replicate Arendt's "chronology" of antisemitism. 
As we have seen, Arendt argued a subtle 'in-between' position: that whilst the roots of 
antisemitism could be traced back to elements present within the prior period, its 
dominance 'over all competing "isms"' [Arendt, 1979,9] represented the birth of an 
entire new political structure. Adorno and Horkheimer emphasise the first part of 
Arendt's argument - the roots of antisemitism within modern bourgeois society - at 
the expense of the second part, that is, the newness or originality of modern 
antisemitism. Instead, they emphasise the compatibility of antisemitism with the 
development of capitalism. This difference is reflected in the following contrast: for 
50 
T. .... I.. "... _ .J.. ----- 
P-11 -- -' 11 ' '- J]- ------- I ne tnongnt or IVlerzsCne ana iviarx ian especiauy into aus camp. 
Bauman and Lyotard are examples of this way of thinking. 
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Arendt the totalitarian form of antisemitism represents the demise of the nation-state 
and nationalism; whilst for Adorno and Horkheimer the fascist form of antisemitism is 
perceived as the "pinnacle" of nationalism itself. This aspect of the thinking of 
Adorno and Horkheimer reaches its apotheosis in the argument that the Fascist form 
of antisemitism is merely an aspect of "mass society" in which no specific qualities 
attach to antisemitism itself. A further significant difference between Arendt and the. 
authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment concerns their respective understanding of the 
relationship of antisemitism to modernity. Adorno and Horkheimer understand 
antisemitism as a modern phenomenon, yet paradoxically trace its "elements" far back 
in time - much further than does Arendt - and see it as an admixture of both 
modern and archaic modes of domination. It may be more accurate to say that for 
Adorno and Horkheimer antisemitism arises as the coming to the surface of forms of 
domination that had been expelled or repressed by the onward march of enlightenment 
itself. This is not to say that by resorting to "pre-modern" factors in their account of 
antisemitism, Adorno and Horkheimer return to what Arendt termed "eternal 
antisemitism" Arendt; 1979,7]; it is more the case that they see repressed archaic 
forms of domination as attaching themselves to antisemitism, and to the modern 
scapegoating of Jews, as the result of thoroughly modern conditions. 
Finally, it is appropriate to note here another theme that runs through this study: that 
of the relationship of real Jews to the concept of "the Jews". Adorno and Horkheimer 
are interested in explaining the link between antisemitism and "the Jews" and seek to 
explain why Fascism should turn Jews (in their flesh and blood) into the concept of 
"the Jews". However, they do not invert this question in order to examine the Jews 
themselves and their relationship to the concept of 'the Jews'. This lacuna is reflected 
in the organisation of the "Elements of Antisemitism". It comprises seven sections. As 
the chapter progresses, Adorno and Horkheimer move from a discussion of Jews to 
the emergence of the antisemitic category of "the Jews" exclusively through a 
discussion of antisemites and antisemitism. In this process, actual relations between 
Jews and other people(s) disappear so that antisernitism is explained solely in terms of 
the antisemites. Inherent in this way of thinking is the idea that antisemitism 
represents a form of "projection" which has little or nothing to do with Jews 
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themselves and is attached to Jews regardless of their own actions and agency. In this 
regard, Adorno and Horkheimer remain well within the terms of the "scapegoat" 
thesis 
In the "Introduction" to Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer state that 
antisemitism's "'irrationalism" is deduced "from the nature of the dominant ratio itself,. 
and the world which corresponds with its image" [1989; xvii]. In their account of 
antisemitism, the latter is to be understood as an "irrationalism" that emerges from its 
relationship to modern rationalism, each produced in relation to one another through 
the dialectic of enlightenment. They characterise antisemitism as a "by-product" or 
more accurately a "waste product" of the "dominant ratio". This notion of "waste" not 
only brings into focus the relationship antisemitism has to the "dominate ratio" but 
also the relationships to the body that such a metaphor implies. 
In the opening lines of "The Concept of Enlightenment" Adorno and Horkheimer state 
that "[i]n the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always 
aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully 
enlightened earth radiates with disaster triumphant" [1989; 3]. They seek an answer to 
the question of why enlightenment and disaster have run together through the 
relationship of two theses: 'myth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts 
to mythology" [1989; xvi]. Their argument, in brief, is that within myth there is 
contained an element of enlightenment in the sense that the former seeks to 
emancipate men from the domination of nature; whilst within enlightenment there is 
the mythical idea that nature is an unchanging and unchangeable force to which one 
must submit. In explaining how such inversions come to pass, Adorno and 
Horkheimer emphasise the mediation of social relations between people through their 
relationship to nature. This points to the inversion that occurs in their dialectic of 
enlightenment: that human efforts to dominate nature and thus to emancipate 
ourselves from nature end up by our being dominated by it to such an extent that 
domination itself appears as natural, rational and eternal. 
102 
The central element of this thesis is contained in the idea of the instrumental i sation of 
reason: that is, the idea that reason - the ability to think and reflect upon the world - 
has entered into the service of domination. To explicate this thesis, Adorno and 
Horkheimer draw upon Marx's analysis of "commodity fetishism" [1995]. They argue 
that inherent within the instrumentalisation of reason, especially in its modem 
positivistic form, is the perception of the world and all things within it in terms of its. 
quantitative rather than qualitative (and unique) aspects. In this way the nature of 
things, i. e. their specific quality, is replaced by their merely abstract and universal 
form as a measure of quantity and the triumph of form over content is completed 
through the 'sublimation' of the commodity and the substitution of its exchange-value 
for its use-value. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that in the triumph of formalism not 
only are "qualities dissolved in thought, but men are brought to actual conformity" 
[1989; 12]. In a process of generalised exchange, in which each can be exchanged for 
the other, all individual qualities, all aspects of uniqueness, all forms of 'particularity' 
must be erased as a threat to the 'generality' that is the foundation of positivistic 
thought: 
Men were given their individuality as unique in each case, different to all 
others, so that it might all the more surely be made the same as any other. But 
because the unique self never wholly disappeared, even after the liberalistic 
epoch, the Enlightenment has always sympathised with the social impulse. The 
unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual: 
for individuality makes a mockery of the kind of society which would turn all 
individuals into the one collectivity. The horde which so assuredly appears in 
the organisation of the Hitler Youth is not a return to barbarism but the 
triumph of repressive equality... [1989; 13] 
Any metaphysics which goes beyond the empirically given, is ruled out of court, 
given the status of 'superstition' and 'myth'. The most 'progressive' stage disavows and 
criticises its immediate predecessor as "metaphysical" and all that is deemed 
"superstition" thereby becomes the "other" or "enemy" of enlightenment in its latest, 
most rationalistic stage. 
Adorno and Horkheimer highlight the paradoxical situation of individual existence 
that arises within the modern rationalistic age - to survive men must at one and the 
same time annihilate themselves. This relationship between "self-preservation" and 
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"self-destruction"52 is explained through reference to the nature of modern science,. its 
application to the natural world through technology and the capitalist economic 
imperative. The argument rests on the inversion of man's domination over nature into 
its inverse. Modern means of production reflect this inversion through the repetitive 
cycle of technological production. Through technology, human beings work 
incessantly upon what "is", i. e. that which through positivist science is perceived as. 
unchanging and formal nature. In their relations to the machine (as a virtual 
appendage) they reflect this never-ending sameness of nature through their own 
repetitive and unchanging work. They must become like the 'nature' upon which they 
work and give up any notion of their own specific individuality or uniqueness. It is in 
this sense that reference is made to self-preservation as self-destruction: for 
individuals to live, they must deny themselves. 
To summarise the argument so far, Adorno and Horkheimer point to the manner in 
which the dialectic of enlightenment negates the sovereignty of man and promotes the 
"re-introduction" of fear. It is modern instrumental reason, according to this account, 
which gives rise to the "mass", the "collective", the "horde". Human beings still live in 
fear, fear of the forces of nature, and should their incessant activity cease for a 
moment or should they reflect for a moment upon their condition, they will be 
confronted by that which a positivistically-driven rationality declared out of court: the 
uniqueness, diversity and specificity of nature both in its organic and human forms. 
One of the psychological consequences of this inversion, one that is important for the 
analysis of antisemitism, is the "obsessive" character of modern existence and the 
repression, projection and paranoia which goes along with it. 
In this account of the dialectic of enlightenment, it is "the Jews" who stand for that 
which is prohibited within the modern age: metaphysics and transcendence, nature 
and diversity. "The Jews" come to represent the particularism that has no place within 
the rational order of things and the metaphysics which is reduced to 'superstitious 
mumbo jumbo' by its fascist successor. They become the 'other' of antisemites who 
are themselves reduced to conformity like "blinded men robbed of their subjectivity 
52 For a detailed discussion of these aspects, sec. DE pp. 27-3 I 
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[and] set loose as subjects" [1989; 171]). For Adorno and Horkheimer, antisemitism is 
not of itself integral to the world of late capitalism and it is implied that fascism could 
survive and prevail as a system of domination without the murder of millions of 
individuals who fell or were forced into the concept of "the Jews". From a purely 
rationalistic standpoint, they argue, antisernitism is "irrational" in that it does not serve 
the dominant order in any utilitarian way: neither economically nor politically nor. 
militarily. However, because of its very lack of necessity, it serves, as Adorno and 
Horkheimer phrase it, as a "luxury for the masses" [1989; 170]. Antisemitism serves 
as a "luxury" because it permits that which in the normal course of events is denied: it 
is waste in the sense of being useless or superfluous. One of the permissions granted 
by antisemitism is involvement in actions that are irrational, that serve no purpose, 
that break free from the incessant necessity of the scientific-technological world in 
which they are implicated. 
Throughout Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer stress the manner in 
which enlightenment incorporates what at first sight appears either as unnecessary or 
as opposed to itself. This is the case for the "luxury" of antisemitism. As they state, 
[t]he fact that the demonstration of its economic uselessness tends to increase 
rather than to lessen the attraction to the national panacea, points to its true 
nature: it does not help men but panders to their urge to destroy. The true 
benefit for the Volksgenosse lies in collective approval of his anger. The 
smaller the actual advantages are, the more stubbornly he supports the 
movement against his better judgement. Anti-Semitism has proved immune to 
the argument of inadequate "profitability". It is a luxury for the masses[ 1989; 
170] 
Here Adorno and I-Iorkheimer point to the function of antisemitism within the context 
of the enlightened world as an outlet for instincts and impulses that are forbidden in 
the course of "progress". By providing an outlet for these "taboos", antisemitism 
permits the even smoother running of the rationalised structure itself: it provides a 
discharge for the 'superfluous' energy denied by the structures of instrumental 
rationality, whilst simultaneously giving rise to an unparalleled barbarity -a barbarity 
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that is all the more viscous because of its otherwise forbidden nature. 53 The metaphor 
of waste relates to bodily evacuation and to the taboos that attach to it within modern 
civilisation. Antisernitism is presented as a kind of revel within the sphere of the 
prohibited -a partaking of the forbidden fruit that is endowed with the aura of taboo. 
Adorno and Horkheimer liken antisemitism to an "idiosyncrasy" in which its 
constituents, "the Jews" and the antisemites, represent the twin aspects of what 
remains "taboo" within the overarching scheme of things. As they state, 
[t]he old answer of all the anti-Semites is an appeal to idiosyncrasy.... But 
idiosyncrasy inheres in the particular. The general, that which fits into the 
functional context of society, is considered to be natural. But nature which has 
not been transformed through the channels of conceptual order into something 
purposeful, the grating sound of a stylus moving over a slate, the haut gout 
which recalls filth and decomposition, the sweat which appears on the brow of 
the busy man - everything which has failed to keep up, or which infringes the 
commandments which are the sedimented progress of the centuries - has -a 
penetrating effect: it arouses disgust [1989; 180] 
Antisemitism represents an 'idiosyncrasy' which, though disallowed by the 
progressive stages of enlightenment, serves enlightenment's entanglement with 
domination: "Fascism is also totalitarian in that it seeks to make the rebellion of 
suppressed nature against domination directly useful to domination" [1989; 183]. The 
tabooed idiosyncrasy is termed "uncontrolled mimesis" [1989; 181] of that which 
civilisation outlaws. In the "organic adaptation to others" characteristic of fascism, 
such mimesis has not been dispensed with but it has come under increasing control 
and Adorno and Horkheimer point to the two stages through which the control of 
human relationships to nature through mimesis has passed, "by organised control of 
mimesis in the magical phase: and..... by rational practice, by work, in the historical 
phase" [1989; 180]. The irony is that modern positivistic thought, and the 
technological practice with which it is identified, is itself mimetic behaviour and 
sublimates the overt "primitive" or "mythical" fear of nature identified with earlier 
phases, 
53 In his excellent and informative Adorno: A Critical Introduction, Simon Jarvis points to the anti- 
capitalist nature of antisetnitism. Although quite correct, it appears to me that Adorno and 
I lorkheimer's argument Ieads to a far deeper critique of "enlightenment" per se. 
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Society continues threatening nature as the lasting organised compulsion 
which is reproduced in individuals as rational self-preservation and rebounds 
on nature as social domination over it. Science is repetition, refined into 
observed regularity, and preserved in stereotypes. The mathematical formula is 
regression handled consciously, just as the magical ritual used to be; it is the 
most sublimated manifestation of mimicry .... All that remains of the adaptation 
to nature is the obduracy against nature [ 1989; 181 ] 
In this positivistic-technological world, in which all spontaneous (organic) relations to 
nature are prohibited, people are unable to confront their own repressed nature. 
Perceiving such tendencies as an "isolated remnant"[1989; 180]; and ashamed of 
them, these individuals (in the name of self-preservation) refuse to acknowledge them 
as their own and project them (with hostility) onto others. 
Enter the Jews. The Jews fulfil this role because of their social position within the 
sphere of circulation, a sphere which vanishes from sight with the emergence of "mass 
society" and appears outmoded and superfluous. The Jews' methods of "doing 
business" now take on the characteristics of a natural disposition, 
They seem to translate long verified human relations back into individual 
power relations: in trying to influence the purchaser by flattery, the debtor by 
threats and he creditor by entreaty [1989; 182] 
Since this "relationship" of idiosyncrasy's (of particularity) concerns apparent aspects 
of nature now declared out of bounds, the whole transaction takes place in the sphere 
of the tabooed. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the attraction of antisemitism 
as a political phenomenon is precisely due to the fact that it permits dominated 
individuals to partake in the praxis that was hitherto denied. It is, therefore, a 
"rationalised idiosyncrasy" in the sense that Fascism permits it in the interests of a 
more efficient domination, 
The mental energy harnessed by political anti-Semitism is this rationalised 
idiosyncrasy. All the pretexts over which the Führer and his followers reach 
agreement, imply surrender to the mimetic attraction without any open 
infringement of the reality principle - honourably, so to speak [1989; 185] 
It is in this sense, that Adorno and Horkheimer maintain that "the persecutor and 
persecuted belong to the same sphere of evil" [1989; 171]. Moreover, Adorno and 
Horkheimer are also implying that within this permission to lose themselves in nature, 
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the anti-Semites are in fact mimicking their own projected nature. In other words, they 
f see in "the Jews" a reflection of their own simultaneously repressed and desired 
nature. It is for this reason that they conclude that, antisemites "cannot stand the Jews, 
yet imitate them" [1989; 183]. 
In developing this argument, Adorno and Horkheimer point to an element of. 
antisemitism which has caught the attention of other critical thinkers: the idea that 
antisemitism can only be understood as a mass phenomenon and depends upon the 
simultaneous coming together of "individuals" who have been "robbed of their 
subjectivity". It is in developing this point that the metaphor of waste as bodily 
evacuation comes to the fore. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the anti-Semite loses 
himself, first, in his "relationship" to the projected object of his own natural and 
tabooed self - "the Jews". This point is explained by reference to "smell" as the most 
"natural" of mimetic behaviour, since in smell one becomes a part of the object itself. 
Smell is the most prohibited means of mimesis since the division between self and 
nature that is so essential an aspect of the dialectic of enlightenment, is completely 
overcome: 
The multifarious nuances of the sense of smell embody the archetypal longing 
for the lower forms of existence, for direct unification with circurnambient 
nature, with the earth and mud. Of all the senses, that of smell - which is 
attracted without objectifying - bears closest witness to the urge to lose oneself 
in and become the "other". When we see, we remain what we are; but when we 
smell, we are taken over by otherness. Hence the sense of smell is considered a 
disgrace in civilisation, the sign of lower social strata, lesser races and base 
animals [1989; 184]. 
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that for 'civilised individuals' involvement in such 
forbidden behaviour is only permissible if it serves a given end, which in this case is, 
chillingly, its "elimination", "[a]nyone who seeks out "bad" smells, in order to destroy 
them may imitate sniffing to his heart's content, taking unrationalized pleasure in the 
experience" [1989; 184] 
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In these tabooed but permitted acts, the antisernite dissolves himself in the authority 
that permits it and into the herd of other antisemites. It is this which Adorno and 
Horkheimer understand as the 'schema of anti-Semitic reaction'. 
Anti-Semites gather together to celebrate the moment when authority permits 
what is usually forbidden, and become a collective only in that common 
purpose [1989; 184] 
It is in this authorised acting out of the taboo that Adorno and Horkheimer find the 
meaning within the apparent meaninglessness and irrationality of the rituals, uniforms 
and symbols of the "Fascist formula". They are an "imitation of magic practices, the 
mimesis of mimesis" [1989; 183] -a plastic copy of those modes of archaic 
domination, repressed but now placed into the service of domination. This is the way 
that fascism makes 'the rebellion of suppressed nature against domination directly 
useful to domination' [1989; 183]. 
The question remains: why is it the Jews who come to represent barred and tabooed 
nature? Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that the Jews became the focus of this 
infernal process - and came to represent 'nature' - because they were not only 
distinct from the "national society" but also a threat to it. This was the case, Adorno 
and Horkheimer argue, whether or not "the Jews as individuals really do still have 
those mimetic features which awaken the dread malady, or whether such features are 
suppressed" [1989; 185]. As a mirror of the projection of natural impulses which are 
those of their persecutors, 'the Jews' become the subconscious desires of the 
antisemites themselves. Not only are the allegations against the Jews - that they seek 
world domination, that they are purveyors of black magic, that they seek to poison and 
destroy the world, etc., the subconscious desires of the antisemite, but since their 
persecution rests upon primitive modes of domination, mimesis and magic, now given 
rational purpose, they become the victim of other, related primitive practices, 
including that of sacrifice: 
Disguised as accusation, the subconscious desire of the aboriginal inhabitants 
to return to the mimetic practice of sacrifice finds conscious fulfilment. When 
all the horror of prehistory which has been overlaid with civilisation is 
rehabilitated as rational interest by projection onto the Jews, there is no 
restriction. The horror can be carried out in practice, and in practical 
implementation gores beyond the evil content of the projection [1989; 186] 
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Whilst it may appear from this account that Adorno and Horkheimer treated the 
concept of "the Jews" as one created solely by antisemites - and in so doing implied 
a version of the "scapegoat" thesis - such a view should be moderated by an account 
of the specific reasons of why the Jews became the "chosen people", i. e. those 
"branded as evil by those who are absolutely evil" [1989; 168]. Adorno and 
Horkheimer acknowledge that Jews have themselves been active within the dialectic 
of enlightenment, and so have partaken of the movement in which "civilisation is the 
victory of society over nature which changes everything into pure nature" [1989; 186]. 
They indicate, however, that in their contribution to this progress, Jews succeeded in 
avoiding the reversion into mythology: 
They did not eliminate adaptation to nature, but converted it into a series of 
duties in the form of ritual. They have retained the aspect of expiation, but 
have avoided the reversion to mythology which symbolism implies.... They are 
declared guilty of something which they, as the first burghers, were the first to 
overcome: the lure of base instincts, reversion to animality and to the ground, 
the service of images [1989; 186]. 
It is also to be noted that just as the persecution visited upon them was the admixture 
of archaic and modern forms of domination, so too were Jews associated with both 
stages. The paradox, however, is that the justification for the attack upon them is 
precisely because of their ability to escape that which their murderers have themselves 
fallen victim to and projected onto the Jews - the myth of the mimesis of nature and 
its associations of barbaric animalism and sacrifice. 
Because [the Jews] invented the concept of kosher meat, they are persecuted as 
swine. The anti-Semites make themselves the executors of the Old Testament: 
they want the Jews who have eaten of the tree of knowledge to return unto dust 
[1989; 186]. 
The implication is that antisemitism represented a reversion not only to nature but to 
the "basest" aspect of nature. For Adorno and Horkheimer, antisemitism was the 
vehicle for a crisis of the "Western tradition" that far exceeds Jewish / gentile relations 
themselves. It became the negative resolution of the dialectic of enlightenment -a 
resolution that destroys the Jews and the antisemite, and the very notion of 
subjectivity itself. 
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I shall now turn to the second element of antisemitism that Adorno and Horkheimer 
propose: "the Jews" as representatives of "metaphysics". This point in turn draws 
upon another of the central themes included within Dialectic of Enlightenment as a 
whole. Adorno and Horkheimer understand the dialectic of enlightenment as the 
gradual increase of a positivism that refuses any meaning to the world other than the 
appearance of the empirically given. They argue that this refusal is inherent within the. 
instrumentalisation of reason and its implication with domination over nature, 
For the scientific mind, the separation of thought from business for the 
purpose of adjusting actuality, departure from the privileged area of real 
existence, is as insane and self-destructive as the primitive magician would 
consider stepping out of the magic circle he has prepared for his invocation; in 
both cases the offence against the taboo will actually result in the malefactor's 
ruin. The mastery of nature draws the circle into which the criticism of pure 
reason banished thought. [1989; 26] 
In other words, reason is robbed of its ability to reflect critically upon its own 
categories of thought and the idea that anything may be thought beyond the 
empirically given, metaphysics in general, is disavowed and endowed with the label 
of myth. Metaphysics shares the same fate as that of the nature that remains "outside" 
or "beyond" rational mastery: "nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere 
idea of outsideness is the very source of fear" [1989; 16] 
Yet, as in their discussion of nature, Adorno and Horkheimer point out the way in 
which this extreme positivism, this extreme rationality, also "reverts back into 
mythology". Metaphysics becomes as taboo as nature: 
Factuality wins the day; cognition is restricted to its repetition; and thought 
becomes mere tautology. The more the machinery of thought subjects 
existence to itself, the more blind in resignation in reproducing existence. 
Hence, enlightenment returns to mythology, which it never- really knew how to 
elude [1989; 27] 
It is within this dialectic that the Jews, as representatives of metaphysics, as 
something beyond the given, come to be 'tabooed'. As was noted above, Adorno and 
Horkheimer emphasise the manner in which each successive phase of the dialectic of 
enlightenment delegitimates its predecessor with the accusation of 'myth': "One after 
the other, mimetic, mythic and metaphysical modes of behaviour were taken as 
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superseded eras" [1989; 37]. This dialectic of "overcoming" is concretised by Adorno 
and Horkheimer through the manner in which oppositions born in one phase comes to 
be incorporated in the dominant thought of the later phase. Speaking of the stages of 
critical thought, i. e. oppositional thought, they state that, 
[Opposition] suffer[s] what triumphant thought has always suffered. If it 
willingly emerges from its critical element to become a mere means at the 
disposal of an existing order, then despite itself it tends to convert the positive- 
it elected to defend into something negative and destructive. The philosophy 
which put the fear of death into infamy in the eighteenth century, despite all 
the book-burnings, and piles of corpses, chose to serve that very infamy under 
Napoleon..... The metamorphosis of criticism into affirmation does not leave 
the theoretical content untouched, for its truth evaporates. Now, of course, a 
mechanised history outstrips such intellectual developments, and the official 
apologists - who have other concerns - liquidate the history that helped them to 
their place in the sun, before it can prostitute itself [1989; xii] 
Contained within this last sentence, which refers to the latest 'progress' in the dialectic 
of enlightenment, the reference to "liquidation" is far from coincidental. Rather, it 
points to the claim that is being made here, that it is "the Jews" who came to represent 
the metaphysics of transcendence - that of rights, freedom and emancipation - 
which on the one hand justified the emergence of bourgeois society, and on the other 
hand became the taboo of the fascist society which emerged from it. 
In explaining this point, Adorno and Horkheimer appear to have had in mind Marx's 
On the Jewish Question [1992]. They argue that it was the Jews historical economic 
role - their "fate" [1989; 175] - that was partly responsible for their becoming 
representative of the metaphysics of freedom: 
The Jews were the colonisers for progress. From the time when, in their 
capacity as merchants, they helped to spread Roman civilisation throughout 
Gentile Europe, they were the representatives - in harmony with their 
patriarchal religion - of municipal, bourgeois and, finally, industrial conditions 
[1989; 175] 
However, with the "progression" of bourgeois society, both the Jews' role and the 
values they came to personify were increasingly declared superfluous. The first reason 
relates to Marx's idea that rights are indelibly linked to the sphere of exchange or 
circulation, 54 a sphere which identified as the province of Jews. However, with the 
54 See above: chapter 2 
112 
emergence of mass society this "space" was itself colonised by increasing large-scale 
productive monopolies who faced the consumer directly. 55 With the destruction of the 
middle-class, as the class of the sphere of circulation, the Jews' specific economic 
function came to an end. Furthermore. this change into "mass society" also brought 
with it the demise of the individual subject. 56 Without the self and the social basis on 
which the self can emerge, notions of rights are not just superfluous but a threat to the. 
emerging order. 
As Adorno and Horkheimer acknowledge, this need not of course have resulted in the 
physical extermination of the Jews. One of the "elements of antisemitism" was the 
Jews' economic position, so that they came to be the "scapegoat" for the injustices of 
the system as a whole: 
the fear and hatred aroused by the non-transparency of social relations is 
revenged on mediators, on those (the Jews) who are taken to epitomise the 
sphere of circulation itself, as though their mediation were itself the reason for 
society's lack of transparency [Jarvis 1998; 63] 57 
However, the murderous impulses arise within their persecutors because of their 
projection onto the Jews of their own frustrated desires, 
Liberalism had allowed the Jews property, but no power to command. The 
rights of man were designed to promise happiness even to those without 
power. Because the cheated masses feel that this promise in general remains a 
lie as long as there are still classes, their anger is aroused. They feel mocked. 
They must suppress the very possibility and idea of that happiness, the more 
relevant it becomes. Wherever it seems to have been achieved despite its 
fundamental denial, they have to repeat the suppression of their own longing. 
Everything which gives repetition for such repetition, however unhappy it 
must be in itself.... draws upon itself that destructive lust of civilised men who 
could never fulfil the process of civilisation [1989; 172] 
5' For a discussion of this process see: "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception" in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment pp. 120-167 
5`' See fora detailed discussion of this point, The End of Reason", Max Horkheimer, in The Essential 
Fran/firt School Reader, Ed. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, Contirnuum, New York; 1982 
57 Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction, 1998, Polity, Cambridge. See also Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, pp. 172-176 
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The very idea of freedom embodied within the notion of rights came to be regarded as 
a metaphysics that could not be accounted for in the positivistic rationalising of the 
world, in which "what you see, is what you get - and nothing more" It came to be 
rejected as containing the remnant of a superstition that current knowledge had 
declared a myth. And, because of their association which such a metaphysics, the 
Jews came to be as taboo as the values that they were said to embody. Adorno and. 
Horkheirner conclude these points in the following manner, 
[t]hose who always wanted to be first have been left far behind..... The kaftan 
was a relic of ancient middle-class costume. Today it indicates that its wearer 
has been cast onto the periphery of a society which, though completely 
enlightened, still wishes to lay the ghost of its distant past. Those who 
proclaimed individualism, abstract justice, and the notion of the person are 
now degraded to the condition of a species. Those who are never allowed to 
enjoy freely the civil rights which should allow them human dignity are 
referred to, without distinction, as "the Jew" [1989; 175] 
Adorno and Horkheimer seek to explain how this ressentinient serves the "dominant 
ratio" itself. They argue that the antisemites' image of the Jews cannot bear the 
thought of their "true happiness" - the thought of "happiness without power" [1989; 
172] - and . the masses' own 
longing for this happiness, now embodied in "the Jews", 
is reflected back to them as something offensive and loathsome, 
The illusory conspiracy of corrupt Jewish bankers financing Bolshevism is a 
sign of innate impotence, just as the good life is a sign of happiness. The 
image of the intellectual is in the same category: he appears to think -a luxury 
which the others cannot afford - and he does not manifest the sweat toil and 
physical effort. Bankers and intellectuals, money and mind, the exponents of 
circulation, form the impossible ideal of those who have been maimed by 
domination, an image used by domination to perpetuate itself [1989; 1721 
Did Adorno and Horkheimer avoid those "pitfalls" that Hannah Arendt claims have 
beset accounts of modern antisemitism: eternal antisemitism, the "scapegoat" thesis, 
the concept of "the Jew" as the creation of the antisemitic imagination? The charge of 
eternal antisemitism cannot be upheld. It is of course true that recourse is made to 
archaic forms of domination which are identifiable for them in the phenomenon of 
antisemitism itself. However, their thesis is designed to highlight how these archaic 
modes are themselves sublimated into the dialectic of enlightenment, they do not 
claim that their history can be understood in terms of an equally archaic "Jewish 
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Question". At first sight, the criticism implied in the "scapegoat" thesis appears more 
valid. The persecution of the Jews is ultimately traced back to the nature of their 
persecutors. The Jews become, therefore, the screen upon which the antisemites 
project their own resentment. It is a resentment that has little to do with the Jews per 
se. Thus the question that must be asked in the light of these comments is again "why 
the Jews? ". To a certain extent Adorno and Horkheimer have addressed this question:. 
they present the Jews as representatives of 'forbidden nature' and of 'metaphysics'; 
they associate the Jews with the idea of freedom, emancipation and rights; the refer to 
the class position of Jews in the sphere of circulation. Yet such answers do not appear 
satisfactory: if "the Jews" were not the sole owners of the circulation sphere, why 
initially did they become its representatives? In seeking the answer to this question, 
Adorno and Horkheimer offer an explanation that in many respects is similar to 
Arendt's thesis as to why the Jews failed to become politically (and socially) 
"assimilated". 
On a social level, they argue that because of their economic role as "intermediaries", 
the Jews could not be permitted to "put down roots and so they were dismissed as 
rootless" [1989; 175]. Because they appeared as the "colonisers of progress" [1989; 
175], those harmed by this "progress" focused their attention and resentment against 
the Jews. As regards the Jews' relationship to the state in the period preceding Fascism 
(and it is here that the echoes of Arendt's thesis is most audible), 
Even in the nineteenth century the Jews remained independent on an alliance 
with the central power. General justice protected by the state was the pledge of 
their security, and the law of exception a spectre held out before them. The 
Jews remained objects, at the mercy of others, even when they insisted on their 
rights [1989; 175]. 
Adorno and Horkheimer were no doubt wary of providing any information that may 
have added grist to the antisemitic mill. It is, perhaps, for this reason that, in terms of 
the Jews economic function they state that, "Commerce was not their vocation but 
their fate" [1989; 175]. When we turn to the "deeper" psychoanalytical. reasons as to 
why the Jews should be the screen of antisemitic projections, the case is not so 
conclusive. Adorno and Horkheimer state that, 
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[t]he existence and way of life of the Jews throw into question the generality 
with which they do not conform. The inflexible adherence to their own order 
of life has brought the Jews into an uncertain relationship with the dominant 
order [1989; 169] 
Here, the idea of the Jews' 'particularity' or non-universality is more posited than 
developed. It points to the idea that their was something about Jewish existence as 
Jewish existence that may have been partially responsible for the catastrophe that was, 
visited upon those caught within the Nazis definition. Yet, the very notion of the 
particularity of the Jews echoes the antisernitic argument that the Jews, either for 
genetic or religious reasons or for reasons of sheer "stubbornness", provided their own 
ground for not being emancipated. In seeking to understand how it was that Jews were 
transformed into the concept of "the Jews" by the antisernitic imagination, the 
actuality of Jews was lost sight of. 
Present within Adorno and Horkheimer's account, antisernitism itself comes to 
embody all the problems they find within the dialectic of enlightenment itself. The 
Jews increasingly come to personify those aspects of enlightenment praxis that are 
excluded and tabooed. The implication is that the "actual reversion of enlightenment 
civilisation to barbarism" [1989; xvi-xvii] comes to be represented within antisemitism 
and antisemitism becomes the very mark of'the limits of enlightenment'. It is as if the 
dialectic of enlightenment negatively resolves itself around the question of 
antisemitism and as if the Jews serve as the index of enlightenment praxis itself. 
Rather than understand the meaninglessness of antisemitism, the danger is that it is 
endowed with a disproportionately powerful significance. The "Jewish Question" 
comes to be elevated into the question of the failure of "western" thought itself and 
antisemitism comes to signify something more than the specifics of anti-Jewish 
hostility. It begins to echo the antisemitic claim that only through the "solving" of the 
Jewish Question, can all other outstanding issues be resolved. In this account, Adorno 
and Horkheimer remain within the sphere of socio-historical research, yet they do not 
avoid presenting antisemitism in terms akin to an eschatology of satanic greatness. 
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Chapter 7 
Zygmunt Bauman: Modernity and Antisernitisni 
Zygmunt Bauman's contribution to critical theories of antisemitism is contained in 
two important and influential studies; Modernity and the holocaust, published in. 
1989, and Modernity and Ambivalence, published in 1991. Bauman's objective in 
both these works is to question the hitherto prevailing orthodoxy which perceived 
antisemitism and the holocaust as a pathology of modernity and the "civilising 
process"; that 
[T]he holocaust was an interruption in the normal flow of history, a cancerous 
growth on the body of civilised society, a momentary madness among sanity 
[that could be left to] the professional pathologists. [1989, viii] 
In many ways, this approach represents simultaneously both the strengths and 
weaknesses of Baunian's account. Bauman is correct to identify the fact that 
antisemitism and the holocaust can only be understood as a modern phenomenon that 
differs quite radically from pre-modern forms "Judeophobia", and as such must bring 
into question the rhetoric of an apologist modernity, whereby these events are 
perceived as the (untimely) antithesis of modernity. 
Conversely, however, the weakness of his account arises through his insistence on the 
strength of the relationship between modernity and antisemitism and the holocaust. 
Indeed, in holocaust and Modernity, in which Bauman addresses the structural 
relationship between modernity and antisemitism, the very notion of relationship is 
conflated so that modernity becomes equated with antisemitism. As we shall see, the 
consequences of this undialectical approach are, first, a complete negation of any 
possibility of the development of freedom or opposition within modernity. 
Consequently, in his account of antisemitism there is no aspect or remnant of 
modernity that can point to a way forward, a way out of and a challenge to modern 
antisemitism. Secondly, and related to this point, is an evasion of questions of human 
agency and responsibility. 
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Yet, in Modernity and Ambivalence , in which Bauman concentrates upon the 
relationship between modernity and antisemitism at the cultural level, the strength of 
his earlier claims is somewhat weakened. This limited retreat is most evident in his 
use of a dialectical methodology; one that sees the possibility of opposition emerging 
from within modernity itself; and, correspondingly, one that takes into account human 
agency, choice and responsibility. However, in the account of his work that follows, I 
argue that these revisions, do not go far enough to reform his initial thesis as to the 
undialectical nature of the connections between antisemitism and modernity 
As do those of many of the other theorists examined in this study, Bauman's account 
of antisemitism connects it with a far deeper and more profound complex of problems 
within modernity itself. 58 In this way, the "Jewish Question" turns into one of the 
question of modernity. Antisemitism comes to be perceived as the manifestation of 
these deeper complexities and bears only a contingent relationship to the Jews 
actuality. Quoting Hannah Arendt, Bauman states that "only the choice of the victims, 
not the nature of the crime, can be derived (if at all) from the history of antisemitism. " 
[1991; 19] 
As does Arendt and other critical theorists, Bauman discusses the relationship of 
modernity to antisemitism through a critique of the praxis of Enlightenment. 
However, Bauman's account is unusual in that he argues that rather than antisemitism 
arising as a limitation or a failure of this praxis, it enters the modern world as its 
logical consequence. Indeed, at some points Bauman seems to argue that it was the 
very success of Enlightenment thought and practice that gave rise not only to 
antisemitism, but also the holocaust itself. This observation, therefore, permits 
Bauman to be placed amongst those critical theorists who understand antisemitism as 
inherent within the "logic" or "rationality" of modernity itself. It is for this reason that 
Bauman is able to characterise the Nazi "state" as similar to any other nation-state of 
the same period regardless of its specific political dimension. 59 
SE .-, "r.,.. _ ... -'---, -_, _--_ui+_-_, __e___ vor a aiscussion or ruts point see oeiow: k. onciusion . 59 On this point, cf. Hannah Arendt: Origins of Totalitarianism. Part 111, "Totalitarianism". 
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This argument re-formulates and radicalises aspects of Adorno and Hork(leimer's 
thesis of antisemitism. Most significantly, Bauman draws on the idea that one of the 
causes of antisemitism is the naturalisation of the Jews which itself emerges from the 
inversion of enlightenment into domination. Whilst, Adorno and Horkheimer stress 
the element of inversion within the internal logic of enlightenment's move into 
domination however, Bauman, sees the element of inversion subtracted, so that. 
domination is seen as an inherent characteristic of enlightenment. 
Bauman is able to revise Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis as he does not perceive the 
"modern project" of the domination of nature to be connected to any (autonomous) 
development within society. For Bauman, the modern quest for order does not arise 
through its relationship to the needs of developing capitalism. Thus, whereas the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment seeks to explain the manner in which the state comes 
under the domination of society, Bauman argues that the states' needs and goals, had 
from its birth, dominated any autonomous social sphere. Thus, what other theorists 
perceive as socially constituted phenomena, Bauman treats as weapons in the state's 
arsenal to be used against any and all opposition. 
We can see evidence of this view in Bauman's treatment of those aspects of 
modernity which entered the social world on the coat-tails of enlightenment praxis 
and which were said to offer at least the potential for freedom. The concept of 
emancipation, for example, is understood by Bauman as a "tool" of coercion and 
domination. 60 Thus, far from providing Jews with protection against antisemitism, 
emancipation, and with it, legal rights and claims to equality, are explained as part of 
the very problem itself. 
Bauman's understanding of "modernity" is important to his thesis. Bauman 
characterises modernity as that period ushered in by Enlightenment praxis, a concept 
of which he is highly critical. Enlightenment praxis is for Bauman the union of 
knowledge and power, of what lie terms "legislating reason" and the "absolutist or 
60 See, particularly, Afodernily and the Holocaust, chapter 3 and Modernity and Ambivalence, chapter 
I. 
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"panoptical"61 state. Through this union the social world was to be moulded (by the 
state) according to the plan offered by universal reason (provided by the 
philosophers). This alliance between modern critical philosophy and the modern state 
expresses itself through each partner's claim to the realm of universality. From the 
side of critical philosophy came the assertion of a "foundational philosophy" [1991; 
25], 
the philosopher's unchallenged prerogative to decide between true and false, 
good and evil, right and wrong; and thus his licence to judge and authority to 
enforce obedience to the judgement. [1991; 22] 
From the side of the state, were what Bauman calls its "foundational politics" [1991; 
26], that is, the idea that the state was to exert its power, without challenge, in all 
matters now considered to be under its provenance 
In the two Bauman observes, 
a striking symmetry of declared ambitions and practised strategies, as well as 
similar obsession with the question of sovereignty of legislative power 
expressed as the principle of universality of legal or philosophical principles. 
[1991; 26] 
Thus, for Bauman, modernity is the period when this universalistic praxis came 
together and began to act upon the world. For Bauman, the sheer novelty of this union 
must not be underestimated since it represents a profound and fundamental breach 
with the pre-modern period that immediately preceded it. From its dawn, social 
reproduction became perceived by these new powers as a specific self-conscious task; 
a task that involved constant monitoring and vigilance of the space under the 
jurisdiction of the new territorially defined national-state lest the order (dictated by 
reason) be subverted. As a consequence of the universal blueprint and its criteria for 
the perfect ordered and rational society, the population had to be divided into 
useful plants to be encouraged and tenderly propagated, and weeds - to be 
removed or rooted out. [According to these criteria] a premium [was put] on 
the needs of the useful plants (as determined by the gardener's design) and 
disendowed the needs of those declared to be weeds. They cast both categories 
as objects of action and denied to both the rights of self-determining agents 
[1991; 20, emphasis in the original]. 
`'' The reference to the Panoptican obviously points to an affinity within Bauman's thesis and the work 
of Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish. 
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No longer, therefore, could social reproduction be left to the (apparently) natural and 
spontaneous ways in which it had occurred in the pre-modern world. Indeed, these 
spontaneous and local forms of social existence and social reproduction, when viewed 
from the new vantage point of reason and the state, were perceived as nothing other 
than a threat to the new grand design of the universal and thus perfected social order. 
Bauman argues that inherent in this notion of social order is the construction and 
strict maintenance of boundaries so that "everything in its place and a place for 
everything" becomes the order of the day. Any slippage or transgression would lead to 
a subversion of the very order that was sought. Consequently, the (modern) social 
space had to be constantly monitored and its subjects kept under constant 
surveillance. What made the task so unending was not so much the possibility of a 
transcending of these new boundaries, but the potentiality that those previously 
deemed worthy of "cultivating" would degenerate as a result of contamination by 
"others". It is for this reason that Bauman argues that all subjects came to be "objects" 
of state surveillance and action. It is in this way, therefore, that Bauman argues that 
from its very inception, enlightenment and modernity, in the guise of universal reason 
and the enlightened state, is domination. 
It is into this world of (attempted) boundered order that the Jews enter as the 
embodiment of a threatening disorder; they became the Other of the "modern project". 
Bauman contends that in the pre-modern world, the Jews were perceived and treated 
as any other caste, and, as with all other castes, their existence was to all intents and 
purposes self-contained, replete with their own autonomous communal mechanisms 
and mode of authority. The Jews lived in a place separate and distinct from gentiles, 
wore different and distinguishing clothes and any contact they may have had with 
others (and Bauman maintains that in the pre-modern world, such times were few) 
were both strictly regulated and formalised through various networks of ritual. Since 
all groups knew and understood these "rules", ambivalence, i. e. complexities and 
confusions as to their own and others' identities rarely, if ever, arose. All of these 
forms of social reproduction appeared to those concerned as "natural", as something 
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that did not need reflection or critical thought. It was this "self-regulation" and 
certainty that was undermined with the advent of modernity and the development of a 
social praxis premised upon the universalism of the modern state through which social 
order came to be the sole concern of the state. 
In Bauman's account of the connection between antisemitism and modernity the most. 
important change in the transition between the pre-modern and the modern eras is the 
fact that the formal and legal recognition of the Jews' (and other castes) differences 
and distinction was ended. In the modern era, inclusion within the new universal body 
politic of the nation-state was now premised upon the concepts of citizenship which, 
in turn, rested upon legal equality as expressed through the medium of rights. Now 
robbed of political and legal measures through which the modern state could 
differentiate between classes of its members formally (at least without falling into 
contradiction), novel and discrete ways had to be devised in construing and 
constructing the Jews' distinctiveness as the personification of the threatened and 
feared boundary and order-transgressors. These new measures relied upon fields of 
knowledge that operated "underneath" the sphere of overt social and political 
relations. 
Bauman, therefore, argues that there is a paradox at the very heart of modernity. On 
the one hand, and in keeping with its belief in universal Reason, modernity overtly 
proclaimed the virtues of bildung as a means for all humans, along with the "correct" 
amount of personal effort, to achieve their full human potential regardless of the 
(particularistic) prejudices and practices that were held to afflict them. These historical 
handicaps included one's Judaism. Yet, on the other hand, the discourses of modern 
science (natural, human and social), also under the name of universal Reason 
proclaimed their belief in the objective truth presumed upon the objective and 
unchanging laws of nature. Consequently, the realms to which these sciences applied 
(i. e. both the natural and the social worlds) could be tampered with only at one's (and 
the ordered society's) peril. In this scientific view, certain aspects of the world were 
eternally constant. One such element was the social and moral attributes of "blood". 
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According to the "objective methodology" of modern science, certain allegedly 
ultimate truths could be discovered about the immutable essence of particular groups 
of individuals (themselves constructed by science and its demands of boundaries and 
order). Such essences, which continued to operate despite appearances to the contrary, 
spoke to the moral and other values of a person These group attributes were 
discovered and fixed according to unchangeable laws of nature operating deep within 
the human body and psyche itself. It was, Bauman argues, within this context that 
antisemitism adopted its specifically modern racist and potentially murderous form. It 
was this development that created the notion of "Jewishness" as an enduring "natural" 
characteristic that "afflicted" all those who were (and would always remain) Jews. In 
identifying the consequence of this scientific discourse of "racial" "Jewishness", 
Bauman quotes the words of Hannah Arendt: 
Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness 
there was no escape [1989; 58]. 62 
Through the scientific belief that it had discovered the laws of nature, one's 
"Jewishness" was written in stone and was deemed to be "stronger than human will 
and human creative potential" [1989; 58]. The result of this "finding" was that the 
"trait" of "Jewishness" came to be understood as natural and so irredemable. As such, 
nothing could alter the Jews' propensity to subvert the boundaries and order so 
integral to the modernist project. The Jews were now proven beyond all reasonable 
doubt to be the eternal enemy of the universalising and "enlightened" state. It was, 
therefore, modern science that legitimated the ostensible "natural" differences of the 
Jews in the era when legal equality had prohibited that distinction both formally and 
legally. Thus, as did the enlightened state, modern enlightened science also conflated 
enlightenment with domination. 
The question remains, however, as to why it was the Jews that took on this role as the 
representatives of the threat of disorder. In answering this question, Bauman has 
recourse to the perception to the pre-modern of the Jews. Consequently, one of the 
paradoxes of Bauman's account of antisemitism as expressed in Modernity and the 
holocaust is that despite his insistence on the rigidity of the pre-modern/modern 
62 For Arendt's meaning of this statement; see above. chapter 5 
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dichotomy, the Jews transcend this particular boundary. It is, in other words, only the 
Jews who stand "outside" of history. 
Bauman argues that the Jews differed in one vital respect from the other pre-modern, 
semi-autonomous castes. Their difference related to their religious or theological 
relationship to Christianity. Bauman's point is not that this religious form of 
Judeophobia is synonymous with modern antisemitism, but rather an ambivalence in 
the relationship continued in the modern era, albeit with a modern content. Thus, 
Bauman's suggestion of the uniqueness and originality of modern antisemitism is 
brought into question, and, indeed, in some respects he comes near to expressing ideas 
which are to be found in the "eternal antisemitism" methodology. 
Bauman states, for example, that the ambivalence arise in the pre-modern era. He 
states that, 
Christianity needed the Jews and it needed the separation and estrangement of 
the Jews and could not reproduce itself, and certainly could not reproduce its 
ecumenical domination, without guarding and reinforcing the foundations of 
Jewish estrangement - the view of itself as the heir and overcoming of Israel. It 
was born of the rejection by the Jews. It drew its vitality from the rejection of the 
Jews. Christianity could theorise its own existence only as an ongoing 
opposition to the Jews. Continuing Jewish stubbornness bore evidence that the 
Christian mission remained as yet unfinished. Jewish admission of error, 
surrender to Christian truth, and perhaps a future massive conversion, served as 
the model of Christianity's ultimate triumph. Again, in a. truly "alter-ego" 
fashion, Christianity assigned to the Jews an eschatological mission. It 
marginalized Jewish visibility and importance. It endowed the Jews with a 
pmt'erfid and sinister fascination they would hardly possess. [1989; 38, 
emphasis in the original] 
Since the "self-reproduction of the Church and its ecumenical domination" needed this 
ambivalent view of the Jews, they came to occupy a place in the pre-modern Christian 
imagination that went far beyond the realities and practicalities of day-to-day intercourse 
and antagonisms. Indeed, ambivalent theological relationship permits the "relative 
autonomy of the "Jewish Question" from the "popular social, economic and cultural 
experience" [1989; 38]. Pre-modem Judeophobia (although in Modernity and the 
holocaust, Bauman anachronistically refers to it as "antisemitism") therefore acquired a 
form that transcended the material social relations that existed between Jews and 
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Christians and gave rise to the image or "concept" of "the Jew" as personifying the 
carrier of a "message" that "alternative to this order here and now is not another order, 
but chaos and devastation" [1989; 39]. Thus, 
The age of modernity inherited "the Jew" already firmly separated from the 
Jewish men and women who inhabited its towns and villages. Having 
successfully played the role of the alter-ego of the Church, it was prepared to be 
cast in a similar role in relation to the new, secular, agencies of social integration 
[1989; 39]. 
It was this image of the "conceptual Jew" (made distinct from the "flesh and blood" 
Jew) as the antithesis of order that Bauman argues was utilised in the turbulent passage 
from the pre-modem to the modem. As with the pre-modem "Jew", the outstanding 
feature of the "modem Jew" is the incongruity of the content that filled the old form. 
Bauman argues: 
[The nature] of Jewish incongruities shows there was hardly a single door 
slammed on the road to modernity in which the Jews did not put their fingers. 
From the process which brought their emancipation from the ghetto, they could 
not emerge but heavily bruised. They bestrode all the barricades and invited 
bullets from every side. The Conceptual Jew has been, indeed, construed as the 
archetypal "viscosity" of the modem dream of order and clarity; as the enemy of 
all order, old, new and, particularly, the desired one [1989; 40]. 
The incongruities that attach to the modern "conceptual Jew" are the familiar catalogue 
of the discontents of various elements of society who perceive the Jews as the root of all 
their problems. To the modem anti-modern, the Jew became the embodiment of the 
coldness and spiritlessness of the dominance of money-exchange. To the modernists and 
the socialists63, the Jews likewise became the embodiment of the rule of capital, so that 
the overthrow of capital required the destruction of the Jew. To the peasant and the 
working-class, the Jews were seen as representing the ruling-elite. To the aspiring 
"indigenous" laissez-faire minded middle-class, the Jews, fighting for civil and political 
rights, were perceived as an ally of an interfering state. To the old-landed ruling-elite, 
the Jews were seen as potential usurpers of political power. To the aspiring nationalists 
seeking a "hone", the Jews were seen as frustratingly international, and as defenders of 
universal as opposed to particular, national rights [1989; 46-51 Thus, in all ways, 
61 On this point Bauman relies on an antisemitic reading of Marx's On [he Jewish Question. For a detailed 
account of such an interpretation see: Carlbach, J. (1978) Karl Marx and the Radicul Critique of Judaism 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. For an alternative reading see: Chapter I above. 
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[t]he Jews were "strangers", - always on the outside even when inside, 
examining the familiar as if it was a foreign object, asking questions nö 
one else asked, questioning the unquestionable and challenging the 
unchangeable [1989; 55]. 
It is to this ambivalence of the "conceptual Jew" that the scientific laws of nature 
testified, fixed and naturalised. Once the Otherness of the Jews was so inscribed, 
Bauman argues that the only way left to neutralise the threat of Jewishness was by 
segregation and, ultimately, destruction and genocide. 
In Modernity and Ambivalence, Bauman re-traces, from the perspective of "culture"64, 
the Jews' entry into modernity and the consequences of the journey. As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, his account in the later work appears to confront many of the 
criticisms that can be made against Modernity and the holocaust. Consequently, one can 
read Modernity and Ambivalence as both a supplement and a corrective to that earlier 
work. 
In contrast to the rather general and abstract nature of Bauman's explanation of 
antisemitism in Modernity and the holocaust, Modernity and Ambivalence remains more 
historically grounded. He concentrates on Germany, but refers to this part of his study as 
a "case study", implying that it is an example or is representative of the phenomenon of 
antisemtism. Therefore, the specificity of German antisemtism is underplayed. This 
point becomes clear in Bauman's repeated thesis, noted above, that the Nazi "state" is to 
all intents and purposes the same as any other modem Western state. 
Modernity and the holocaust presents antisemitism without, not only antisemites, but 
also without Jews. Bauman explains antisemitism as the product of the combination of 
"universal" abstracts - Reason, the State, Science. Indeed, he argues that public outbursts 
of antisemitism, such as Kristalbiacht, were in fact counter-productive in their desire to 
instil antisemitism in the general population. Similarly, his discussion of the Jews is 
replaced by a discussion of the "conceptual Jew" which, as just discussed, becomes 
distinct from "flesh and blood" Jews. In Modernity and Ambivalence, however, Bauman 
64 By "culture" Bauman appears to be referring to "national" aesthetic values and national forms of 
"manners" and "etiquette". 
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considers the place of agency and responsibility in the phenomenon of antisemitism, He 
does not, however, discuss the agency of the antisemites, but does present in 
considerable detail the role of Jewish agency in the development of the antisemitic 
image of "the Jew". 
The third adjustment concerns the methodology of the two studies. As I noted above; 
Modernity and the holocaust presents antisemtism in a non-dialectical manner in its 
connection with modernity. One of the consequences of this approach is an entirely 
negative reading of modernity so that any potentiality for freedom or opposition to 
antisemitism is puled out of court in advance. Conversely, in Modernity and 
Ambivalence, Bauman argues that modernity itself produces a dialectic. It produces a 
dialectic of order and ambivalence which is reproduced in his view of antisemtism as the 
dialectic of modernity and the Jews. 
Importantly, the dialectic is not that between modernity and antisemitism. For Bauman, 
these terms collapse into each other. Rather, it is his thesis that the dialectic within 
modernity produces ambivalence, that is, the Jews, who from that position come to 
represent the potential freedom in which ambivalence and homelessness, modern vices, 
becomes postmodern virtues. In this way, therefore, not only is antisemitism presented 
as the question at the very heart of modernity, the Jews come to represent the vanguard 
of a new freedom. Hence, we can understand Bauman's description of the Jews as the 
Other of modernity. 
The implication of this position is that the Jews were from the outset ahiays already 
Other and unable to assimilate. This consequence evades the question of how in the 
course of modernity the Jews were gradually excluded, but also re-formulates the 
antisemitic belief as to the Jews' distinctiveness and "otherness". 
Yet, whilst the debt to Adorno and Horkheirner is made explicit in Modernity and 
Ambivalence many aspects of Bauman's thesis as the cultural causes of antisemitism 
appears as a treatise premised upon Hannah Arendt's observation that assimilation for 
the Jews implied assimilation into an antisernitic society. Moreover, this connection 
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with Arendt can also be seen in Bauman's reference to the social (or, for him, 
f 
cultural) 
categories of parvenu and pariah. Finally, we can also see the debt to Sartre's notions of 
the "authentic" and "inauthentic" Jew. 
The central concept in Modernity and Ambivalence is that of the stranger; a role that, as 
we have seen, had been occupied by the Jews. Bauman argues that the modem quest for. 
order involves a clear distinction between those inside and those outside the newly 
marked (national) territory: "friends" and "enemies" respectively. The concept of the 
stranger, therefore, not only throws this boundary-demarcation into question but also 
challenges the distinction in the first place. The stranger represents an outsider on the 
inside and the insider who is outside. As Bauman states, 
[The strangers] are all neither/nor; which is to sat that they militate against the 
either/or. Their under-determination is their potency; because they are nothing, 
they may be all. They put paid to the ordering power of the opposition, and so 
the ordering power of the narrators of the opposition. Oppositions enable 
knowledge and action; [the strangers] paralyse them. [The strangers] brutally 
expose the artifice, the fragility, the sham of the most vital of separations. They 
bring the outside into the inside, and poison the comfort of order with suspicion 
of chaos[1991; 56, emphasis in the original]. 
As such, the stranger (i. e. the Jew) becomes the personification and embodiment of 
ambivalence; a characteristic which, as we shall see, leads directly to the antisemitic 
mythology of the "real" Jew who exists "underneath" the "assimilated" Jew. 
The urge for order and clear-cut boundaries is the rasion d'etat, the state is bound to 
invest a heavily to obliterate the threat of disorder, arising from the (destabilising) 
stranger. Yet, Bauman argues that the more that the praxis of order is set into motion, 
the more ambivalence is created. This "negative dialectic" arises from the artificial 
nature of order which imposes itself upon an unordered and heterogeneous world. In 
other words, the more grids that are placed onto that world, the more visible those 
aspects which do not fit become. In terms reminiscent of Adorno and Horkheimer, 
Bauman refers to these "remnants" as modernity's "industrial waste". 
One of the techniques through which the state seeks to confront and neutralise the ever- 
present threat of the stranger is through the offer of assimilation. Yet, for Bauman this 
128 
apparently liberal exercise is nothing other than an exercise of power and domination: In 
Bauman's account, assimilation demands the denial and casting of one's own culture 
and one's absorption (i. e. disappearance) into the culture of those making the offer. In 
this way, assimilation acts as a technique in the modern state's drive for order and 
homogeneity, and as a corresponding attack on difference. Consequently, this "cultural 
crusade" - the demand that the stranger assimilate into the dominant culture through. 
acceptance of its values - is, along with political and legal equality, another weapon in 
its war against heterogeneity and diversity. 
Thus, Bauman speaks of assimilation as a trap rather than as an offer. The power to 
define what constitutes the values to be assimilated, to determine the stranger's success 
in adopting them, and, consequently, his success in ridding himself of his "own" culture, 
lays with the dominant power itself. Moreover, the dominant power is always at liberty 
to change the "rules of the game" whenever it so wishes. Thus, the liberal idea that 
assimilation involves a symmetrical relationship between the two parties is replaced in 
Bauman's account of a strictly asymmetrical relationship. 
Bauman observes that the attempt by the stranger to take up the offer implies a re- 
enforcing of the host's (already considerable) power and dominance. If, on the one hand, 
the stranger refuses the offer, then he remains in the ambivalent (and dangerous) 
position of the stranger. He remains outside the moral universe constituted by the 
"national community". 
Bauman further perceives a contradiction between the fact that assimilation is offered to 
the individual, but that the culture that they must leave behind is seen as a group or 
collective phenomenon. This contradiction results in a "Catch-22" for those seeking to 
assimilate. On the one hand, the majority of the Jews (the unassimilated) will always be 
a reminder of the limits of the assimilation process, as well as the measure against which 
the assimilated's success will be measured. As such, the more the assimilated seek to 
distance themselves from their co-religionists, the more the accusations of duplicity 
become compelling. On the other hand, should the assimilated remain in overt 
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connection with these others, then the more their own assimilation will be viewed-as 
11 
unsuccessful. 
Yet, the most dangerous aspect of the trap of assimilation, and one that ultimately leads 
to what Bauman sees as its inherent and logical failure, is that the more the stranger (in 
this case, the Jew) attempts to assimilate, the more his difference to his host becomes- 
apparent. The host culture, despite its creation as artifice, perceives itself and legitimises 
itself in the language of naturalness, allowing for the continued survival of. the 
foundations of homogeneity and uniformity which constitute the very essence of the 
modern nation-state.. The consequence of such an ideological legitimisation means that 
cultural membership is seen by the nationals, now recast as "natives", as a matter of 
"natural ascription" . As such, 
it places the possibility of conscious attempts at 
successive assimilation beyond the actions and intents of those seeking admission. 
The practical outcome of the "trap" of assimilation was that the Jews who sought 
assimilation were caught in a "no-man's land" where they became clearly identifiable as 
a distinct (and, by definition, ambivalent and so dangerous) group. By taking up what 
they perceived as the "offer" of assimilation, they cut themselves off from their own 
heritage and culture and sought entry into a culture that could not only refuse them. As 
Bauman states, 
Though it effectively alienated its agents from their community of origin, 
assimilation did not lead, therefore, to a full and unconditional acceptance by the 
dominant nation. Much to their despair, the assimilated found that they had in 
effect assimilated themselves solely to the assimilated. Other assimilants were 
the only people around who shared their problems, anxieties and preoccupations. 
Having left behind their former social and spiritual affinities, the assimilants 
landed in another community, the "community of assimilants" - no less 
estranged and marginalized than the one from which they escaped, but in 
addition also incurably ambivalent. [1991; 143, emphasis in the original] 
The very act of assimilating, therefore, points to the Otherness the stranger is seeking to 
overcome. From the perspective of the "native", assimilation always gives rise to a 
suspicion of duplicity; that despite appearances to the contrary, "underneath" the 
assimilated remains what he always was (and is and will be). Assimilation is only a 
mask in the eyes of the hosts, therefore, and under it lurks the "real" Jew. Thus, in 
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tracing the cultural aspects of assimilation, Bauman again concludes that modernity 
creates the idea of "Jewishness" as a natural and so immutable characteristic, 
unamenable to any form of integration within (any) modem nation-state (now 
themselves legitimised in the eyes of its members as a matter of nature) The links 
between such naturalisation and Otherness of the Jews points obviously to the ultimate 
technique open to the modem state to counter its antithesis of order and boundary-. 
definition - genocide. 
As I noted above, Modernity and Ambivalence, Bauman seeks to explore the role and 
extent to which human agency may or may not have played a part in the phenomenon of 
antisemitism. I also argued this discussion was absent from Modernity and the 
holocaust. However, because of the nature of his thesis, he can only concentrate upon 
the question of Jewish responsibility. He discusses those who either fell for the trap of 
assimilation, or those who saw it for what it was. It is at this point that he draws upon 
Hannah Arendt's terminology of parvenu and pariah. 
In describing the modem state as the "Panoptical State" [1991; 91] Bauman is referring 
to the work of Foucault 65 and provides a clue to the reasons for his focus upon the 
actions of those Jews directly involved in the assimilatory effort. Bauman implies that 
the power and domination that he sees as inherent within the praxis of assimilation 
located the contradictions discussed above ii'ithin the assimilating Jews themselves. 
Since the "source" or "origin" of the assimilatory pressure (and so antisemitism) was 
within the all-powerful, all-seeing, and ever-vigilant "gardening" state, Bauman is 
unable to see the antisemite, other than in the nature of that state itself. It is, I believe, for 
this reason that lie cannot but be limited to questions of agency in terms of response to 
that initial assimilatory and antisemitic pressure. 66 It is, therefore, in the context of 
response that Bauman discusses the "strategies" of the parvenu and the pariah. 
Furthermore, this issue of Jewish response and (limited) agency permits Bauman to 
escape from the negative reading of modernity presented in Modernity and the 
65 See especially: M. Foucault Discipline and Punish (1987) London: Penguin 
`'G It is also to be noted that in this discussion, Bauman echoes many of Sartre's ideas a presented in 
Anti-Sumile and Jew. [1995] 
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holocaust, whilst still leaving room for his idea that modernity is inherently antisemitic 
F 
to remain. 
In his discussion of the Jewish parvenu, whom Bauman identifies as those Jews who 
failed or refused to recognise the "true nature" of assimilation, Bauman moves uneasily 
between accusations of naivete and complicity. 67 Bauman conducts this examination. 
within the specific context of the German experience, one that he characterises as 
"prototypical". 
On the one hand, Bauman implies the naivete of the parvenu in his discussion of their 
misguided understanding of the nature of the Germany into which they were seeking to 
assimilate. Drawing on his observation that these Jews only associated with others like 
themselves, he argues that they were unaware of the true nature of the parochilality of 
German culture and its antisemitic tendencies. Instead, the Germany that they 
envisioned was that of the German Enlightenment as represented by the "holy trinity" of 
Geothe, Schiller and Lessing, a German culture that could and would become the 
embodiment of true universality that would overcome the dichotomy of German and 
Jew. Yet, the error of such a belief when seen from the perspective of what Bauman 
terms the "real Germany" was that these assimilating Jews came to represent the 
antithesis of German national(ist) culture; they represented cosmopolitanism, 
enlightenment and a group "feeding off the organism" [1991; 123]. Bauman notes that 
as a consequence of this naivete, they never fully realised that, "emancipation meant an 
escape from the ghetto and German history" [Mosse, quoted in Bauman, 1991; 123]. 
Consequently, the fact that "assimilation meant a head-on collision with the very society 
that they tried to assimilate into" never entered their minds. 68 Furthermore, Bauman 
argues the assimilated Jews provoked within the "native" population a feeling which I 
characterise as ressentiment: 
There was nothing intrinsically wrong with the idea of fusing the two cultures; it 
was rather the would-be German partners, who abandoned their own luminous 
heritage and could not bear the sight of the strangers picking it up and dangling 
67 It appears to nee that although Arendt was also rather hard on the parvenu, she did not express the 
degree of criticism in Bauman's attempt. 
68 It is to be noted that in his part of his argument, Bauman comes closest to replicating Arendt's 
observation noted above as to assimilation meaning assimilation into antisemitic society. 
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it before their eyes, that visited a defeat upon a venture moribund in itself [1991; 
138. emphasis in the original]. F 
On the other hand, Bauman also accuses assimilating Jews of a betrayal exercised 
against their "own" culture, co-religionists, and, ultimately, themselves. In keeping with 
the Focauldian element of his thesis, Bauman argues that the "objective" predicament in 
which the assimilating Jews found themselves - the embodiment of ambivalence - could. 
not but be internalised. Consequently, the fight against ambivalence came to be located 
in the Jews themselves. This internalisation compounded and manifested one of the 
contradictions which Bauman sees as inherent within assimilation: the conflict between 
the individual nature of the "offer" of assimilation, and the collective nature of the 
"traits" that one needed to shed. 
The outcome of this dilemma, now made personal, was the parvenus highlighting those 
aspects of Jewish culture that they believed matched the modern, rational age, and 
discarding its more "mystical" or allegedly "pre-modem" characteristics. Similarly, it 
meant repressing any element that might be identified as "characteristically Jewish", 
such as speaking Yiddish, and, ultimately, perceiving their own culture and heritage 
through the perspective of disgust. Bauman rather harshly then concludes that this self- 
denial was attempted solely for the promise (never to be fulfilled) of entry into the 
"good (i. e. antisemitic)] society". Finally, Bauman implies that this internalisation of the 
dominant values could not but further the modern state's goal of extirpating the 
difference and diversity that it saw as a threat to its aim of perfect (universal) order. 
The panoptic nature of the assimilatory process is most evident in Bauman's account of 
the relationship between the Western (i. e. German) Jews and the Eastern Jews (or 
Os juden). Bauman argues that the immigration of the Os juden into Germany created 
severe problems for the assimilating German Jews. In contrast to Hannah Arendt's 
thesis, Bauman argues that rather than permitting the Western Jews to stand out, the 
German Jews were instead identified with them. One of the consequences was that the 
Os judeni revived the image the Western Jews had tried so hard to escape. 
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More importantly, however, because of the speed with which the new Os juden 
F 
changed 
their habits of dress and other "Eastern" habits, questions were raised regarding the 
"success" of the assimilation of the German Jews and brought to the fore the antisemitic 
notion of the alleged duplicitous of all Jews. It brought into the popular imagination the 
idea that the Jews were the masters of mimicry, and so, appearances to the contrary 
could never be trusted. Racism, Bauman argues, was merely the most extreme of the. 
opinions that maintained that some aspects of human behaviour are not amenable to 
assimilation, but represent the "natural" limitations to any attempt at integration through 
Bildung. Again, therefore, Bauman argues that the processes of modernity, in this case, 
that of assimilation, results in the naturalisation of an alleged particularity in those it 
once claimed in the name of "universality". However, as Bauman has sought to 
illustrate, the promise of assimilation was fraudulent from the start. 
In this context, Bauman argues that the parvenus amongst the Western Jews had 
internalised the domination inherent within the assimilatory process to such a degree 
that they adopted an antisemitic stance to their Eastern co-religionists. Bauman 
contends that this betrayal manifested itself in stereotyping the Eastern Jews with all 
those traits from which they themselves wished to escape. Indeed, he argues that this 
group echoed the majority culture's metaphors in terms that "anticipated Nazi 
rhetoric"69 [1991; 134, emphasis added]. Thus, not only did the assimilatory process 
entail a constant "self-vigilance" inithin the Western Jews, but it also required the 
internalisation of the dominant (antisemitic) values of the host community. In this way, 
Bauman argues that the Os jzuden became the Other of the Others, and that naivete 
turned into complicity. Indeed, it holds the German Jews themselves responsible for the 
consequences of such collaboration. 
The harshness of Bauman's judgement against the Western parvenus rests partly in his 
argument concerning the pariah. As does Arendt, Bauman draws on the thought of 
`19 It is to be noted here that, once again Bauman implies the continuity between the modern nation- 
state and the Nazi regime. 
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Bernard Lazare70 in characterising the pariah as the one who saw through the allure-of 
the trap of assimilation. He argues that the strategies open to the pariah were threefold. 
First, they could accept the offer of assimilation at face-value and, through political 
activism, to look to the state to deliver on its promise. This route would prove to be 
unsuccessful, as Jewish intellectuals within leftist groups became marginalised and, - 
ultimately, delegitimised through identification with the negative stereotype of Os jziden 
and the claim of the Jews' duplicity. 
The second path was to accept the modernist project by creating a Jewish nation-state. 
this route was followed by Theodre Herzl. Yet, Bauman argues that far from re-forging 
the links with the (Jewish) past, Zionism was a response to the failures of the thoroughly 
modern process of assimilation. As he states, the aim of Zionism was "to salvage the 
Jews from the collapse of European liberalism and to salvage liberalism from the 
consequences of its collapse in Europe [1991; 148]. " 
The final strategy was to accept the situation of isolation and "homelessness", and here 
Bauman cites the example of Jews such as Freud, Kafka and Simmel. However, as 
Bauman explicitly notes, these Jews came from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and not from Germany. In recognising their situation for what it truly was Bauman 
argues that they were in an ideal position to be critical of the claims of universality made 
by the various nation-states of their region. Recognising such claims as particularistic 
and relative, it was they who were able to grasp the actually-existing universal condition 
of modernity: that despite all attempts at order and boundary-making, the real human 
condition was one of existential isolation and the diversity of humankind, both at an 
individual and a group level. And, Bauman argues, it is this observation that makes 
these Jewish pariahs the first postmodern harbingers of the demise of the modern 
iwwellaschung. It can thus be argued that Bauman implies that the trap of assimilation 
offered two resolutions - Auschwitz or Kafka, or, to paraphrase Marx, barbarism or 
freedom. 
70 Jewish French writer of the late I9th century. 
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In conclusion, Bauman's accounts in both Modernity and the holocaust and Modernity 
and Ambivalence expresses the idea that the connection between modernity and 
antisemitism cannot be understood in terms of a relationship whereby the limitations of 
the former give rise to the latter. Instead, he argues that from its very inception, 
antisemitism is inscribed in modernity in its very meaning, goals and ambitions. It is 
modernity's quest for order and boundaries that gives rise to fear of the Other. It is of 
course true that Bauman speaks of contradictions within modernity, such as those 
between universality and particularity. However, as he makes clear in Modernity and 
Ambivalence, this universality is itself a claim to power masking more parochial or 
relativist claims, a claim only recognised by Jews themselves. Consequently, Bauman 
maintains that despite its rhetoric, all aspects of modernity, including, on the one hand, 
the (overt) concepts of citizenship, equality and rights, along with notions of cultural 
values, and on the other hand, the (covert) discourses of science and "nature", are part of 
its strategy and techniques of power and domination aimed at creating a rational, 
homogenous and docile population. It is also for this reason that Bauman's explanation 
of antisemitism does not recognise antisemites and instead remains in the realm of 
discursive power. 
Moreover, because of Bauman's insistence on a unidimensional understanding of 
modernity, he does not make any distinction between liberal democratic states and the 
Nazi regime. Nor does he distinguish between a regime with legal rights and those 
without, a point he reiterates in both works especially in his argument that rights are 
synonymous with coercion. Consequently, he cannot address the question of the 
relationship between equality and inequality or the limits and failings of equality which 
give rise to inequality and antiseniitism. It is for this reason that I have emphasised that 
Bauman's work is similar to Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, (a 
point expressly made by Bauman), but is one in which the notion of inversion, from 
enlightenment to domination is lacking. Therefore, paradoxically, whilst Bauman 
recognises the thoroughly modern nature of antisemitisni, he collapses all its 
multifarious and ambivalent aspects into a homogenous unity that only permits the 
exercise of power and domination, the network of which encapsulates antisemitism 
itself. 
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In both studies, Bauman argues that it is the Jews who become marked as modernity's 
Other. In Modernity and the holocaust he explains this by relying upon the Jews' pre- 
modem relationship to Christianity and one that continues in form, if not in substance. 
On this account, therefore, the place and responsibility of "flesh and blood" Jews in the 
history of antisemitism is evaded. Conversely, in Modernity and Ambivalence, he. 
suggests that modernity itself creates the Jews as its ambivalence and, therefore, as a by- 
product in its quest for order. We also see how the quest for order produces in the Jews 
"strategies" that reproduce that process. Whilst the result is the antisemitic imagery of 
the Jew (that is, the re-appearance of the "conceptual Jew"), the concept appears to 
match the "flesh and blood" Jews. Thus, in Bauman's account, the Jew, becomes either 
over-determined or under-determined; either they are not the antisemite's Jew or they 
are the Jew upon which antisemitism is concentrated. Whichever outcome is accepted, it 
leaves open the question of the relationship between concept and actuality. 
Finally, Bauman has argued that the "Jewish Question" is the locus of far more 
fundamental and deeper problems with modernity. However, these problematics and 
consequences manifest themselves solely around the question of the Jews and 
antisemitism. In this way, therefore, the Jewish Question becomes the question of 
modernity, and is endowed with a significance comparable to that placed upon it by the 
antisemitic imagination itself. This virtual "eschatological" reading of antisemitism and 
the Jews is replicated in Bauman's idea in Modernity and Ambivalence that whilst 
modernity (and antisemtism) creates the Jews, the Jews become modernity's 
"gravediggers" and the hope and potential for the future. In many ways, this reading of 
the Jews is but a philosemitic replication of the antisemitic myth of the role of the Jews 
as the harbingers of doom and ultimate destruction. 
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Chapter 8 
Jean Francois Lyotard: Un-thinking the Unthinkable 
f 
The word of God must be infinite, or, to put it in a different way, the absolute 
word is as such meaningless, but it is pregnant with meaning. Under human 
eyes it enters into significant finite embodiments which mark the innumerable- 
layers of meaning.... The key itself may be lost, but an immense desire to look 
for it remains alive. 71 
If Zygmunt Bauman's account of antisemitism collapses any relationship between 
rights and antisemitism by arguing that the latter is a constitutive part of the former, 
Jean-Francois Lyotard (1925-1997) also refutes any notion of relationship. However, 
rather than collapsing the two poles, he stretches them apart to such a degree that the 
language of relationship is replaced by the language of the Other. In this way, Lyotard 
locates the holocaust, antisemitism and the Jews in a realm that is the Other of society 
one that is outside or beyond social relations premised upon autonomous rights- 
bearing individuals.. 
Lyotard's contribution to critical theories of antisemitism, and his thesis of the Other 
in particular, are contained in a series of books and articles written from the early 
1980s to the early 1990s. Although the historical context of any text is important to 
illuminate its meaning, in many ways, for Lyotard's work it is decisive. It is thus 
worth while spending a little time discussing this context. 
The immediate spur for Lyotard's contemplation of antiseinitism was a series of 
scandalous issues in France that immediately grabbed popular and academic attention. 
The first of these episodes was the publication of Faurisson's "denial" of the existence 
of gas chambers at Auschwitz. 72 in 1981. It was as an intervention in this controversy 
that Lyotard wrote and published The Differend (1983). This dispute was followed a 
couple of years later by the so-called "Heidegger Affair" with the publication of 
71 Gershom Scholem, On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism New York: Schoken, 1969. Quoted from Z. 
Bauman. Modernity and Ambivalence p. 173 
72 In "A Paper Eichmann", Pierre Vidal-Naquet 1981 
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Victor Farias' indictment of I-Ieidegger's political commitment to National Socialism. 
It was as a contribution to this debate that Lyotard published Heidegger and "the 
Jews" in 1988. Finally, two articles published in 1990, Europe, the Jews, and the Book 
and The Grip (Mainmise) (both 1990) comprise Lyotard's reflections on the repugnant 
desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Carpentras. Yet, while these specific episodes 
may have served as the impetus for a series of publications focused upon 
antisemitism, the holocaust and the Jews, in many ways these publications also 
became a critical tour de force of the entire tradition of "Western" thought. In what 
follows, I will concentrate my attention on what Lyotard has to say about antisemitism 
and will refer to the wider elements of his work only when led by this primary issue. 
The cumulative effect of these controversies upon the realm of public affairs in France 
was great. They broke the silence that surrounded the holocaust that had reigned in 
France for almost forty years. Along with the trial of Klaus Barbie, these "affairs" 
challenged the orthodox self-representation of France as the nation of resistance and 
brought to the light awkward questions of collaboration and responsibility. Lyotard's 
writing in response to these "affairs" bears witness to the national trauma experienced 
in France in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Lyotard's treatment of the holocaust, antisemitism and the Jews is constantly 
mediated by its historical context He refuses all attempts to "seek the truth"; indeed, 
he argues that such a goal is all but impossible. Rather, lie is concerned to understand 
what it is about these phenomena that permitted them to be forgotten so quickly and 
apparently so easily. He implies that it is only in answering that question, that we can 
even begin to think about the actual events under investigation. It is partly for this 
reason that for Lyotard, the issues surrounding the holocaust, antisemitism and the 
Jews require a thoroughly critical reading of the "western" tradition of modern 
thought and practice. Hence, Lyotard's inclusion in this study. 
Context may also shed light upon the distinct character of Lyotard's writing. His 
investigations not only lead him to a "writing of "the ethical"", but t his writing is 
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itself also a praxis of ethics. Lyotard's writings demand that readers think about what 
they are thinking about. Lyotard's thesis in The Differend is that no event contains 
meaning in itself. Rather, meanings are only ascribed once that event has been 
"phrased", that is, put into language, and only when that phrase enters into a "genre of 
discourse" or "language game". In this way, meanings are ascribed (and continue to 
be ascribed) only when the event/phrase has entered into a chain of discourse.. 
However, of all events the holocaust, antisemitism defy any such "phrasing"; they 
escape even the possibility for the ascription of meaning - they cannot be spoken 
about. Confronted with the question of why these "events" cannot be phrased the 
reader in turn begins to think about the "events" themselves. And it is this thinking 
about what is being thought about that breaks or disrupts the genre of discourse within 
which the reader is implicated. It is in the silence that follows from this lack of words 
that, without one word of description or representation, the reader is confronted with 
the intimation (and not the knowledge) of the unspeakable terror and horror that was 
the holocaust. By analogy, what Lyotard has to say about Claude Lansmann's Shoah 
is equally applicable to Lyotard's writings themselves, 
Claude Lansmann's film Shoah is an exception, perhaps the only one. Not 
only because it scarcely offers a testimony where the unpresentable of the 
holocaust is not indicated, be it but for a moment, by the alteration in the tone 
of a voice, a knotted throat, sobbing, tears, a witness fleeing off-camera, a 
disturbance in the tone of the narrative, an uncontrolled gesture. So that one 
knows that the impassable witnesses, whoever they might be, are certainly not 
lying, "play-acting", hiding something. [1988; 26] 
It is this idea of the unrepresentability and unspeakableness of the holocaust and 
antisemitism that informs Lyotard's account of these events. His writing resonates 
with the shock of having to be reminded of something forgotten but which should not 
have been forgotten. 
In the works cited above, Lyotard aims to explain why it is and what it is about the 
holocaust, antisemitism and the Jews that prohibits them from being grasped by the 
mind in the same manner as that occurs with other events. Why it is, in other words, 
that they cannot be "phrased"? 
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To a certain extent an answer to this question had been provided some twenty years 
earlier. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno had also argued that the holocaust, which he 
referred to by the use of the emblematic "Auschwitz", was an event that could never 
be negated and sublimated within the framework of Hegelian speculative dialectics. 
According to this line of argument "Auschwitz" represents the limits of "identity" and 
"reconciliation"; it remains unique, therefore, in its "non-identity" and in its inability. 
to be reconciled within the movement of speculative dialectic as a whole. 
However, for Adorno, this irreconcilability does not represent the demise of dialectics 
per se, but, rather, gives rise to what he termed "negative dialectics", in which, 
[T]he absolute, as it hovers before metaphysics, would be the non-identical 
that refuses to emerge until the compulsions of identity has dissolved. Without 
a thesis of identity, dialectics is not the whole; but neither will it be a cardinal 
sin to depart from it in a dialectical step .... It lies in the definition of negative 
dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. 73 
Thus, "Auschwitz" stands "alone", unamenable to integration within speculative 
dialectics, but, nonetheless is "included" within the system of negative dialectics as 
that which can never be negated. Simon Jarvis summarises this point with his 
characteristic clarity 
Hence Adorno's insistence that dialectical thinking relies on an undialectical 
element precisely in order to remain dialectical. Adorno, then, asks how the 
dialectical experience of thought is possible. It is made possible by that which 
it cannot exhaustively think, the non-identical. 74 
Lyotard's critique of Negative Dialectics in general, and its implications for the event 
of "Auschwitz" in particular, is not carried out so as to "save" dialectics. On the 
contrary, it is to show that the "phrase-event" that is "Auschwitz" is incapable of 
being integrated or "chained" within any philosophical discourse or meta-narrative of 
a "philosophy of history" that is dialectical in nature, be it speculative or negative. ' 
Lyotard argues that any dialectical treatment of "Auschwitz" can only give rise to a 
result or resultat - as a "moment" in the dialectical unfolding of history. To permit 
73 Negative Dialectics p. 406 
74 Simon Jarvis, opp. cit. p. 173 
75 Lyotard also questions "debates" about "Auschwitz" to be included in the "dialekitkc" of Aristotle. 
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such a result would undermine Lyotard's thesis that "Auschwitz" cannot only not be 
known "in itself', but also that it cannot be (re)presented in the discourses of thought.. 
Lyotard's general thesis is provided in a nutshell by Lyotard himself in a small 
passage from his article Europe, the Jetios, and the Book 
My claim is that the Jews represent something that Europe does not want to or 
cannot know anything about. Even when they are dead, it abolishes their 
memory and refuses them burial in its land. All of this takes place in the 
unconscious and has no right to speak. When the deed is done in full daylight, 
Europe is seized for an instant by the horror and the terror of confronting its 
oivn desire. [1990b; 159 emphasis in the original] 
At the outset we can present Lyotard's response in a schematic way. Lyotard's 
contribution to questions of antisemitism and the Jews turns upon a re-focusing of the 
way these issues are usually approached. Rather than understanding them politically 
he transforms them into questions of ethics. The ethical escapes phrasing, even the 
possibility of phrasing, according to the tradition of Western political praxis. Indeed, 
for Lyotard, politics can be defined precisely as the attempt to silence and forget the 
ethical. This point can be expressed as the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy 
with "Europe" representing the former, and the Jews the latter. It follows, therefore, 
that since Europe believes it has successfully overcome any form of dependency, of 
heteronomy, no place or "genre of discourse" is left accessible to the ethical. It is this 
situation that makes the ethical, and its representatives, the Jews, the Other of Europe. 
Lyotard argues that despite all proclamations to the contrary, Europe's attempt to deny 
the ethical is always doomed to failure. The ethical remains deep in its unconscious. 
As such, the disconcerting feeling that something is not quite right is often present as 
an unlocatable anxiety which, every now and then, gives rise to an obsessive attempt 
to rid itself of those who appear to personify the limits of its own putative success. 
The holocaust is one such episode, yet, since it was a further attempt to extinguish the 
ethical, it too took place beyond the sphere of the political. Lyotard explains this point 
as follows: 
The solution was to be final: the final answer to the "Jewish" question. It 
was necessary to carry it right up to its conclusion, to "terminate" the 
interminable. And thus to "terminate" the term itself. It had to be a 
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perfect crime, one would plead not guilty, certain of the lack of proofs. 
This is a "politics" of absolute forgetting, forgotten. Absurd, since its 
zeal, its very desperation distinguishes it as extrapolitical. Obviously, a 
"politics" of extermination exceeds politics. It is not negotiated on a 
scene. This obstinacy to exterminate to the very end, because it cannot be 
understood politically, already indicates that we are dealing with 
something else, with the Other. [1988; 25] 
Having given a brief overview of Lyotard's answer to his own question as to why the 
holocaust, antisemitism and the Jews remain beyond, or "exceed" politics, and come 
to be the Other, it is now necessary to examine the argument in more detail. The 
essential point for Lyotard is that the political and the ethical, autonomy and 
heteronomy, Europe and the Jews cannot be understood in terms of a relationship, 
since the concept of a relation implies that the "phrase" of the one can be linked to the 
other. It is exactly this linking that Lyotard claims is not possible. It is in this way, 
therefore, that Lyotard's thought on these issues attempts to break free of any 
dialectical (i. e. relational) understanding between modernity and antisemitism. 
Lyotard argues that the political aim of emancipation has always involved the attempt 
at autonomy, the attempt to be free of any dependence upon an Other; the attempt to 
free oneself from the ethical. 
The Christian Churches had introduced the motif of fraternity. The French 
Revolution extended it, by turning it on its head. We are brothers, not as sons of 
God but as free and equal citizens. It is not an Other who gives us the law. It is 
our civic community that does, that obliges, prohibits, pen-nits. That is called 
emancipation from the Other, and autonomy. Our law opens citizenship to every 
individual, conditional on respect for republican principles. [1993; 161-162] 
In this way, Lyotard explains how this discourse of political praxis premised upon the 
related concepts of rights, equality and the rule of law comes to be defined solely in 
terms of its (final) overcoming of heteronomy, of being in debt to an Other. In this 
discourse only humanity occupies the place of the legislator. 
Similarly, in what Lyotard refers to as the "narratives" of modernity, "man" 
emancipates, seeks his autonomy from any other, through recognising and naming 
himself as the author of "his" own creation. Moreover, because western political 
consciousness is premised upon this recognition, any attempt at representing the other 
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results in that other becoming assimilated to the one seeking to represent it.. Thus; it 
becomes no different from the consciousness that inaugurates the attempt. As it is a 
consciousness that recognises itself as autonomous and self-standing, it will represent 
the other in the same way. It will name the other in the same way that it names itself, 
and attribute to it the same qualities. Consequently, the other will cease to have any 
power over the inaugurator and the relationship of asymmetry and heteronomy will be 
destroyed. As with all relations between autonomous individuals, the possibility of the 
debt owed to the other can be, and will be, cancelled. Humanity will be emancipated 
from the Other and the ethical - heteronomy will be evaded or forgotten. 
Yet, this attempt at emancipation and autonomy cannot but fail. It fails because what is 
forgotten - the ethical - does not, for the mere fact of being forgotten, cease to exist. 
Rather, it is repressed and, as such, remains beyond the notice of consciousness. Yet, 
even though buried within the realms of the unconscious, it nonetheless makes itself felt 
within the realm of consciousness. Consciousness occasionally and for no apparent 
reason feels itself assailed from the outside, even though the real location of the 
disturbance is within its own depths. Lyotard explains this point in the following way: 
This sudden feeling is as good as a testimony, through its unsettling strangeness, 
which "from the exterior" lies in reserve in the interior, hidden away and from 
where it can on occasion depart to return from the outside to assail the mind as if 
it were issued not from it but from the incidental situation. [1988; 12-13] 
It is through this process that the autonomy which believes itself to be the victor will 
always remain alert to the stirrings of its own unconscious connection with heteronomy, 
the ethical. Because it cannot be ordered through consciousness, the unconscious affect 
will appear suddenly, as if it came from nowhere, as a bolt out of the blue. Believing it 
has emancipated itself the ethical will suddenly, unexpectedly, be seized by an "anxiety" 
which it cannot place. Yet, this "Forgotten", itself forgotten and buried within the 
unconscious, is continually present as a lack, or lapsus, as an absence, within 
consciousness. As a result, consciousness will continually respond to an unconscious 
desire to be rid of that which it senses, but does not know and which disrupts its search 
for "true" autonomy, It is in this way that Lyotard explains how it is that the ethical - 
heteronomy- remains, but remains in excess of the political - autonomy - and acts as a 
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constant disturbance. Thus, the ethical remains simultaneously as that which is both 
f "excluded" and "included". 
The question that remains, of course, is why this conflict, which Lyotard locates within 
the heart of the political praxis of European modernity, should affect the Jews as the 
Jews and give rise to antisemitism and the holocaust? In answering this question,. 
Lyotard eschews any recourse to the "scapegoat" theory. Rather, he identifies something 
he believes is distinctive about the Jews that brings upon them the obsessive wrath of 
the West. The Jews, Lyotard claims, are the representatives of the ethical that can never 
be extinguished and remain as the constant challenge and reminder of the limits of 
European political praxis. It is the Jews, in other words, who in the face of claims of 
autonomy stand out as the intimation of what the political forgets: one is always in debt 
to the Other, that lieteronomy can never truly be done away with. 
To explain why the Jews come to "represent something that Europe does not leant to 
or cannot know anything about" [1993; 159] Lyotard draws references and allusions 
from the body of works of Kant, Freud and Levinas. 
In particular Lyotard focuses upon the Jews' constitution as Jews. He argues that the 
Jews were constituted as the Jews through 
a promise and an alliance that are not the contract and the pact, a promise 
made to a people who did not want it and had no need of it, an alliance that has 
not been negotiated, that goes against the people's interests, of which it knows 
itself unworthy. And so this people, an old communal apparatus already well- 
to-do, hypothetically, with intact defence mechanisms and dynamic, economic, 
linguistic regulations without which it would not be a people, this simple 
people taken hostage by a voice that does not tell it anything, save that it (this 
voice) is, and that all representation and naming of it are forbidden, and that it, 
this people, only needs to listen to its tone, to be obedient to a timbre. [1988; 
21] 
Central to Lyotard's interpretation of this origin is that this Call was an event so 
traumatic that it could not be registered within consciousness but which nonetheless 
remained buried within the unconscious. Forbidden to be represented, the Other (the 
Voice) remains beyond and unknown to consciousness. Never able to be recognised, 
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known or named it lingers as a feeling that exceeds all knowledge and language.. Lyotard 
argues that the purpose of the Jews' "Book" (in which this origin is recounted) is, 
therefore, not to represent the Other, through which the debt and obligation to the Other 
is cancelled, but rather is constantly to remind the Jews that they have "forgotten the 
Forgotten". As a consequence, the Jews are eternally reminded of this debt to the Other. 
Thus, the Jews are, 
[f]orgetting souls, like all souls, but to whom the Forgotten never ceases 
to return to claim its due. The Forgotten is not to be remembered for 
what it has been and what it is, because it has not been anything and is 
nothing, but must be remembered as something that never ceases to be 
forgotten. And this something is not a concept or a representation, but a 
"fact", a factum (Kant Critique of Practical Reason, A56): namely that 
one is obligated before the Law, in debt. [1988; 3] 
Lyotard suggests that the Jews are unable to work through the trauma of their origins 
because of the prohibition of representing the Other that called them into existence. 
Consequently, the Jews are unable free themselves from their obligation, their debt - 
their heteronomy - and embark on the project of emancipation and autonomy. They are, 
therefore, the very personification or embodiment of the ethical, and, as such, are the 
Other of modem political praxis. 
Thus it is that the Jews cannot manage to find their place in the systems by 
which thought is represented in the politics and social practices of the European 
Nest. They cannot form a "nation" in the medieval sense, nor a people in the 
modem sense. The Law forbids them to acquire the communitarian status of an 
ethnic group. Their relation to the Event of the Covenant and the Promise is a 
relation of dependence, not a relation to a land and a history but a relation to the 
letters of a book and to a paradoxical temporality. [ 1993 143] 
The Jews, therefore, exist "within" Europe in the same manner as does the ethical itself. 
They exist as the "absent-present" that exceeds the political but that remains deeply 
entrenched within the unconscious. Their "presence" is registered within Europe's 
consciousness as a challenge and limit to its self-proclaimed autonomy. 
`[T]he jews" are within the "spirit" of the Occident that is so preoccupied with 
foundational thinking, what resists this spirit; within its will, the will to want, 
what gets in the way of this will; within its accomplishments, projects and 
progress, what never ceases to reopen the wound of the unaccomplished. "The 
jews" are the irremissible in the West's movement of remission and pardon. 
They are what cannot be domesticated in the obsession to dominate, in the 
compulsion to control domain, in the passion for empire, recurrent ever since 
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Hellenistic Greece and Christian Rome. "The jews", never at home wherever 
they are, cannot be integrated, converted, or expelled. [1988; 22] 
It is in this way and for these reasons that the "conflict" between the political and the 
ethical, autonomy and heteronomy, turns into a conflict that cannot but involve the Jews 
and inevitably becomes antisemitism. Indeed, Lyotard argues that antisemitism is 
precisely this antagonist encounter. 
Anti-Semitism is one of the means of the apparatus of its culture to bind and 
represent as much as possible - to protect against - the originary terror, actively 
to forget. it. It is the defensive side of its attack mechanisms - Greek science, 
Roman law and politics, Christian spirituality, and the Enlightenment, the 
underside of knowledge, of having, of wanting, of hope. One converts the Jews 
in the Middle Ages, they resist by mental restriction. One expels them during the 
classical age, they return. One integrates them in the modern era, they persist in 
their difference. One exterminates them in the twentieth century. [1988; 23] 
At this point, Lyotard's thesis comes to resemble "eternal antisemitism". Because 
Lyotard implies that all (European) post-Judaic religious and political movements have 
sought emancipation and autonomy (in the sense of closing the debt to the (originating) 
Other) and it follows that those who are aware that the debt has not been cancelled will 
remain as a thorn in their side. In this account, antisemitism is detached from any 
specific relationship to modernity76 even while Lyotard remains aware that the holocaust 
arose within the context of a specific historical period characterised by a specific form of 
political praxis. This context he terms as "republicanism"; that of the modern 
emancipated political nation-state premised upon the rule of law, equality and rights. 
Lyotard's claim that antisemitism - the desire to be rid of the ethical - occurs in the 
unconscious of Europe, that is, in a realm that exceeds politics, means that antisemitism 
need not be part of any political project. Indeed, this is precisely the situation within the 
modern political nation-state, where tolerance and assimilation appear to deny the space 
for Jews as Jews or the possibility of antisemitism. As Lyotard states, 
Our law opens citizenship to every individual, conditional on respect for 
republican principles. The Jews are allowed in like anyone else. This is called 
assimilation. [1993; 161] 
76 Modernity, of course is usually taken to mean the period covering the last two hundred years, 
However, this periodisation is equally a matter of some debate. 
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However, Lyotard echoes Hannah Arendt's observation, but for entirely different 
reasons, that for the Jews, assimilation means assimilating antisemitism [1988; 22]. For 
Lyotard this is the case because, as we have discussed, political emancipation is 
precisely the denial of the ethical, the denial of the very premise that constitutes the Jews 
as the Jews. Perhaps more importantly, assimilation as understood in its political and 
legal sense takes place only at the level of appearances, at the level of consciousness. At. 
the level of the unconscious, antisemitism still abounds. 
What then can a "French or German citizen of Israelite profession" be - 
above all if he is an officer like Dreyfus or a head of government like 
Blum? In the European unconscious, it is recognised that his debt to the 
Other will prevail over his duties to the others, to the national 
community. And that he is bound to be a potential traitor. Unless he 
forgets himself as Jew. This is the great temptation for the "assimilated" 
themselves. The "final solution" will come as a monstrous reminder to 
them that they are always, even despite themselves, witnesses to 
something about which Europe wants to know nothing. [19993; 161] 
Political assimilation, then, appears in some senses to be a purely cosmetic measure. 
Underneath it, in the realm of the unconscious, the conflict with the ethical will continue 
unabated and the superficiality of republican political universalism will collapse. And, 
as I have indicated, it is in this realm that Lyotard locates the mass murders of the Nazi 
regime, a realm of which Europe is unaware; a realm that exceeds thought. 
Despite his insistence on the absence of relationships between "modernity' and 
antisemitism Lyotard, at this point in his argument, appears to have re-formulated the 
conclusion reached by Adorno in Negative Dialectics; that antisemitism and the 
holocaust represent the limit and boundary of thought. However, Lyotard is keen to 
avoid such a conclusion.. 
His argument against Adorno's idea of the complete negativity of "Auschwitz" is two- 
fold. His first point is that despite Adorno's claim that "Auschwitz" represents the limits 
of thought, s one can know something about "it", even if what is known is its own 
irreconcilable negativity. Even this negativity would make of "Auschwitz" a resultat -a 
moment in the unfolding of dialectical thought - and so be able to be "phrased", to be 
brought into the realm of thought, within a genre of discourse. Lyotard cites as an 
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example of this "inclusion" Adorno's expression "After Auschwitz". For Lyotard, the 
use of such temporality implies that "Auschwitz" can be located, placed or "phrased" 
through and within the categories of the mind, of thought - that it becomes amenable to 
consciousness as experience. Yet, as I have stressed, this is precisely the type of 
reasoning that Lyotard eschews and claims cannot be applicable to antisemitism and the 
holocaust. 
Secondly, Lyotard argues that if "Auschwitz" is the negation of speculative dialectics 
that Adorno claims it to be, then the "result" (a term Lyotard has questioned) would be 
unmitigated nihilism. In a detailed and complex argument77 Lyotard questions 
Adorno's claim and argues that that "in making the name "Auschwitz" a model for and 
within negative dialectics, Adorno suggests that what meets its end there is merely 
affirmative dialectics". This counter-claim rests, Lyotard notes, on the contradictory 
manner in which Hegel has included such attempts within his own works on 
speculative dialectics through his own distinction between positive or affirmative 
dialectics and negative dialectics. 
This opposition is a trace, the scar of a wound in speculative discourse, a 
wound for which that discourse is also the mending. This wound is not an 
accidental one, it is absolutely philosophical. [1983; 90] 
Lyotard's reading of this point implies the correlation between the negative aspects of 
dialectics and "the ancient kind" of scepticism; and it is in Hegel's utilisation of 
scepticism that Lyotard detects a contradictory attitude. He notes that, on the one 
hand, Hegel understood it as "the free aspect of every philosophy" and itself part of 
affirmative speculative dialectics. On the other hand, Hegel also understands 
scepticism as an nihilistic abstraction through which all "determinations" are 
"disintegrated". It is this sense that 
[s]cepticism always sees in the result only pure nothingness, and abstracts 
from the fact that this nothing is determinate, is the nothing of that out of 
which it comes as a result. 78 
By presenting negative dialectics as scepticism which sees in the result -"Auschwitz" - 
a nothingness that is devoid of "determination", the consequence is that only 
" See: The Dlfferend and the sectioned titled Resultat 
78 Hegel; Phenomenology of the Mind. p. 137, quoted in Lyotard, p. 91 
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nothingness results. Whereas speculative dialectic "make this distressing negativity 
f 
work for the production of an affirmation", 
"Auschwitz" [as] a model of negative dialectics... will have awakened the 
despair of nihilism and it will be necessary "after Auschwitz" for thought to 
consume its determinations like a cow its fodder or a tiger its prey, that is, with 
no result. In the sty or the lair that the West will have become, only that which 
follows upon this consumption will be found, waste, matter, shit .... We wanted 
the progress of the mind, we got its shit. [1983; 91] 
Conversely, Lyotard argues that what emerges from the inability of thought to 
comprehend the holocaust and antisemitism is a silence, not the silence reflective of a 
void, of a nothingness, but rather a silence that "speaks". For Lyotard, this silence is not 
the referent of a "nothing" in the sense of not being there, but rather that "something" 
is, which is inexpressible, un(re)presentable, but present as a feeling. It is a feeling can 
only be intimated or pointed toward and cannot be the "thing itself" [1983; 57]. 
In presenting his thesis in this way, Lyotard is able to maintain his claim that the 
antisemitism and holocaust within modernity can be explained without recourse to any 
notion of dialectical relationship. For Lyotard, antisemitism and the holocaust are 
neither the antithesis of modernity, of a system of social relations premised upon law, 
rights and equality, nor its logical conclusion. Rather, they are its Other. 
Thus, Europe could forget these events so quickly and so easily, because it never knew 
about them in the first place. Europeans did not know what was happening, because 
what was happening exceeded the realm of the political. Concerned as these events are 
with the ethical, they are the Other of the political and so cannot be located or "phrased" 
within the discourses that relate to that realm; "language games" that have no place for 
what is outside them. Taking place in the realm of the unconscious, they remain 
unknown and unknowable to consciousness. They cannot but escape the realm of 
thought and knowledge, but reach us only in the silence of a feeling. It is to this feeling 
that Lyotard's writing testifies. 
Several questions arise throughout Lyotard's analysis Lyotard is of course quite 
correct to identify the feeling of sheer incredulity when "reminded" about the 
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holocaust. He is, in my opinion, equally correct to reflect upon that feeling. However, 
it seems to me to be problematic when the theorising of reflections or feelings about 
antisemitism and the holocaust come to stand in for a theory of the events themselves. 
In many terrible situations we begin at a loss for words, but later seek to understand 
what has happened. Indeed, it is often only in understanding that mourning does not 
become melancholia. It seems to me that Lyotard's unwillingness to understand gives 
rise to several potential problems with his account of antisemitism and the holocaust. 
In many ways, Lyotard appears to make of the holocaust what the initial Call was to the 
Jews. Lyotard locates antisemitism and the holocaust outside the realm of 
consciousness, of thought, and of knowledge; that is, the same realm through which the 
initial constitution of the Jews occurred. Both the Jews and antisemitism are forgotten 
and not forgotten. Moreover, Lyotard's writing itself is aimed to make us remember that 
we have forgotten this forgotten, in a manner similar to that of the Jewish "book". The 
paradox of Lyotard's account is that in a manner similar to Adorno, but with different 
consequences, the holocaust, which is claimed to be unknowable, to be beyond 
(political) meaning, is endowed with an excess of (ethical) meaning. It becomes the 
most significant ethical event in over five thousand years. The "Judaizing" of the 
holocaust in this way is problematic. As Bauman points out, the holocaust and 
antisemitism is part of European history. To infer that it is "Jewish history" already 
assumes a division that has itself to be brought under critical scrutiny. 
Equally problematic is Lyotard's claim that the failures of Jewish emancipation are to be 
explained by the nature of the Jews themselves, that they are the personification of the 
ethical itself -a point reflected in Lyotard's notion that the Jews are the Other of 
modernity. Despite the philosemitism underpinning it, that heteronomy is "more" ethical 
that autonomy, it can appear that the antisernitic claim that the Jews are unfit for 
emancipation and autonomy because of some inherent aspect is, in a perverse way, 
legitimated by Lyotard's account. Consequently, the Jews of whom Lyotard speaks 
appear to be "the Jews" murdered by the Nazis. It appears, therefore, that the Yellow 
Star forced upon so many millions of individuals in some way spoke to a "truth" about 
the one wearing it. 
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Lyotard's attempt to understand antisemitism and the holocaust without reference to any 
notion of relationship (dialectical or otherwise) is also questionable. There is little doubt 
that he more than implies that emancipation and autonomy, especially in its modem 
form of rights and equality, can be said to give rise to the exclusion of "heteronomy", 
which is then resented by the emancipated themselves. Read in this way, Lyotard's 
account re-formulates Nietzsche's understanding of antisemites as a dialectic of rights 
and ressentiment. Yet, for Lyotard, such a conflict takes place in excess of, or beyond, 
the realm of consciousness, of the political. Through this shift of location, any 
equivocality attaching to rights and equality is lost and is replaced by a dismissal. Yet, 
as the political history of the holocaust and other events has shown (precisely the type of 
knowledge declared inappropriate by Lyotard) it was precisely the loss of rights that was 
the first step to murder. 79 
It also follows from this point that from Lyotard's perspective, the Jews really are of 
central significance to the question of "modernity". It is as if for Lyotard, the Jews are 
the markers or embodiment of the limits of modernity itself. In this way, the question of 
modernity and its relationship to antisemitism and the holocaust becomes the question 
of the Jews. It is a question, moreover, that we can never answer since as Lyotard 
argues, it is placed beyond the field of political and social praxis. Thus, by taking 
antisemitism and the holocaust, and only antisemitism and the holocaust, outside of 
history, human knowledge is deemed to be of no avail. In this way, antisemitism and the 
holocaust and the Jews come to represent the nemesis of the entirety of Western political 
and social praxis and the struggle for emancipation that has punctuated it. 
However, I would argue that, if anything, it is precisely antisemitism and the holocaust 
that cry out for understanding. Moreover, they require an understanding that recognises 
the social and political (secular? ) forces at play and, correspondingly does not represent 
the futility of any political pi-, axis of emancipation. It appears to me that after the 
holocaust that which is most in question or most at threat, is the emancipation thus far 
79 Sec: for example, The Origins of Totalitarianism. It is to be noted that in the recent barbarism in 
Kosova, those expelling the "Albanians" ensured that their passports be destroyed 
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achieved. It is for this reason that I have argued in this study that any explanation of the 
relationship between modernity and antisemitism should avoid an either/all approach - 
either the "modem" claim of rights and no antisemitism, or no rights and antisemitism; 
or the "postmodern" claim of no rights and no antisemitism or rights and antisemitism - 
and instead should concentrate upon the social and political equivocalities that give rise 
to both. 
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Conclusion 
The Ambivalence of Modernity - Antisemtism as the Search for Certainty 
When introducing this study, I noted that critical theories of antisemitism have in 
common a characterisation of antiserntism as a modern phenomenon. Each of the 
theorists I have discussed seeks to explain the emergence of antisemitism through a 
critique of modern political emancipation and the legal rights through which that 
emancipation. was concretised. Whilst the earlier theorists, such as Marx and 
Nietzsche explained antisemtism as emerging in a dialectical relationship with 
emancipation, later writers, such as Bauman and Lyotard saw emancipation itself, its 
nature and substance, as responsible. It is to this developmental trajectory that I shall 
now return, 
The earlier theorists, argue that antisemitism arises out of the spaces left by what they 
identify as the shortcomings of emancipation and rights. This "space" is said to arise 
from the nature of emancipation which gives rise to a society comprised of 
autonomous and equal rights-bearers whose social recognition rests upon their role as 
owners of private property. As a consequence, each individual is perceived as existing 
in isolation from others, whilst being involved in a struggle of all against all. 
Corresponding to this idea of abstract and equal individuals torn from themselves, 
others and nature, there is the sense of a loss of any form of communal existence or 
sense of hierarchy, which is replaced by a sense of uncertainty and insecurity, as if 
there is nothing solid on which to rest human existence. It is in the attempt to 
constitute what is absent or lost that antisemitism is said to arise -a world of 
naturally-constituted communities ordered according to immutable laws of nature in 
which everyone has a place and there is a place for everyone (with the Jews at the 
bottom). 
In the accounts of Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre, therefore, the phenomenon of 
antisemitism can be said to arise through the dialectic of rights and ressentiment, both 
of which are arise as a consequence of what these theorists take to be the limits of 
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modern political emancipation. In many ways, therefore, antisemitism arises as a way 
of compensating for the difficulties and anxieties that modern social existence 
generates. Yet, the point to note is that in these accounts, is the fact that antisemitism 
is understood as coming into existence through a relationship with emancipation. As 
such, a relationship of tension exists between them and although emancipation is held 
as the primary cause for the development of antisemitism, the two terms of the, 
dialectic are not conflated. 
The dialectic of rights and ressentiment is further evidenced by the fact that these 
early theorists adopt an ambivalent attitude to political emancipation. On the one 
hand, they identify the causes of antisemitism with the shortcomings of emancipation. 
Yet, it is equally the case that they stress the potentiality of antisemitism. In other 
words, whilst antisemitism may be one of the outcomes of the limits of emancipation, 
it is not necessarily the only possible outcome. Correspondingly, these thinkers also 
emphasise the positive or beneficial aspects of modern emancipation. Most noticeable 
is the idea that it brings with it a social and political form of universal freedom and 
equality; a manifestation out of which its actual concretisation, its substantiality, could 
arise. To paraphrase Marx, of whether equality or inequality, freedom or barbarity will 
reign, remains entirely open and undetermined. 
This ambivalence of emancipation is also reflected in the figure of the antisemite. In 
these early accounts, the question as to whether equality or inequality will arise is 
always mediated through the prism of human agency and responsibility. As is the 
nature of political emancipation itself, whether an individual will or will not become 
an antisemite is equally open to question. However, whilst these theorists offer 
reasons as to -why antisemitism is a possible option for an individual, they also say 
that without that individual action or agency, antisemtism could not materialise as a 
concrete praxis, at least to the extent that it closes all other social options, 
potentialities and possibilities. 
The question of individual responsibility is also important in these works 
conceptualising of the Jews. Both Marx and Sartre stress that there is nothing inherent 
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in the Jews that justifies the image the antisernite places upon them. Indeed, their main 
point is to move any account of antisemitism away from a discussion of an alleged 
Jewish nature or essence, and to shift it onto a critique of modern society. They seek 
to dissolve the issue of antisemitism with the aim of developing emancipation's 
potential for concrete and realisable freedom and equality. From this perspective, 
therefore, there is a basic assumption that the Jews are already part and parcel of the. 
modern social world and their challenge is with those who seek to exclude them as the 
"Other". In this way, these theorists throw down the gauntlet to the antisemites' claim 
that the "Jewish question" is the question of the modern period. 
It is for this reason that aspects of their accounts on antisemitism concentrate upon the 
ways that the antisemitic image of the Jews comes into being. In keeping with their 
basic idea that antisemitism arises as an attempt to compensate for the social 
conditions in which modern individuals find themselves, they argue that the 
antisemitic image of the Jews arises from the projection of these conditions onto the 
Jews as if they were inherent Jewish attributes. It is for this reason that the Jews 
appear to the antisemites as the embodiment of modernity itself. Thus, the Jews are 
presented variously as personifying the values of modernity such as reason and 
intellect, as the coldness and harshness of modern legal relations, or of transformers of 
the natural world (human and organic) into the nexus of money. 
Individual responsibility is less important when it comes to understand the role of the 
Jews. In presenting the image of the Jews, these accounts of antisemitism overlook the 
agency of the Jews themselves in the perpetuation of the categories of Jew and 
Gentile. Paradoxically, the development of antisemitism appears to take place without 
any Jewish agency so that the Jews as an entity appear to remain outside history, an 
accusation that these early accounts trace to the thought of antisemites.. 
A slightly different problem arises in the thought of Nietzsche, and on that becomes 
more significant in later accounts. In Nietzsche's discussion of antisemitism, he gives 
reasons for modern animosity against the Jews. He states that they come to represent 
the severe and austere morality of the rights-bearing individual engaged in the 
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constant activity of exchange. The problem is that it is not clear whether Nietzsche 
himself sees these as specifically Jewish traits which he believes can be found in the 
Old Testament. Thus, in Nietzsche's work, despite his evident distaste for antisemites, 
it can appear that the reason for the Jews' persecution lies within the "nature" of the 
Jews themselves. This is an issue to which I shall return. 
In the accounts of antisemitism written in the immediate aftermath of the holocaust80, 
the factors present in the earlier accounts undergo a change of emphasis. Most 
noticeable and significant amongst these modifications, is the manner in which the 
relationship of modern emancipation to the emergence of antisemitism is 
reformulated. The ambivalence and open-endedness of political emancipation is 
restricted and, as a consequence, its degeneration into antisemitism is explained in a 
more deterministic and structural manner. 
This more stringent critique is exemplified by Arendt and Adorno and Horkheimer. 
They understand political emancipation in its relationship to antisemitism arises by 
reference to factors that suggest that from its inception, emancipation is inverted from 
freedom into barbarity and equality into inequality. However, by explaining the 
relationship of political emancipation to antisemitism as an "inversion", these 
theorists maintain a distance between emancipation and antisemitism and, thereby, 
seek to account for that transition or transformation. Consequently, their accounts of 
emancipation still rely upon a mediating factor. For Adorno and Horkheirner it was 
emancipation's imbrication with social forms of domination tied to the specific 
demands and course of capitalist development that resulted in the emergence of 
antisemitism. For Arendt, it was the emancipation's entanglement within the 
contradictions of nation and state. 
This idea of a "space" between emancipation and antisemitism is reflected in their 
view that whilst the seeds of antisemitism are identified as existing within the 
A0 I have included the work of Jean-Paul Sartre in the earlier accounts because, although written in 
1944, and as explained in Chapter 4 theoretically it remains more similar to those of Marx and 
Nietzsche. than to Arendt and Adorno 
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structure of the bourgeois period, the period immediately following political 
emancipation, antisemitism only emerges in its final form as an element of a new 
social configuration: totalitarianism in the thought of Arendt, and Fascism, or late 
capitalism, for Adorno and Horkheimer. However, in seeking to establish the 
connection between these more general conditions and antisemitism, the latter appears 
as the lightning-rod for more fundamental and complex problems. As a consequence,. 
the reasons offered to explain antisemitism replicate these wider issues. In this way, 
the idea that the Jewish Question is of central significance first conies to the fore. 
That the flaws that they identify in political emancipation should give rise to 
antisemitism is explained by the fact that the Jews' position within the modern body 
politic was conditional and tenuous. Here, the earlier idea that it was antisernites who 
sought to exclude a group of people already integrated, is replaced with the idea that 
the Jews have always, to a certain extent, been excluded. Neither Arendt nor Adorno 
and Horkheimer, however, attempt to explain this exclusion by reference to innate 
characteristics of the Jews, but both must account for the way in which an empirical 
group of Jews was transformed into the antisemitically driven concept of "the Jews". 
Both accounts argue that the concept of "the Jews" arose because of the fact that from 
the beginning, Jews occupied an identifiable position in society because of the special 
services or functions they performed. Whilst the mere occupying of these positions 
gave rise to a general feeling of ressentiment against them by the remainder of the 
population, it was only when such services and functions were made superfluous by 
other social and political developments that the Jews themselves became perceived as 
"superfluous". As a consequence, both accounts argue that the entire population 
became antisemitic in the wake of the transformation to either totalitarianism or 
Fascism. 
This closing of the distance between emancipation and antisemitism is reflected in the 
lessening of significance of the figure of the antisemite. As I have just noted, both 
Arendt's and Adorno and I-lorkheimer's accounts of antisemitism imply that along 
with the transformation from bourgeois to later forms of existence, entire populations 
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became antisemitic. However, this transformation is explained as a result of deeper 
and wider social changes, so that the role of human agency and responsibility in 
adopting an antisemitic perspective, and acting on such a worldview, declines, which 
corresponds with a decline in the ambivalence and tension identified in the earlier 
accounts which left open the question as to whether freedom or barbarity would result. 
As a consequence of this development within critical theories of antisemitism, the. 
Jewish question comes to adopt a more central position in the critique of modernity 
itself; a position that in some ways mirrors antisernitic perspectives on the issue. 
In their accounts of the manner in which antisemitism arose both Arendt and Adorno 
and I-Iorkheimer stress that with the development of totalitarianism or Fascism 
antisemitism ceased to have reference to the particular circumstances of Jewish- 
Gentile relations. Yet, it is in their discussions of the precursor to this development 
that we can see the most significant differences between them. 
Hannah Arendt was insistent that what I have termed her "Genealogy" concentrate on 
the role the Jews themselves played in the development of antisemitism. She stresses 
both the political and social actions of the Jews that placed them in a tenuous and 
conditional relationship outside the modern body politic. She is equally concerned to 
trace the role that Jews played in the emergence of an idea of an innate or "natural" 
"Jewishness"; an idea that she sees as a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient for the 
perverse determination of the Nazis to exterminate each and every Jew. 
Conversely, in Adorno and Horkheimer's discussion of the way in which the concept 
of "the Jews" emerged, (flesh and blood) Jews disappear from the picture. In their 
place remains only their portrait as painted by antisemitism. The implication is that 
the hostile imagery of the Jews as embodying the failures of modernity remains 
unchallenged. Thus, both antisernitism and "the Jews" are endowed with a 
significance that transforms a phenomenon that arises as one aspect of the limits of 
political emancipation into the central question of the age. 
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In contradistinction to the earlier theorists who sought to dissolve or de-centre the 
Jewish question both this account and Arendt's, reformulate antisemitism and the 
Jews in terms of an increasing prominence. In this way, we begin to see the loss of 
critical distance between theories that seek to explain and challenge antisemitism and 
the assumptions of the phenomenon itself.. It is a loss, moreover, that becomes more 
apparent in the final body of work to be discussed. 
The last two works that I examined, those of Bauman and Lyotard respectively, can be 
grouped together under the heading of postmodern accounts of antisemitism. In these 
accounts, any space or distance between political emancipation and antisemitism is 
occluded. Their critique of political emancipation in its connection to antisemitism is 
so harsh that antisemitism comes to be read as inhering within its very substance and 
nature. As such, political emancipation becomes synonymous with the exclusion of 
the Jews. As a result, rights, as the medium through which emancipation was 
concretised, come to be represented as coercive instruments of dismissal and denial. 
Corresponding to this view of antisemitism, the holocaust is also read as an event 
inscribed within the substance of political emancipation. 
Bauman and Lyotard's work have in common the absence of human responsibility for 
the modern phenomenon of antisemitism. This point can be illustrated by the absence 
of the figure of the antisemite and their associated explanation of antisemtism as 
something which occurs beyond or "behind the backs" of the conscious activity of 
modern individuals. 
In denying and removing any tension or ambivalence within the praxis of political 
emancipation and its conflation with antisemitism, they collapse the concept of "the 
Jews" and the presentation of empirical Jews so that the Jews' exclusion from 
"modernity" comes to be attributed to the nature of Jews themselves. Thus, in 
Bauman's account, the Jews are perceived as the personification of ambivalence and 
difference, the very elements which give rise to antisemtism initially. Similarly, 
Lyotard's description of the Jews as the personification of "the ethical" reflects in 
themselves the reasons for their exclusion. In these ways, therefore, the Jews become 
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the carriers of the causes for their own destruction. Thus, in these accounts, the 
question as to how Jews came to be conceptualised as "the Jews" is redundant, since it 
is argued that they were never part of modern society initially. It is as if the "Yellow 
Star" pinned on their bodies appears to reflect the truth of their existence. 
It is, therefore, as a direct result of their explanations of antisemitism that Bauman and. 
Lyotard perceive both antisemitism and the Jews as the unqualified site of all the 
failures and anxieties of modernity. In this way, therefore, the phenomenon of 
antisemtism takes on almost eschatological qualities, as evidenced by Bauman's claim 
that the Jews themselves are the precursors of a superseding era of postmodernity. It is 
at this point that a loss of critical distance or symmetry between critical and anti- 
antisemitic theories and the phenomenon that is the object of investigation appears 
most fully; it appears in the idea that antisemtism and the Jews really are the index 
and markers for the failure of the "modern project". 
The paradox of this position is that it reproduces many of the assumptions of 
antisemitism that were identified and challenged in the earlier accounts discussed 
above. In both, for example, an individual's "identity" arises through membership of a 
given group. As a consequence, the most "legitimate" social composition is implies to 
be that which allows particularity to flourish unhindered and unmolested by any claim 
to universalism. Indeed, such universal goals, along with individual equality it 
contains is said to be doomed to failure and so can only be understood as the 
imposition of a false and manipulated order. 
What is perhaps most interesting, however, is the way in which these last accounts 
solidify, or fix, the relations and concepts that are used by critical theory to theorise 
the causes for the emergence and development of antisemitism. This methodology can 
be evidenced through the conflation of political emancipation and antisemtism, so that 
the one is read as the other. The ambivalence that earlier theorists had identified 
through their critique of political emancipation is countered by the idea that that 
political emancipation can only express itself through antisemitism. It is no longer a 
question of potentiality, but of certainly. 
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This notion of solidity is illustrated through the denial that the meaning of the Jews is 
in fact contested and contestable. Instead, "the Jews" come to be understood as fixed 
with a specifically "Jewish" attribute. As a result, the certainty so ardently sought for 
by antisemites to compensate for the anxieties brought about by an age in which 
"everything solid melts into air" [Marx 1848] is replicated. In these accounts of 
antisemitism, therefore, it is as though everything has its place, and there is a place for 
everything; modern emancipation dared to tamper with this spontaneous order and it 
was the Jews who paid the price. 
The characteristics of the postmodern theories of antisemitism were present in 
embryonic form in the earlier accounts of Arendt and Adorno and Horkheimer, but 
almost (although not entirely absent) from those of Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre. A 
possible reason for this transformation was the occurrence of the holocaust between 
the time of the first and second theoretical accounts. The scale, barbarity and horror of 
this event seems to have left its scar on the accounts of antisemitism that followed it 
and became the prism through which it was seen. As such, the gradual and increasing 
insistence on the centrality of antisemitism and the Jews as the defining aspect of 
modernity comes to mirror the traumatic and traumatising nature of this catastrophe. 
Without in any way seeking to diminish the hitherto unprecedented horror of the 
systematic and calculated murder of millions of individuals, it seems to me that the 
significance of the holocaust to later accounts of antisemitism is a product, not of the 
events themselves, but of its traumatic nature. It seems as if the magnitude of the 
holocaust gave rise to a theoretical pessimism and nihilism that appeared as the only 
way to acknowledge that such things could happen in the world. Even such a rigorous 
and sensitive thinker as Hannah Arendt appears at times to despair of a political 
answer to such a calamity. 81 However, it appears to me that the most productive way 
of confronting the trauma is through an attempt to understand it and to show it for 
what it was - as something meaningless. By placing upon it a significance and 
81 See her comments in Origins of Totalitarianism in which she has recourse to the teachings of 
Augustine as a possible way to live in a world in which "everything is possible". 
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meaning that, for many theorists after 1945, over-endows it, to the degree that for 
Bauman it marks the end of one era and the beginning of another, and for'Lyotard 
calls into question millennia of thought and takes on a meaning comparable to that of 
the call of God to the Jewish people, seems to me to give Nazism and antisemtism a 
(posthumous? ) victory. 
To overcome this trauma, it seems to me that critical theories of antisemtism need to 
re-evaluate the holocaust through a cautious and reflective return to earlier accounts of 
antisemtism. In explaining antisemtism through a critique of modern emancipation, 
critical theory needs to re-engage with the idea of the ambivalence and open- 
endedness of emancipation along with its inherent potential for either freedom or 
barbarity. In other words, critical theories of antisemitism need to re-connect with 
their earlier commitment to social and political emancipation. In this way, the 
holocaust comes not to be explained as an inevitability, but as a possible outcome that 
may arise when the uncertainty inherent within a praxis with the aim of universal 
human freedom and equality is destroyed in the name of a ressentiment that relies on a 
certainty founded on false and arbitrary assertions. 
In addition to this reconnection, critical theories of antisemitism must also focus upon 
opening up and interrogating the concepts upon which antisemitism relies. In the light 
of my criticisms of the initial accounts it is necessary that later theorists understand 
the manner in which those concepts arose, as well as the relationships between them 
and those people to whom they are made to apply. Moreover, they must do so 
through concentrating upon the thoughts and actions of all who are involved. In this 
way, for example, the concept of "the Jews" as a distinct entity can be seen as one 
attempt amongst many to impose upon an individual an "essential" or, at least, 
"determining" attribute that denies and restricts the reality of modern social existence. 
In this way, both the concept of "the Jews" and the antiserntism with which it is 
associated can be understood as one manifestation amongst many that seek to replace 
fragile equality with a certainty that is premised upon a hierarchical ladder of 
collective forms. 
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Correspondingly, theoretical accounts of antisemitism also must recognise that 
modern ambivalence and potentiality are not solely "external" phenomena but are 
locatable within social individuals themselves. Thus, the question of whether 
tendencies leading to freedom or to barbarity dominate at any given time is ultimately 
one of personal and social responsibility. Finally, these questions must be asked of all 
in society, regardless of which side they may or may not have been or be allocated by. 
those who attempt to build walls of sand, but who try to convince others of their 
impenetrability and solidity. 
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